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“As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are 
certain, they do not refer to reality.”
Albert Einstein (1879 to 1955) 
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Abstract 
The aviation sector is faced with a novel array of new airspace users including Urban Air Mobility 
(UAM) concepts, personal air mobility vehicles, reusable space launch vehicles, and Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS). Focusing on UAS, there is much effort being directed towards the 
development of safety regulations for this industry. National Aviation Authorities (NAA) have 
advocated the adoption of a risk-based approach to the development of regulations, whereby regulations 
are driven by the outcomes of a systematic process to assess and manage identified safety risks.  
 Central to a risk-based approach is the Safety Risk Management Process (SRMP). A review of 
relevant aviation safety policy, guidance and regulatory material found that aviation safety literature 
does not adequately address the uncertainty inherent to any SRMP. For example, when measuring risk, 
only the likelihood and severity are taken into consideration, with uncertainty generally not being 
mentioned. Where uncertainty is recognised, it is taken into consideration through the use of 
conservative worst-case assumptions. This can result in the imposition of overly stringent restrictions 
or worse, regulations that do not adequately mitigate safety risks. Subsequently, providing a more 
comprehensive treatment of uncertainty in the aviation SRMP is essential to the uptake of a risk-based 
approach to rule-making. Further, it follows that if assessments of performance can be uncertain, then 
these uncertainties also need to be accounted for in other NAA regulatory processes such as the 
regulatory compliance assessment and compliance finding processes. It was found that the current 
aviation compliance process does not provide an objective means for accounting for uncertainty. As a 
consequence, compliance assessments can be subjective and inconsistent, with regulators lacking the 
tools and processes to be able to make objective compliance findings on the basis of compliance risk. 
A means to enable NAA to account for uncertainty in regulatory compliance processes is needed. 
The overall aim of this thesis is to improve regulatory outcomes under the new paradigm of 
risk-based regulation, through providing a conceptual framework for the rational, transparent and 
systematic treatment of uncertainty in the risk assessment and regulatory decision-making processes. 
The thesis proposes the application of Bayesian methods and normative decision theory to the aviation 
safety regulatory process. System Safety Regulations (SSR), commonly referred to as “Part 1309” 
regulations, for UAS are used as a case study. It is posited that the general theoretical approach proposed 
in this thesis can improve the objectivity, consistency, and transparency of current aviation regulatory 
processes. The generalised approaches presented in this thesis enable the adoption of risk-based rule-
making for new aviation sectors and provides the theoretical basis for risk-based compliance; a 
paradigm shift in how aviation safety regulators approach risk-based regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Figure 1: Concept image of an unmanned aircraft operation over Melbourne City, Australia 
Image copyright © Achim Washington 
“Only those who will risk going too far can possibly find out how far it is possible to go” 
T.S. Eliot (1888-1965) 
Section §1.1 of this chapter provides a brief overview of the background, highlighting the importance 
of the research. Following this, the key research questions are clearly outlined in Section §1.2. Next, 
the aims and objectives (Section §1.3), scope (Section §1.4) and significance of the research (Section 
§1.5) are detailed in the individual sub sections. Section §1.6 then summarises the main research 
publications completed during this candidature, detailing: how they link to each other; how they address 
the overall research questions of the thesis;  and how they impact the overall objectives of the thesis. 
The novel contributions of each of the chapters are also summarised in this sub section.   
1.1. Background 
The aviation sector is faced with a wide variety of new airspace users including, Urban Air Mobility 
(UAM) concepts, personal air mobility vehicles, reusable space launch vehicles, and Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS). As with any new technology, there is risk associated with the operation of 
these systems. These emerging airspace users will differ to Conventionally Piloted Aircraft (CPA) not 
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only in relation to the technology and concepts of operation but also in the management of their 
associated risks. One area in particular where these systems differ is the uncertainty in their associated 
risks. This uncertainty arises due to a lack of operational data, experience and knowledge [1]. There are 
less data, experience and knowledge due to several factors including: the relative infancy of the systems, 
the restrictions imposed on their operations, and the rapid pace of technology development [2]. A 
systematic approach for managing these uncertainties within the aviation regulatory process is needed 
to ensure acceptable regulatory outcomes for the sector. 
1.1.1. Case Study - Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
The UAS industry is an area in the aviation sector that has received considerable amount of attention in 
recent years. Unlike CPA, UAS do not have a human pilot on board [3]. This unique characteristic 
allows for a considerable amount of diversity amongst these systems. In terms of size, UAS can range 
from micro (something that can fit in the palm of one’s hand) to large (something comparable to CPA). 
In terms of configuration, UAS can include fixed wing, multirotor, helicopter and hybrid configurations, 
to name a few. The list of applications for UAS is ever expanding, with UAS being used in both the 
civil and military sectors. Common civil applications include law enforcement, emergency rescue, 
environmental monitoring, crop dusting and aerial photography [4]. 
Perhaps the greatest non-technical challenge facing the UAS sector is the lack of a suitable 
regulatory framework governing the safety of their operations [5], [6]. Owing to the inherent differences 
that exist between CPA and UAS [7], it is widely acknowledged that the use of an “off-the-shelf” 
approach will not result in an effective airworthiness regulatory framework for UAS [6]. A “one-size-
fits-all” approach to the airworthiness of UAS will also prove to be problematic owing to the diversity 
that exists between these systems [6]. A new and comprehensive framework of safety regulations for 
UAS is required to fully realise the potential benefits of the sector [6], [8], [9]. 
The European Aviation Safety Authority (EASA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
and the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS) have recommended the 
adoption of a risk-based approach as a guiding principle in the development of regulations for UAS 
[10]–[15]. Under this principle, safety risk management (and its sub-processes) should drive the 
development of regulations, ensuring a clear traceability between the legislated requirement and the 
risks that are intended to be managed. The intended outcome is a framework of regulations and 
standards that has a defensible and objective basis in risk with the resulting regulatory requirements 
proportionate to the safety risks. A risk-based approach acknowledges that regulations are merely the 
embodiment of the outcomes of a risk management process [16], specifically: “they are legal 
requirements relating to how various stakeholders (e.g., UAS operators) should go about treating safety 
risks; requirements relating to the implementation of controls or measures to modify, mitigate, or 
otherwise reduce the risk”. 
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UAS provide an application case study to explore the practical utility of the extension of risk-
based regulatory practices. There are two primary safety hazards associated with UAS operations [16], 
[17]. These are:  
1) A collision or near collision between an Unmanned Aircraft (UA) and another aircraft (whether 
the other aircraft is in the air or on the ground);  
2) The impact of the UA, or its components, with people or structures situated on the ground. 
It is important here to note that while there are a number of secondary hazards associated with the top-
level primary hazard (e.g. ignition of fires, release of contaminants, collapse of buildings, etc.), the 
discussion provided will be limited to only the top-level primary hazards. Under a risk-based approach, 
a comprehensive and objective assessment of the risks associated with these two primary hazards forms 
the principal input to the development of new standards and regulations for the sector. For the purposes 
of this thesis, the risks associated with the latter of these two hazards are of principal interest.  
 The risks posed to people and property situated on the ground are largely managed through the 
development and promulgation of regulations that provide assurance in the airworthiness of the UAS 
[6]. When coupled with operational regulations (e.g., restrictions in terms of when and where UAS can 
operate), airworthiness regulations can more effectively manage the risks posed to people and property 
overflown [6]. Not all UAS types may be required to meet prescriptive codes of airworthiness 
requirements in order to be safe for operation (e.g., open category of UAS as defined in [18]). However, 
for those UAS operations that do, they will likely be required to show compliance to a system safety 
regulation equivalent to the regulations contained in sub-part 1309 to various civil airworthiness codes 
for CPA.  
Compliance with the System Safety Regulations (SSR)1 is thus a central component to the 
airworthiness of any aviation system. SSR supplement prescriptive requirements on the design and 
testing of an aviation system and are, in part, put in place “to ensure that an aircraft is capable of 
continued safe flight and landing following a failure or multiple failures of systems” [19]. The 
regulations can be applied to installed sub-systems or an aircraft system as a whole.  
There is ongoing debate on the setting of appropriate SSR for UAS [20]. Numerous 
specifications of SSR for UAS have been proposed by EASA [21], NATO [22] and JARUS [23], to 
name a few. As stated by the Australian Department of Defence [24]: 
“… The USAR.1309 AMC, for example, which is fundamental to the safety of a UAS, is 
unsurprisingly an area of evolution and disagreement. After all, manned aircraft Airworthiness Codes 
have evolved over many decades, based on extensive in-service experience and a relatively stable 
technology, whereas UAS currently exhibit neither of these attributes."  
                                                     
1 While not common, this acronym has been adopted for use throughout this thesis to refer to system safety 
regulations.  
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Regulators have already proposed the adoption of a risk-based approach for the regulation of 
the sector [10]–[15]. Under the risk-based approach, models that comprehensively capture the nature of 
the risks posed to people and property on the ground guide the development of airworthiness and 
operational regulations for UAS. A variety of Ground Risk Models (GRM)2 that analyse and capture 
these risks were identified in the literature. Of particular interest to this thesis is how these GRM account 
for uncertainty and its subsequent input to the rule-making process. 
1.2. Research Questions 
There are a wide variety of new airspace users in the aviation sector. These users are characterised by 
a lack of operational data, experience, and knowledge arising due to: 1) the relative infancy of the 
technology, 2) restrictions imposed on their operations, 3) the rapid pace of technology development, 
and 4) use of commercial-off-the-shelf components [1]. A uniform set of regulations tailored to their 
operations are required. 
Focusing on UAS, regulatory bodies such as FAA, EASA and JARUS have recently 
recommended the adoption of a risk-based approach for the development of regulations [10]–[15], 
central to which is the Safety Risk Management Process (SRMP)3. Based on a review of relevant 
aviation safety policy, guidance and regulatory material (e.g. [25]–[30]) it was found that aviation safety 
literature does not adequately address the uncertainty associated with the SRMP. Measures of risk are 
limited to only likelihood and severity, with uncertainty generally not taken into consideration. Where 
uncertainty is recognised, conservative worst-case assumptions are used to address them. This can result 
in the imposition of overly stringent restrictions on systems where there is uncertainty in the safety risk, 
something characteristic of new airspace users such as UAS. Subsequently, providing a more 
comprehensive treatment of uncertainty in the aviation SRMP is essential to the uptake of a risk-based 
approach to rule-making. This leads to the first research question addressed in this thesis: 
1. What are the uncertainties associated with the safety risk assessment process and how are 
they addressed within the current aviation safety risk management and regulatory 
development processes? 
To answer this question, it is necessary to identify the general types of uncertainty and how they can be 
objectively represented in risk assessment processes. In the context of the case study application, GRMs 
are reviewed to determine the current state-of-the-art, the components that go into defining these 
models, and the sources and levels of uncertainty associated with them.  It is then important to determine 
                                                     
2 Alternate terms such as Risk Models (RM) have also been used in the literature. To maintain consistency the 
term GRM has been adopted for use throughout this thesis.  
3 Alternate terms such as Risk Management Process (RMP) have also been used in the literature. To maintain 
consistency the term SRMP has been adopted for use throughout this thesis. 
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how these sources of uncertainty can be incorporated into existing GRM and how best to represent them 
to the decision makers for input to downstream regulatory processes (i.e., compliance assessment and 
compliance finding). This research question is further divided into the sub-questions: 
1.1. What are sources of uncertainty inherent in safety risk assessment processes and how are they 
being characterised and represented in existing models?  
1.2. How can the identified sources of uncertainty be incorporated into existing aviation safety 
risk management and regulatory development processes?  
1.3. How should the risk and uncertainty measures obtained from the regulatory safety risk 
assessment processes be represented to decision makers and which of these measures best 
supports regulatory decision making? 
Answering the above research question provides regulators with an objective understanding of 
the uncertainty in safety risk assessments. Under a risk-based regulatory regime, these assessments 
underpin National Aviation Authorities (NAA) rule-making and compliance processes. Looking at the 
compliance processes, if assessments of performance are uncertain, then these uncertainties are also 
inherent in the assessments required to show compliance to regulations. The current aviation 
compliance process does not provide an objective means for accounting for uncertainty. As a 
consequence, compliance assessments can be subjective and inconsistent, with regulators lacking the 
tools and processes to be able to make objective compliance findings on the basis of compliance risk. 
The existing notion of risk-based regulation has only been applied to one part of the overall 
regulatory process, that of developing regulations (rule-making) [25]–[28], [31], [32]. Specifically, how 
to develop and apply a suitable code of requirements that have traceability to, and are proportionate 
with, the degree of operational risk posed by a given aircraft system or sub-system. The risk-based 
principles can also be applied to other regulatory processes including compliance assessment and 
compliance finding as illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Components of Risk-based Regulation 
The challenge explored in this thesis is how to apply the general principles of risk-based 
regulation to include the regulatory processes of compliance assessment and compliance finding. Such 
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an extension is necessary to account for the uncertainty inherent in the state of compliance of an aviation 
system against a specific requirement. Thus, the second question of this thesis is: 
2. How can uncertainty associated with the SRMP be accounted for in existing aviation rule-
making and compliance processes? 
Answering this question requires an understanding of the fundamental concepts of risk, uncertainty and 
decision making, and their application within aviation risk and regulatory processes. This leads to the 
following sub-questions: 
2.1. What are the uncertainties and how are they currently managed in the aviation safety 
compliance assessment and compliance finding processes? 
2.2. How can the uncertainties in these processes be represented and accounted for to support more 
objective and consistent regulatory outcomes? 
2.3. What are some of the potential benefits of the extended risk-based philosophy in the aviation 
sector? 
1.3. Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to improve regulatory outcomes under the new paradigm of risk-based 
regulation, through providing a conceptual framework for the rational, transparent and systematic 
treatment of uncertainty in the risk assessment and regulatory decision-making process. The objectives 
of this thesis are as follows: 
1. To identify and characterise the various sources of uncertainty inherent in risk assessment and 
decision-making processes and determine how this is currently managed, with application to 
the aviation regulatory framework; 
2. Drawing on contemporary risk and uncertainty theory, to develop a new compliance assessment 
and compliance finding decision-making process that incorporates the varying sources of 
uncertainty inherent in them; 
3. To apply the above to the regulation of UAS, in particular, the system safety “Part 1309” 
regulations. 
It is posited that the framework proposed in this thesis improves the objectivity, consistency, 
and transparency of regulatory processes; a paradigm shift in how aviation safety regulators approach 
risk-based regulation. This research broadens the current understanding of risk-based regulation in the 
aviation sector. Under the proposed framework, risk-based regulation considers the risks associated 
with: 1) the specification of regulations or requirements (rule-making), 2) the processes of assessment 
against regulations or requirements (compliance assessment), and 3) the decision-making process used 
to judge compliance (compliance finding). 
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1.4. Scope 
The general theoretical concepts and frameworks developed in this thesis are applicable to any 
regulatory process, however, the scope of application in this thesis is limited to airworthiness 
regulations (and in particular, SSR) for UAS. Risk models and regulations relating to the operation of 
UAS in unsegregated airspace are not considered. Whilst the case study of UAS is used in this thesis, 
it must be emphasised that this approach can be applied more broadly to any aviation regulation or 
compliance assessment process. 
1.5. Significance of Research 
In the presence of uncertainty, regulatory authorities tend to adopt a "precautionary approach" [10]–
[15] applying overly conservative restrictions that can significantly inhibit UAS operations. Current 
aviation risk assessment and risk management practices do not provide regulatory authorities with a 
systematic process for managing uncertainty. As a result, regulatory processes, which are based on 
outcomes of the SRMP (i.e., rule-making, compliance assessment and compliance finding) can be 
subjective. On successful completion of this thesis, a novel approach for showing compliance to the 
SSR will be provided through the development of a new decision-making framework that is capable of 
taking varying sources of risk and uncertainty into consideration. This will allow for a more rational, 
transparent and systematic treatment of uncertainty in the risk assessment and regulatory decision-
making process and in turn, outcome regulations that are more proportionate to the risks they aim to 
address.  
The outcomes of this research can be potentially employed by NAA worldwide. The extension 
of the risk-based approach to better account for uncertainty in regulatory processes can be applied to 
any aviation sector. Thus, this research has the potential to not only help shape regulations for the UAS 
sector but other aviation sectors in the future. This includes UAM concepts, personal air mobility 
vehicles and reusable space launch vehicles, to name a few. These industries are similar to the UAS 
industry as they typically have low data and high uncertainty associated with them.  
1.6. Account of Research Progress 
The body of this thesis (Chapter 3 through to Chapter 7) comprises of individual journal and conference 
papers that were authored during the PhD candidature. A list of publications that directly relate to the 
overall aims and objectives of this thesis has been provided in Table 1 of Section §1.6.1. The linkage 
between these publications (Section §1.6.2) provides an overall outline of this thesis and allows the 
reader to get a clear understanding of how, when viewed in conjunction with each other, these papers 
address the research questions, aims and objectives of this thesis. All these papers are included “as 
published” without editing. Additional papers were also co-authored during this period; however they 
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have not been included in the main body of the thesis as they do not directly relate to the overall 
objectives of this thesis.  
1.6.1. List of Publications 
The body of this thesis comprises of five publications (three journal publications and two full paper 
peer reviewed conference publications). Each of these papers have already been published. The 
individual papers form the chapters of this thesis as indicated in Table 1. The publication details are 
also provided in Table 1. The order in which these papers are presented is based on how they relate to 
the research questions and not the order in which they were published. This relationship is described in 
Section§1.6.2. A complete list of all the journal papers, conference papers, conference presentations 
and technical presentations that are submitted in support of this thesis are included in Appendix A.  
Table 1: List of publications 
Chapter 3  
Title of Paper A Review of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Ground Risk Models 
Authors Achim Washington, Reece Clothier, Jose Silva 
Journal Progress in Aerospace Sciences 
Status Published 
Impact Factor 6.814 
Link https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0376042117301392  
Chapter 4  
Title of Paper 
A Bayesian Approach to System Safety Assessment and Compliance Assessment for Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems 
Authors Achim Washington, Reece Clothier, Brendan Williams 
Journal Journal of Air Transport Management 
Status Published 
Impact Factor 2.412 
Link https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0969699716304768  
Chapter 5  
Title of Paper Managing Uncertainty in the System Safety Assessment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Authors Achim Washington, Reece Clothier, Brendan Williams, Jose Silva 
Conference  
17th Australian International Aerospace Congress (AIAC 17), Melbourne, Australia, 27th and 28th 
February, 2017 
Status Published in proceedings (full paper peer reviewed) 
Link https://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;res=IELENG;dn=739801934595508  
Chapter 6  
Title of Paper 
Adoption of a Bayesian Belief Network for the System Safety Assessment of Remotely Piloted 
Aircraft Systems 
Authors 
Achim Washington, Reece Clothier, Natasha Neogi, Jose Silva, Kelly Hayhurst, Brendan 
Williams 
Journal Safety Science 
Status Published 
Impact Factor 3.619 
Link https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925753518312670  
Chapter 7  
Title of Paper 
Managing Uncertainty in Unmanned Aircraft System Safety Performance Requirements 
Compliance Process 
Authors Achim Washington, Reece Clothier, Jose Silva 
Conference 
International Conference on Unmanned Aircraft Systems (ICUAS 2018, Amsterdam), 10th and 
11th May, 2018 
Status Published in proceedings (full paper peer reviewed) 
Link 
https://waset.org/publications/10008962/managing-uncertainty-in-unmanned-aircraft-system-
safety-performance-requirements-compliance-process  
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1.6.2. Linkage Between Publications and Thesis Outline 
The aviation sector is rapidly evolving with the introduction of a number of new and novel airspace 
users such as UAS. As with any new technology, there is risk and uncertainty associated with the 
operation of these systems. In order to ensure that these systems are able to operate alongside their 
manned counterparts, it is imperative to take this risk and uncertainty into consideration. That brings us 
to the concept of risk-based regulation.  
Achieving risk-based regulation warrants consideration of the uncertainties inherent to the risk 
assessment and decision-making processes that underpin the regulatory processes of: 1) rule-making, 
2) compliance assessment, and 3) compliance finding. The existing notion of risk-based regulation of 
an aviation sector, however, only addresses the first of these processes. This research broadens the 
current understanding of risk-based regulation in the aviation sector to include the risks (i.e. uncertainty 
and consequence severities) associated with the compliance assessment and compliance finding 
regulatory processes. By doing so, the research allows for a risk-based approach to the regulation of a 
system to be applied to new and evolving technologies such as UAS.  
The overall structure of the thesis is provided in Figure 3. The concept of risk-based regulation 
is outlined in the first two levels of  this figure, providing an overview of the regulatory processes of 
interest for this thesis. The third level of Figure 3 highlights the different theoretical concepts (that form 
part of the literature review) that are used to get a better understanding of these regulatory process of 
interest. The review of these theoretical concepts also helps identify the research gaps in the chosen 
areas of application for this thesis (i.e. GRM and SSR), that are highlighted in the fourth level of this 
figure. This provides a clear indication of the main areas of focus for this research.  
 
Figure 3: Linkage between chapters and their collective contributions 
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 Together, these four levels provide a clear linkage between the different chapters of the thesis 
and show how the research gaps identified through the literature review (Chapter 2) are addressed 
through the chosen areas of application (Chapter 3 to Chapter 7). The following sub sections provide 
an in-depth summary of the individual chapters, highlighting the aims and objectives of the chapters; 
the overall structure of the chapters; and how the aims and objectives of the thesis are met taking the 
novel contributions of the chapters into consideration. They clearly show how different elements of the 
research questions are addressed and help highlight the novel contributions of the research. The 
difference between each of the chapters and the growth and progression between these chapters is also 
clearly highlighted in these sub sections. 
1.6.2.1. Chapter 2:  Literature Review  
The fundamental theory necessary to understand the overall concept of risk-based regulation is provided 
in Chapter 2 and summarised in the third level of Figure 3. The gaps in the literature, which led to the 
development of the research problems and the narrowing of the scope of this thesis were arrived at 
through the literature review presented in this chapter. The chapter first introduces a number of 
fundamental concepts including: events and scenarios; hazards; consequences; accidents, incidents and 
mishaps; and safety (Section §2.1). The concept of uncertainty while also fundamental to understanding 
the concept of risk, was reviewed in a separate section as it is central to the overall research undertaken 
(Section §2.2). Understanding each of these fundamental concepts was essential to understanding the 
overall concept of risk, which in itself was reviewed in great detail (Section §2.3). The final concept 
that needed to be reviewed before the SRMP could be introduced was decision theory (Section §2.4). 
This provided the fundamentals necessary to get a better understanding of how decisions can be made, 
something integral to the SRMP. Once each of these concepts were clearly understood, the SRMP was 
introduced and explored in detail (Section §2.5). This not only involved conducting an in-depth review 
of each of the sub-processes that underpin the SRMP (i.e. establish the context, risk identification, risk 
analysis, risk evaluation, risk treatment, communication and consultation and monitor and review) but 
also understanding the various sources of uncertainty associated with each of these sub-processes and 
looking at how these sources of uncertainty are taken into consideration. Discussion on the application 
of the SRMP in the aviation industry is also provided in this section. 
  The following section then looks to get a better understanding of the concept of risk-based 
regulation and its application within the aviation sector (Section §2.6). This is particularly important as 
it not only better helps define the overall problem, but also highlights the shortcomings of the current 
risk-based approach adopted by the industry. In essence, it is seen that the risk-based principles are only 
applied to the rule-making process and no uncertainty is taken into consideration in any of the 
components that go into defining risk-based regulation (rule-making, compliance assessment and 
compliance finding). On carefully analysing and evaluating these shortcomings it is evident that, the 
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current framework and tools used by the industry cannot be applied to new and evolving technologies 
such as UAS where there is limited data and high uncertainty. Thus, research needed to be undertaken 
to not only expand the current understanding of risk-based regulation to include a risk-based approach 
to compliance assessment and compliance finding but also look at how uncertainty associated with each 
of these sub-processes can be considered. 
Taking the case study example of UAS into consideration, owing to the limited data and high 
uncertainty associated with these systems, the next section (Section §2.7) then looks to limit the scope 
of the discussion, as outlined in the fourth level of Figure 3. The various sources of uncertainty 
associated with UAS are briefly identified, highlighting the need for a framework that is able to take 
this uncertainty into consideration. In adopting a risk-based approach to the regulation of the industry, 
it is important to not only understand the risks posed by the system but also how these risks can be 
evaluated and how decisions can be made based on this risk. Limiting the discussion to UAS, models 
that comprehensively capture the risks posed by these systems to people and property on the ground are 
essential to the development of airworthiness and operational requirements. These models are referred 
to as GRM and form the first area of focus for this thesis (Section §2.7.2). Given the risks are clearly 
identified, models that are able to manage these risks are then required. This is largely done through the 
development and promulgation of regulations that provide assurance in the airworthiness of the UAS. 
Not all UAS types may be required to meet prescriptive codes of airworthiness requirements in order 
to be safe for operation, however, those that do, will likely be required to show compliance to SSR, also 
referred to as Part 1309 regulations. This is the second area of focus of this research (Section §2.7.3). It 
is important here to note that, detailed reviews on both GRM and SSR are provided in the individual 
chapters where these topics are discussed. In order to avoid repetition, these reviews are not included 
in this section. The literature review undertaken in this chapter is meant to supplement, rather than 
replace the literature reviews provided in the individual publications and is needed to provide a better 
understanding of how each of the publications relate. Throughout the proceeding chapters, these 
theoretical areas are applied to the regulatory processes of rule-making, compliance assessment and 
compliance finding. For details, the reader is directed to the individual chapters. The following chapter 
summaries will look to show how each of the identified research questions are addressed and how 
together they help achieve the overall aim of this thesis. They aim to address the key challenges involved 
in the incorporation of uncertainty into the risk analysis and regulatory decision-making processes. As 
a collection, they broaden the current understanding and scope of risk-based regulation in the aviation 
sector to include each of the regulatory processes outlined in the second level of Figure 3. 
1.6.2.2. Chapter 3:  A Review of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Ground Risk Models  
As with any new technology, there is a considerable amount of risk and uncertainty associated with the 
operation of any new system. Before these risks can be evaluated and decisions regarding them made 
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(risk evaluation and risk treatment), it is first  important to clearly identify the risks and see how they 
relate to each other (risk identification). This is part of the risk assessment process, which in itself is 
divided into the three sub-processes of risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation. In the 
context of UAS, there are two primary hazards of interest: a collision or near collision between a UA 
and another aircraft (whether the other aircraft is in the air or on the ground) ; and the impact of the UA, 
or its components, with people or structures situated on the ground [16], [17]. The focus of this chapter 
and the thesis in general is on the characterisation of the latter of these two hazards. The risks associated 
with this hazard are identified in the chapter. These risks are largely managed through the development 
and promulgation of regulations that provide assurance in the airworthiness of the UAS [6]. As 
described in [6], airworthiness regulations can be combined with operational regulations (e.g., 
restricting where and when UAS can be operated) to more effectively manage the risks posed to people 
and property overflown. Under the risk-based approach, models that effectively capture the nature of 
the risks posed to people and property on the ground (i.e. GRM) are essential to the development of 
airworthiness and operational regulations for UAS.  
The objectives of this chapter are thus to: 1) provide a comprehensive review of existing GRM 
and the component models that go into defining them; 2) describe how these component models and 
the uncertainty surrounding them impact different elements of the safety regulations for UAS; and 3) 
identify where future research into the development of models is needed to support the development of 
effective regulations for UAS. Relating this to the overall objectives of the thesis, it is evident that the 
paper aims to answer elements of the first research objective, that is, to identify and characterise the 
various sources of uncertainty inherent in the risk assessment process and determine how this is 
currently managed, with application to the aviation regulatory framework (Research Objective 1).  
The paper starts by first introducing the concept of a GRM and identifying all of the component 
models (i.e. failure model, impact model, recovery model, stress model, exposure model, incident stress 
model and harm model) that go into defining a GRM. Arriving at this set of component models was in 
itself the result of an extensive literature review undertaken. In order to understand how the identified 
GRM and component models identify and manage uncertainty, a framework for systematically 
describing the treatment of uncertainty in modelling is needed. In this paper, Paté-Cornell’s [33] 
framework for describing the “six levels of treatment of uncertainties in risk analysis” is used to assess 
how each of the reviewed models manages uncertainty. Identifying the uncertainty and providing a 
means for managing this uncertainty allows for the setting of appropriate regulations under the risk-
based approach to rule-making. Each of the component models were then analysed independently 
providing: a detailed description of the component model; a review of the literature associated with the 
component model, highlighting the assumptions made in relation to the component model; a description 
of how the component model was substantiated in the literature; a summary of how uncertainty is 
represented in the component model (based on Paté-Cornell’s framework [33]); and a clear linkage 
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between the component model and the regulations, highlighting not just the component of the 
regulations that are affected but also how the associated assumptions and uncertainty impacts these 
regulations.  The paper concludes with some overall findings relating to: 1) the diversity of the models, 
2) cascading assumptions; and 3) inadequate treatment of uncertainty and the implications of these 
findings on the overall GRM and component models.  
In providing such an in-depth review of GRM, the paper was able to highlight the sources of 
uncertainty associated with the safety risk assessment process (Research Question 1.1) and show how 
they are addressed within the current aviation safety risk management and regulatory development 
processes (Research Question 1.2). These sources of uncertainty are defined with respect to each 
component model and then related to the regulatory framework, showing how they are likely to impact 
the safety risk management and regulatory development processes. By adopting Paté-Cornell’s [33] 
framework to identify the levels of uncertainty accounted for in each of the component models, the 
paper showcases where additional research efforts need to be directed. The goal is to adopt a Level 5 
treatment of uncertainty, where uncertainties about fundamental hypotheses are displayed by a family 
of risk curves. By clearly highlighting this objective and recognising the limitations associated with the 
lower levels of treatment of uncertainty in terms of the risk management and regulatory development 
process, this chapter also addresses elements of Research Question 1.3. 
In addition to being one of the first review papers of its kind and proving an in-depth review of 
the GRM and component models that go into defining them, this paper makes a number of novel 
contributions to theory. It provides a conceptual framework for describing the component models of 
GRM, and in turn, providing a general theoretical basis for the systematic development and analysis of 
models proposed in the literature. In addition to this it also identifies various sources of uncertainty with 
respect to each of the component models and shows how failing to account for such uncertainties can 
impact various elements of the regulation. The research lays the foundations necessary to help meet the 
remaining objectives of the thesis. 
1.6.2.3. Chapter 4:  A Bayesian Approach to System Safety Assessment and 
Compliance Assessment for Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
As mentioned in Section §1.6.2.1, in order to limit the scope of the discussion and make significant 
contributions to theory, this chapter and the thesis in general focuses on one part of the regulations, 
namely the SSR. The SSR or Part 1309 regulations supplement prescriptive design requirements and 
are put in place to ensure that an aircraft or system is capable of continued safe flight and landing 
following a failure or multiple failures of systems [19]. At a high level, they specify a number of 
requirements, the most important for this research being, the System Safety Performance Requirements 
(SSPR). For further details on the SSR and SSPR, the reader is directed to the individual chapter.  
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This chapter explores a new approach to the certification of UAS to the Part 1309 regulations, 
where the system safety compliance process is modelled as a decision-making process under 
uncertainty. The chapter builds on the literature review conducted in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this 
thesis to understand the various sources of uncertainty and see how they are currently managed in the 
compliance assessment and compliance finding processes. The overall aim of this chapter is to improve 
the objectivity, transparency, and rationality of compliance findings in those cases where there is 
uncertainty in the assessments of the system. Relating this to the overall objectives of the thesis it is 
evident that the focus of this chapter is on the second and third research objectives. That is, to draw on 
contemporary risk and uncertainty theory, to develop a new compliance assessment and compliance 
finding decision-making process that incorporates the varying sources of uncertainty inherent in them 
(Research Objective 2) and to apply the above to the regulation of UAS, in particular, the system safety 
“Part 1309” regulations (Research Objective 3). Elements of the first research objective are also 
addressed in this chapter. 
The chapter first introduces the SSR, identifying the particular requirement of interest for the 
research, namely, the SSPR. Each of the sub-processes that go into defining the SSPR compliance 
process, namely, the System Safety Assessment (SSA) process, Compliance Assessment (CA) process 
and Compliance Finding (CF) process are then described in detail. On critically analysing the 
Traditional SSPR compliance process, the various sources of uncertainty inherent to the process were 
identified. Taking the CA and CF decision-making processes into consideration, it was seen that there 
currently does not exist any means of accounting for the uncertainty in any of the outputs from the SSA 
process. As such, there is no objective means for expressing the resulting uncertainty in the output state 
of compliance. In order to address these limitations an Extended SSPR compliance process is then 
presented in this chapter. The uncertainty in the failure rate (Average Probability of Failure per Flight 
Hour (APFH)) of the system (one of the outputs of the SSA process) is taken into consideration by 
adopting a Bayesian analysis approach. This provides a probability distribution representing the 
uncertainty in the APFH of the system as opposed to a single point estimate. The CA process is then 
updated to take the uncertainty in this output into consideration. It makes use of a Bayesian hypothesis 
test to provide the probability of the system meeting the requirements rather than providing a “TRUE 
or FALSE” output assessment. Finally, a normative approach to decision-making is applied to the CF 
process. This provides a more rational, transparent and systematic mathematical framework for making 
compliance findings based on compliance risk. The mathematics and rationale behind the adopted 
approaches, and a case study example exemplifying the features of the model are also provided in this 
chapter. For details, the reader is directed to the individual chapter. 
By showing how the identified sources of uncertainty can be incorporated into existing aviation 
safety risk management and regulatory development processes through the adoption of Bayes theorem, 
Bayesian hypothesis testing and normative decision theory, the research is able to help answer Research 
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Question 1.2. By clearly identifying how the outputs from the risk assessment process should be 
represented to the decision maker (i.e. as a family of risk curves) and showing how this can be taken 
into consideration, the research also helps answer Research Question 1.3. The focus of this chapter is 
however on Research Question 2. The uncertainty inherent in the Traditional SSPR compliance process 
can lead to inconsistent, subjective, and potentially erroneous regulatory outcomes. This situation arises 
due the absence of a systematic and objective means for representing uncertainty to decision makers, 
and a framework that enables decision makers to make rational, logical, transparent, and consistent 
decisions when faced with uncertainty. By clearly identifying the various sources of uncertainty and 
how they are currently managed in the aviation safety compliance assessment and compliance finding 
processes, the research has addressed elements of Research Question 2.1. By providing a means to 
represent and account for the uncertainties in not just the SSA process, but also the CA and CF 
processes, this research also helps support more objective and consistent regulatory outcomes, thus 
helping address Research Question 2.2. 
This Extended SSPR compliance process marks a significant step forward compared to the 
Traditional SSPR compliance process. It provides a means of taking the high uncertainty associated 
with new and evolving technologies such as UAS into consideration in not only the SSA process, but 
also the CA and CF decision making processes that follow. With reference to Paté-Cornell’s “six levels 
of treatment of uncertainties” [33]; the revised framework provides for the highest treatment of the 
uncertainty associated with estimates of one of the outputs of the SSA process, i.e., the APFH. This 
facilitates a more rational, transparent and systematic compliance approach to decision-making. It 
directly addresses the second research objective by drawing on contemporary risk and uncertainty 
theory, to develop a new compliance assessment and compliance finding decision-making process that 
incorporates the varying sources of uncertainty inherent in them. By focusing on the SSR, the third and 
final research objective is also considered. 
In terms of novel contributions, this research has helped in the development of the overall 
concept for risk-based assessment and compliance processes, showing how the theoretical concepts 
described evolve towards a more comprehensive treatment of uncertainty. The potential benefits and 
challenges associated with this process are also highlighted. In addition to this, the research proposes a 
new risk-based approach to the regulatory compliance process, through reframing it as a problem of 
decision-making under uncertainty. This approach developed and demonstrated a mathematically 
robust approach for accounting for uncertainty in performance/compliance assessments. It also allowed 
for the systematic treatment of uncertainty in the aviation regulatory compliance assessment and 
compliance finding processes by the application of a normative decision theory, combined with 
assessments of the consequence of the different compliance finding outcomes. This provides NAA with 
a systematic basis for making compliance decisions (findings) on the basis of compliance risk. 
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While this chapter in conjunction with the previous chapter answers most of the research 
questions outlined previously, there are a number of assumptions and limitations associated with the 
Extended SSPR compliance process that have yet to be addressed. Firstly, in relation to the APFH, in 
accordance with SSA guidance materials, the Extended SSA process makes use of a Poisson failure rate 
model, which assumes a constant failure rate. Currently, most commercial UAS do not exhibit the 
constant failure rates typical of mature aviation systems. For small UAS, their changing configuration 
may mean that they never achieve a stable failure rate. This brings into question the validity of the 
assumption of a constant failure rate model. Secondly, looking at the Extended SSA process, it can be 
observed that only the uncertainty in one of the outputs, namely the APFH of the system, is taken into 
consideration. Additional research needs to be undertaken to show how the uncertainty associated with 
each of the remaining outputs of the SSA process can also be taken into consideration. The following 
chapters look to address both of these limitations.  
1.6.2.4. Chapter 5: Managing Uncertainty in the System Safety Assessment of 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
The Extended SSPR compliance process developed in the previous chapter marks a significant step 
change over the Traditional SSPR compliance process. Limiting the discussion to the SSA process, the 
Extended SSPR compliance process provides a means to take the uncertainty in the APFH of the system 
into consideration through the adoption of a Bayesian analysis approach. While this was an important 
extension to make, on carefully analysing the output, it was observed that one factor that wasn’t taken 
into consideration is the variable failure rate of the system. In keeping with SSA guidance materials, 
the Extended SSA process assumes a constant failure rate and makes use of a Poisson failure rate model 
to represent the likelihood distribution (one of the inputs to the Bayesian analysis process). While this 
may be suitable for well-established technologies such as manned aircraft that are in the “Useful Life” 
phase of their life cycle (exhibiting a stable failure rate), the same cannot be said for new and evolving 
technologies such as UAS. The rapid pace of development of the technology and the use of Commercial-
off-the-shelf (COTS) components, creates a constantly changing system baseline for these systems. 
This in turn means it is difficult to build heritage in a particular configuration of a system. Components 
are not designed or manufactured to accepted standards. Further, many small UAS are not subject to 
routine maintenance. The rapid evolution of technology may mean that many UAS types may never 
achieve a constant failure rate. The main objective of this paper is thus to provide a means to account 
for this variable failure rate in the Extended framework. Relating this to the overall objectives of the 
thesis, it is evident that this research aims to address elements of Research Objective 2.  
This paper starts by introducing the SSR and outlining the main output of the SSA process that 
is of interest to this research, namely, the set containing the failure rate estimates for the system. A 
linkage is then provided to the previous research, describing how the Extended SSA process is able to 
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take the uncertainty in this output into consideration by adopting a Bayesian analysis approach. 
Following this, the limitation of the constant failure rate is then outlined and a means to take it into 
consideration proposed. The research proposes the adoption of a Weibull distribution to model the 
likelihood distribution as it is representative of the “bathtub curve” typically used to model the failure 
rate of a system. The mathematics behind this is then explored. Finally, a case study is undertaken to 
highlight the advantages of the approach.  
In conjunction with the framework proposed in the previous chapter, this extension has a 
number of advantages compared to the Traditional SSA process that only provides a point estimate on 
the failure rate of the system. Firstly, it allows for the variable failure rate associated with new and novel 
technologies such as UAS to be taken into consideration. This is an important extension to make as it 
is representative of real-world systems. In addition to this, by adopting a Weibull distribution, the 
decision maker is provided with further information in relation to the uncertainty of the model. For 
example, the particular phase of the life-cycle the system is in can be determined with greater certainty 
using the additional outputs obtained from the model. Finally, by using this model the decision maker 
is able to make a number of additional inferences (predictions) on the future failure performance of the 
fleet, something that was not possible using the Traditional approach.  
As is evident from the preceding discussion, this chapter aimed at addressing one of the 
limitations of the Extended SSPR compliance process, i.e. the limitation associated with the use of a 
constant failure rate. The focus of this chapter was thus on Research Question 2.1 and Research 
Question 2.2. By critically analysing the Extended SSPR compliance process, the research was able to 
identify an additional source of uncertainty associated with the failure rate of the system that was 
previously not taken into consideration (i.e. the uncertainty associated with the constant failure rate 
assumption). The research then goes on to show how this uncertainty can be represented and accounted 
for to support more objective and consistent regulatory outcomes.  
In terms of novel contributions, this research builds on the previous chapter, looking to address 
the limitation associated with the use of a constant failure rate. The research was able to demonstrate 
how types of model uncertainty can be accounted for in the assessment and compliance processes, 
something fundamental to the adoption of a risk-based approach to the regulation of the industry.  
1.6.2.5. Chapter 6:  Adoption of a Bayesian Belief Network for the System Safety 
Assessment of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems 
Using the case study example of the SSR, the Extended SSPR compliance process developed in Chapter 
4 provided a means of taking the uncertainty in each of the sub-processes that go into defining the SSPR 
compliance process (i.e. the SSA process, CA process and CF process) into consideration. In doing so, 
it provided a more rational, transparent and systematic means of making compliance findings based on 
  
 
© Copyright Achim Washington 2019  18 
 
compliance risk, taking uncertainty into consideration. This allowed the framework to be applied to 
new and novel systems such as UAS that are characterised by limited data and high uncertainty. The 
research also clearly highlighted the importance of extending the current understanding of risk-based 
regulation to include a risk-based approach to compliance assessment and compliance finding. While 
this in itself is a significant novel contribution, as was made evident in Chapter 4, there were a number 
of shortcomings in the Extended SSPR compliance process that were yet to be addressed. The main 
objective of this chapter is to provide a means of taking the uncertainty associated with each of the 
remaining outputs of the SSA process into consideration and show how this can be used to provide 
additional information to the decision maker, thus allowing for a higher level of treatment of 
uncertainty, not just in the SSA process, but also the CA and CF decision making processes that follow. 
It thus addresses Research Objective 2 and helps achieve the overall aim of the thesis.  
The paper first introduces the SSR, outlining the overall structure of the Traditional SSPR 
compliance process. The Extended SSPR compliance process developed in Chapter 4 is then 
reintroduced to show how uncertainty in this process (in particular the SSA process) is taken into 
consideration.  In order to account for the uncertainty in the remaining outputs of the SSA process, a 
Proposed SSPR compliance process is then outlined. This framework is then applied to a generic UAS 
(referred to as RPAS in the chapter) to help identify: a set of failure conditions (which in itself comprises 
of a set of system-level functions and failure modes); a set of failure condition severity categories; and 
a set of failure probability objectives (the three remaining outputs from the SSA process). The chapter 
then goes on to show how the updated output set associated with the APFH can be assessed given this 
new framework. A Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) is proposed as a suitable tool to model the outputs 
from the SSA process. The fundamental theory associated with a BBN is outlined and then applied to 
the framework. Finally, a means to account for the additional data and information (associated with the 
updated outputs from the SSA process) in the CA process is briefly discussed. The chapter concludes 
with a hypothetical case study example that exemplifies the features of the model and highlights some 
of its advantages.  
Under the proposed framework it is now possible to associate multiple possible failure 
condition severities with a given set of failure conditions, and in turn, explore the compliance of the 
system as a whole in relation to all of its potential consequential outcomes. The generic framework 
enables the assessment of multiple outcomes for a given system (e.g. UAS), system function (e.g. 
Propulsion), or failure condition (e.g. Propulsion leading to UDS). Assessments using the proposed 
framework can be performed using existing techniques, namely Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), etc. and the applicable SSR, 
to specify the output sets for a given UAS and concept of operation. By adopting the BBN within the 
SSA process, this framework allows for assessments of the APFH to be determined in situations of high 
uncertainty. Referring to Paté-Cornell’s [33] framework for describing the “six levels of treatment of 
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uncertainties in risk analysis”, it is evident that the outputs from the SSA process have evolved from a 
Level 2 or Level 3 treatment of uncertainty in the Traditional SSA process to a Level 5 treatment of 
uncertainty in the Proposed SSA process. This in conjunction with the extended CA and CF process 
allow for the highest level of treatment of uncertainty in the overall SSPR compliance process, thus 
supporting a risk-based approach to the regulation of the industry.  
Being closely related to the Extended SSPR compliance process outlined in Chapter 4, it is 
evident that the main focus of this chapter was on addressing Research Question 2.1 and Research 
Question 2.2. The Proposed SSPR compliance process not only highlights the additional sources of 
uncertainty that were not taken into consideration in the Extended SSPR compliance process, but also 
shows how these sources of uncertainty can be represented and accounted for in the Proposed SSPR 
compliance process, through the adoption of a BBN. This allows for the highest level of treatment of 
uncertainty and shows how this additional data and information can be represented and accounted for 
in the CA process, thus addressing elements of Research Question 1.3 as well.  
In terms of novel contributions, the chapter: develops a general template for high level 
classification of functions and failures which can be applied to any aircraft system; advocates the 
adoption of a BBN as a valid approach for capturing uncertainty in the assessed compliance scenario 
(this removes the requirement for assessing single credible (often worst-case) scenarios, thus extending 
compliance scenarios to multiple assessments); and is the first to apply a BBN within an aviation SSR 
“Part 1309” system safety context. 
1.6.2.6. Chapter 7:  Managing Uncertainty in Unmanned Aircraft System Safety 
Performance Requirements Compliance Process 
This chapter links together all of the work undertaken from Chapter 4 through to Chapter 6. The overall 
aim is to highlight the challenges associated with the application of the Traditional SSPR compliance 
process to new and evolving systems such as UAS and summarise the advantages associated with the 
Extended and Proposed SSPR compliance process. In doing so, the research helps fortify the research 
undertaken in Chapter 4 to Chapter 6 and thus helps address elements of Research Objective 2. 
The chapter starts by providing a brief overview of the SSR, focusing the discussion on the 
SSPR compliance process. The Traditional SSPR compliance process is outlined, highlighting the 
limitations of this process. Following this, the challenges associated with the application of this process 
to the system safety certification of UAS are then explored. Discussion on the differences between UAS 
and CPA is also provided to better understand the limitations of applying the Traditional SSPR 
compliance process to new and evolving technologies such as UAS. By relating the identified 
challenges to the limitations of the Traditional SSPR compliance process, the paper clearly identifies 
the various gaps in the literature that exist and shows how the Extended and Proposed SSPR compliance 
processes look to address these gaps. The Extended SSPR compliance process is then outlined, with the 
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various outputs identified and the general advantages of this process described. The direction of future 
research efforts is also provided.  
In general, the paper provides a top-level view of the overall research problem and clearly 
outlines the overall concept of risk-based assessment and compliance decision-making processes, 
showing how the theoretical concepts described in previous chapters evolve towards a more 
comprehensive treatment of uncertainty. The paper concludes that a more comprehensive treatment of 
uncertainty (as proposed by the research undertaken in this thesis) has the potential to result in more 
rational, transparent and systematic outcomes from the regulatory process, particularly for new or novel 
aviation systems such as UAM concepts, personal air mobility vehicles, reusable space launch vehicles, 
and UAS. By clearly outlining the limitations of the current approach and the benefits of the extended 
framework, the research directly answers Research Question 2.3. 
While this chapter does not make any novel contributions of its own, it was essential in laying 
out the overall research problems, as well as in presenting a holistic overview of all the steps associated 
thereof. In addition to this, it highlights the need for the research undertaken in each of the previous 
chapters by clearly outlining the overall limitations associated with the Traditional SSPR compliance 
process and its application to the system safety certification of UAS.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
Figure 4: Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk Model at Avalon Air Show 
Image copyright © Achim Washington 
“This report by its very length, defends itself against the risk of being read” 
Winston Churchill (1874-1965) 
This literature review explores the fundamental theoretical concepts underpinning risk-based 
regulation, and its application in aviation safety frameworks (Figure 3). The review is divided into eight 
sections. The first section, Section §2.1, introduces the basic theoretical concepts fundamental to risk. 
The concept of uncertainty is then explored in Section §2.2. Next, Section §2.3 defines the concept of 
risk and highlights the different approaches used to measure risk. Section §2.4 then briefly introduces 
the concept of decision theory. Each of these concepts are related to the Safety Risk Management 
Process (SRMP) in Section §2.5. This section also provides an overview of the general SRMP, 
identifying the various sources of uncertainty inherent in the process. The concept of risk-based 
regulation is then introduced in Section §2.6. This is then related to the case study application of the 
System Safety Regulation (SSR) of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in Section §2.7. Finally, Section 
§2.8 provides an overall summary of the literature review, showing how it helped arrive at the primary 
research questions. A critical analysis of the literature along with main findings made in relation to the 
literature are provided in this section.  
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2.1. Fundamental Concepts 
This section provides a summary of the fundamental concepts necessary to understand the overall 
concept of risk. As will be observed through the course of this section, no single set of definitions of 
any of the fundamental concepts is widely accepted in the literature. The primary objective of this thesis 
is not to propose new definitions, rather to get an understanding of the fundamental concepts and their 
use within an aviation safety context. 
2.1.1. Event and Scenario  
Ayyub [34] defines an event as an “occurrence or outcome or change of a particular set of 
circumstances”. An event, in its most general sense, can be considered as a change in the state of a 
system or its environment. Here, a system is defined as “a group of interacting, interrelated, or 
interdependent elements, such as people, property, materials, environment, and processes” [34].  In the 
context of aviation safety, the FAA [35] defines an event as “an internal or external occurrence that has 
its origin distinct from the airplane”. These occurrences can include atmospheric conditions, runway 
conditions, cabin and baggage fires, etc. but does not include deliberate acts of sabotage [35].  
Ayyub [36] initially defines a scenario as “a hypothetical sequence of events that are 
constructed to focus attention on causal processes and decision points or nodes”. Ayyub later goes on 
to define a scenario as “joint events and system state(s) that lead to an outcome of interest” or “joint 
occurrence of events following a particular order or sequence in occurrence” [34]. Clothier [37] further 
defines a scenario by the measures of two key fundamental properties of the modern world, namely loss 
and likelihood. Other similar definitions can be found in [34], [38], [39]. Taking all these into 
consideration, a scenario can simply be defined as a sequence of events that has the potential to lead to 
an undesirable outcome. A scenario is a complete description of a sequence of events inclusive of 
potential consequential outcomes and its initiating cause(s). 
2.1.2. Hazard 
A hazard is part of the specification of a scenario; it is the condition for loss or harm. Numerous 
definitions for hazard have been proposed in the literature [25], [26], [44]–[46], [27], [28], [34], [35], 
[40]–[43]. While a hazard is quite closely related to the concept of risk and is often used in the definition 
of risk, it is important to understand how it differentiates from risk. A hazard simply exists as a source, 
while a risk includes the likelihood of conversion of that source into actual delivery of loss, injury or 
some form of damage [38].  
On review of some of the definitions of a hazard (Table 2), it was observed that there are three 
main components to a definition of a hazard. These are expressions of 1) condition, 2) potential and 3) 
harm. While some definitions provide more details of the “condition” (e.g. [34], [40]) others may focus 
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on defining the “harm” (e.g. [25], [47]–[49]). For the purpose of this thesis, the definition provided by 
ICAO [25] will be used. According to ICAO [25], a hazard is “a condition or an object with the potential 
to cause injuries to personnel, damage to equipment or structures, loss of material, or reduction of ability 
to perform a prescribed function”.  
A hazard is not necessarily damaging or a negative component of a system. A hazard damage 
potential is only a safety concern when it interfaces with the operation of the system aimed at service 
delivery [25]. Clothier [37] identifies four different types of hazard: exogenous, endogenous, system-
exclusive or environmental-exclusive depending on how each of its components (i.e. stress, strength 
and loss) are defined in relation to the boundary of the system of interest. 
Table 2: Common definitions of a hazard focusing on the condition and harm 
Definitions focused on the “condition”  
• A source of potential harm or a condition, which may result from an external cause 
(e.g., earthquake, food, or human agency) or an internal vulnerability, with the 
potential to initiate a failure mode. It is a situation with a potential to cause loss, that 
is, a risk source. 
[34] 
• A hazard is a present condition, event, object, or circumstance that could lead to or 
contribute to an unplanned or undesired event such as an accident. 
[40] 
Definitions focused on the “harm”  
• A condition or an object with the potential to cause injuries to personnel, damage to 
equipment or structures, loss of material, or reduction of ability to perform a 
prescribed function. 
[25] 
• A real or potential condition that could lead to an unplanned event or series of events 
(i.e. mishap) resulting in death, injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of 
equipment or property, or damage to the environment. 
[47] 
• Any real or potential condition that may result in injury, illness, death to personnel, 
damage to the environment, business interruption or loss of assets. 
[49] 
• Any real or potential condition that can cause degradation, injury, illness, death or 
damage to or loss of equipment or property. 
[48] 
2.1.3. Consequence 
The realisation of a hazard can have more than one consequence associated with it, which can be 
expressed qualitatively or quantitatively and have positive or negative connotations [50]. A 
consequence can simply be defined as the “outcome of an event” [50]. The definitions provided in [34], 
[42] provide varying levels of detail in relation to the outcome, nature of harm and how this outcome 
relates to the initiating event. Other definitions of a consequence can also be found in [28], [46], [51], 
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[52] where terms such as “adverse effects”, “unknown” or “undesired”, “undesirable outcome” and 
“loss” of something of “value” are used to describe a consequence. 
One of the most difficult and debated steps in determining the risk associated with a system can 
be quantification of the consequences and severities. The type and scale used to define harm is 
determined by the objectives and values of stakeholders involved in the SRMP. Often the type of harm 
and measurement can be subjective. While placing a cost on property is easy enough, consequences 
such as, the loss of human life and damage to the environment are not as easily quantified [34]. 
According to Clothier [37], arriving at a clear and uniform understanding of the type and degree of loss 
is a subjective process that depends on the values held by an individual or the community at large. An 
objective specification of consequence is important as it is found that risk-decisions are often more 
influenced by consequence rather than by overall risk, which over time could have a negative impact 
on how we live our lives [53]. As put by Bernstein [54], while “the risk-averse make choices based on 
the consequences without regard to the probability involved … the foolhardy make choices based on 
the probability on an outcome without regard to its consequences’’. To get a more accurate 
representation of risk one must consider both, the extent of harm and the probability of the event.  
According to ICAO [25], a consequence is “the potential outcome (or outcomes) of a hazard”. 
The damaging potential of a hazard only materialises through one or more consequences [25]. This can 
relate to people, property, financial damage, environmental damage, corporate reputation, etc. 
Assuming a consequence occurs, the severity of occurrence can range from negligible to catastrophic 
[25]. These classifications can vary based on the type of loss, the industry and the regulatory body.  
2.1.4. Accident, Incident and Mishap 
Accidents, incidents and mishaps are three specific types of events that are often used interchangeably 
in the literature but are intended to better describe the type and level of detrimental outcome, loss or 
consequence associated with an event. A list of some definitions identified in the literature is provided 
in Table 3. As can be observed from Table 3, there is no consensus in defining these terms. For the 
purposes of this thesis, definitions such as those presented by ICAO [55] and FAA [56]  are used. 
The term accident describes an event of a specific level of loss (usually the highest) degree of 
loss or consequential outcome possible. The severity of this event is a measure of the degree of its 
seriousness in terms of the extent of injury or death resulting from the accident [57]. Examples of 
common definitions include [26], [42], [46], [56]–[58]. Definitions used within the aviation safety 
literature can be found in [3], [25], [26], [28]. The general definition used in this thesis is provided by 
the ICAO [55]: 
 “An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which, in the case of a manned 
aircraft, takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until 
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such time as all such persons have disembarked, or in the case of an unmanned aircraft, takes place 
between the time the aircraft is ready to move with the purpose of flight until such time as it comes to 
rest at the end of the flight and the primary propulsion system is shut down, in which … A person is 
fatally or seriously injured, … the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure … the aircraft is 
missing or is completely inaccessible.”  
Like an accident, an incident is another event defining a lesser degree of consequence. 
Examples of common definitions used to describe an incident are provided in Table 3. Definitions based 
on aviation safety literature can be found in [28], [55], [56]. The general definition used in this thesis is 
provided by the FAA [56] and is defined as:  
“… a near miss accident with minor consequences that could have resulted in greater loss. … 
an unplanned event that could have resulted in an accident, or did result in minor damage, and which 
indicates the existence of, though may not define, a hazard or hazardous condition.” 
Common definitions of a mishap are provided by [47], [56]. While the degree of loss varies 
between these definitions, they generally describe it as a condition that results in varying levels of loss.  
Table 3: Common definitions of an accident, incident and mishap 
Accident  
• An undesired and unplanned (but not necessarily unexpected) event that results in (at 
least) a specified level of loss. 
[46] 
• An unintended event, or sequence of events, that causes harm. [42] 
• An external event that could directly lead to death or injury. [57] 
• An unplanned fortuitous event that results in harm. [56] 
Incident  
• An event that, under slightly different circumstances, could have been an accident. [59] 
• The occurrence of a hazard that might have progressed to an accident, but did not. [42] 
• An event that involves no loss (or only minor loss) but with the potential for loss under 
different circumstance. 
[46] 
• An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft which 
affects or could affect the safety of operation. 
[55] 
Mishap  
• An event or series of events resulting in unintentional death, injury, occupational illness, 
damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment. 
[47] 
• A source of irritation, annoyance, grievance, nuisance, vexation, mortification … a 
minor accident. 
[56] 
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2.1.5. Safety 
Williams [45] states that human nature, personality and perception are very much involved with one’s 
accepted definition of the word ‘safe’. Williams [45] further goes on to state that while safe is often 
taken as the reciprocal of a magnitude of a risk, safety is not merely dependent on risk but is a 
compromise between risk, cost, and benefit. Taking this into consideration, it poses the question of 
whether safety is truly the antonym of risk and whether absolute safety truly relates to zero risk [60]. 
Jardine et al [61], Williams [45], Moller [62] and Moller et al. [60] provide some insight into these 
concepts and help define what constitutes a safe condition. 
The definitions of safety are generally divided into two distinct groups, namely, absolute safety 
and relative safety. These two interpretations are perhaps best described by Moeller [62] through the 
use of a simple example relating to the question, “is my car safe?”. One way to answer this question, 
which highlights the concept of absolute safety, is “No, since there is always a risk of being in an 
accident” [62]. An alternate answer, that which highlights a relative concept of safety is “Yes, the car 
is safe, since the risk of an accident in this car is low, and the latest safety features it comes equipped 
with also minimize the risk of a severe damage in case of an accident” [62]. Both interpretations are 
justified, and it is only how one perceives the risk associated with the event and how much they deem 
acceptable that distinguishes the two. The absolute definition of safety implies that the risk is completely 
eliminated. The relative interpretation is based on the assumption that the risk can be reduced or 
controlled to an acceptable level in accordance with an agreed set of management principles (e.g. As 
Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and So Far As Reasonably Practicable (SFARP) 
frameworks). Table 4 provides a summary of some common definitions used to describe absolute safety 
and relative safety. Definitions based on aviation safety literature can be found in [3], [25], [26], [28]. 
While in an ideal world, absolute safety would be the condition one would want to strive 
towards, such conditions are generally impossible to achieve. According to ICAO [25], “while the 
elimination of accidents and/or serious incidents and the achievement of absolute control is certainly 
desirable, they are unachievable goals in open and dynamic operational contexts”. Uncertainty is 
inherent and inescapable in all real world systems, therefore there will always be some risk associated 
with any action or event.  
Aviation safety frameworks adopt a relative concept of safety, for example ICAO [3], FAA 
[26], CAA [63], CASA [28] DASA [64]. Here safety is the outcome of a risk management process, 
whereby an identified risk has been reduced to an accepted or tolerable level, where the process of 
managing the risk is consistent with a defined set of risk management principles. Examples of such 
management principles include the ALARP and SFARP frameworks [65]. For details on these 
frameworks used in aviation safety literature refer to [66]–[69]. 
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Table 4: Common definitions of absolute and relative safety 
Absolute Safety  
• The conservation of human life and its effectiveness, and the prevention of damage to 
items, consistent with mission requirements 
[62] 
• Freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational illness, 
damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment 
[44] 
• A property of a system, whereby it does not produce or encourage accidents. [58] 
Relative Safety  
• A state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, 
and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard 
identification and safety risk management 
[3] 
• A system can be considered safe if risk has been demonstrated to have been reduced to 
a level that is ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Possible) and broadly acceptable or 
tolerable, and relevant prescriptive safety requirements have been met, for a system in 
a given application in a given operating environment. 
[42] 
• The state in which the risk of harm to persons or property damage is acceptable. [26] 
• The state in which the probability of harm to persons or property is reduced to, and 
maintained at, a level which is as low as reasonably practicable through a continuing 
process of hazard identification and risk management. 
[28] 
2.1.6. Summary 
There is considerable diversity in the definition of fundamental risk concepts, a finding also made in 
[37], [51], [60], [70]. According to Covello and Merkhofer [52], the cause of this conflicting array of 
concepts is the result of the fragmented way in which the field has developed. Arriving at a clear and 
concise understanding of these concepts is imperative to understanding the overall concept of risk and 
to taking the uncertainty associated with each of these concepts into consideration. The review presents 
a diverse array of definitions of fundamental theoretical concepts presented in safety literature. For the 
purposes of this thesis, those definitions prevalent in aviation safety literature are used (refer to the sub-
sections for detail). A consolidation of concepts is a separate area of research. 
2.2. The Concept of Uncertainty 
There are numerous perspectives on the meaning of uncertainty. Dezfuli et al. [71] states that 
uncertainty is a “state of knowledge”, where knowledge is defined as something that is “known from 
gathered information” [71]. Ayyub [36] defines uncertainty as “knowledge incompleteness due to 
inherent deficiencies with acquired knowledge”, while Aven [50] states that uncertainty reflects a “lack 
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of knowledge about the performance of a system (the ‘world’), and observable quantities in particular”. 
Summarising these points of view, uncertainty can be considered as “the state of deficiency in 
information” [34]. It is “a component of ignorance” which is nothing but “deficiency in knowledge” 
and suggests a “complete or partial deficiency in understanding or knowledge of an event, its 
consequence, or likelihood” [34].  
2.2.1. Types of Uncertainty 
A number of different classifications of uncertainty exist in the literature, including those provided by 
Wynne [72], Knight [73], van Asselt and Rotmans [74], Walker et al. [75] and Ayyub [76]. van Asselt 
and Rotmans [74] distinguishes between uncertainties due to lack of knowledge and those arising due 
to the inherent variability of nature [77]. Walker et al. [75] distinguish between location, levels, and 
nature of uncertainty. For details on each, the reader is directed to [75]. The latter of these three classifies 
uncertainty on the basis of source into: epistemic and ontological uncertainties. This classification is 
similar to the approach presented by van Asselt and Rotmans [74]. Ayyub [76] presents yet another 
approach to classifying uncertainty, where uncertainty is classified on the basis of source into three 
types: Ambiguity, Approximation and Likelihood. For details on each, the reader is directed to [76].  
The most widely used approach identified in the literature (e.g. [34], [71], [74]–[76]) to classify 
uncertainty, divides uncertainty into two types: aleatory and epistemic [34], [71]. Uncertainty arising 
through variation in measurable phenomena is classified as aleatory uncertainty and uncertainty due to 
a lack of our understanding of the physical phenomena being studied is classified as epistemic 
uncertainty [34], [77].   
2.2.1.1. Aleatory Uncertainty 
Aleatory uncertainty relates to “stochastic (non-deterministic) events” [71]. It is  “the  inherent, random, 
or non-reducible uncertainty” and may be described through the use of objective or classical frequency-
based probability measures [33], [34]. It represents the “randomness” or “variability in samples” 
inherent in the system that cannot be reduced by further observations but is acknowledged and 
integrated into mathematical models [33]. 
2.2.1.2. Epistemic Uncertainty  
Epistemic uncertainty pertains to “the degree of knowledge of models and their parameters” [71]. It is 
“the knowledge-based, subjective uncertainty that can be reduced with the collection of data or 
attainment of additional knowledge” and can be described by subjective probability measures [34]. 
Epistemic uncertainties represent fundamental uncertainties and are often “ignored and tend to be 
under-reported” [33]. They are particularly significant in those situations where the evidence base is 
small [33]. They are more difficult to treat than aleatory uncertainties as they stem from incomplete 
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knowledge about fundamental phenomena [33] but can be reduced with further information (e.g., via 
observation) of the system.  
Both aleatory and epistemic types of uncertainty are inherent to the SRMP, which is further 
discussed in Section §2.5. 
2.2.2. Sources of Uncertainty  
Epistemic and aleatory uncertainties are an inherent and inescapable part of the modelling and 
assessment of any real-world system and can arise from a number of different sources.  
Aven [78] associates aleatory and epistemic uncertainty in relation to the inputs, model, outputs 
(including parameters of interest) and the decision criteria.  
Riesch [77] and Spiegelhalter and Riesch [79] identify uncertainties relating to: the outputs (e.g. 
due to the essential unpredictability of events); parameters (e.g. due to limitations of information or 
simply lack of empirical information); model (e.g. due to the choice of alternate model structures based 
on limited knowledge about the extent to which each competing model reflects reality); acknowledged 
inadequacies (e.g. due to limitations in the model representing the real world, which may arise due to 
omission of some known aspects, extrapolations from data or limitations in computations); and 
unknown inadequacies (e.g. due to ignorance and unknown limitations in understanding). 
Ayyub [36] identifies a number of sources of uncertainty relating to the model and the 
engineering system from which it is abstracted. The analyst creates a model from this abstraction. 
Following this, decisions regarding what aspects should or should not be included in the model must be 
made by the analyst. This is a subjective process [36] and includes uncertainty in both the aspects that 
are abstracted and not abstracted. These include ambiguity, approximations, and likelihood. Uncertainty 
relating to unknown aspects of the system that can exist due to blind ignorance also need to be taken 
into consideration [36]. Donald Rumsfeld [80] refers to this uncertainty as ‘‘unknown unknowns’’ or 
“things we do not even know what we don’t know”. In engineering and science, decisions are commonly 
based on expert judgements. “Experts render subjective opinions based on existing knowledge and 
information available to them” [81]. There is uncertainty inherent in the use of expert judgement, 
including conflicting or confusing opinions, that need to be taken into consideration [36].  
Macgill and Siu [82] identify uncertainty inherent in the use of probability as a measure of risk. 
Unless probability has a value of zero or one, there is uncertainty about whether an event or outcome 
will actually occur. This uncertainty can also result from imprecision due to either rounding errors or 
the use of misleading specificity and distortion [82]. 
The various sources described above can be summarised as shown in Table 5. There is 
uncertainty that exists in the engineering system being modelled and the model itself, which is an 
  
 
© Copyright Achim Washington 2019  30 
 
abstraction of the engineering system [36], [49], [77]–[79], [82]. Focusing on the model, it is clear that 
there is uncertainty in the inputs (data and parameters) and outputs to the model [49], [77]–[79]. Owing 
to the lack of data, expert judgement and assumptions are often used at various stages of the model. 
These are other major sources of uncertainty prevalent in some models that need to be accounted for 
[36], [49], [77], [79]. Finally, there are unknown inadequacies in the model that can influence most 
models [36], [77], [79]. It is important to recognise their existence. Aven [78], Spiegelhalter and Riesch 
[79], Riesch [77], Ayyub [36], Macgill and Siu [82] and Zio and Pedroni [49] focus on different sources, 
providing detailed descriptions on the sources acknowledged. The above sources of uncertainty are 
relevant to the SRMP, which makes use of a wide range of data sources, models, and abstractions of 
real-world systems (discussed further in Section §2.5).  
Table 5: Summary of sources of uncertainty 
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Input and data ✓  ✓    ✓  
Model and engineering system ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Output ✓  ✓     
Decision criteria  ✓      
Acknowledged inadequacies  ✓     
Unknown inadequacies  ✓  ✓    
Expert judgements   ✓   ✓  
2.2.3. Measuring Uncertainty  
While uncertainty can be measured in a variety of ways [78], [83], [84], it is generally measured through 
the use of probability theory [83]. Probability and probability calculus are often considered to be “the 
sole means for expressing uncertainty” [50], [62]. Probability theory measures uncertainties by the 
probabilities associated with events [84], where an event is defined as an “occurrence or outcome or 
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change of a particular set of circumstances” [34] and “corresponds to any of the possible states a 
physical system can assume, or any of the possible predictions of a model describing the system” [84]. 
According to Ayyub [34], the term probability has a precise mathematical definition but when used to 
represent  uncertainties it  is subject to two different interpretations: that of the Frequentist (objective 
or classical interpretation), and the Bayesian (subjective interpretation)  [34], [85]. 
2.2.3.1. Frequentist Interpretation  
The Frequentist school embodies classical statistical thinking and considers probability as a “true 
property of nature” [86] or “a property of the external world” [62] that can be measured objectively. It 
considers the probability of an event to be the frequency with which it would occur in a long series of 
similar trials [34]. “More precisely, it is the value to which the long-run frequency would converge as 
the number of experiments increases toward infinity” [52]. This approach is based on the “Law of Large 
Numbers” [52], according to which, if independent trials with the same probability of outcomes are 
repeated, the average value of the trials converges to the expected value. In other words, in the long run, 
given the above assumptions, actual value converges to the expected value [62]. One of the main 
advantages of the Frequentist approach is that “it involves only objective treatment of statistical 
samples” [33]. It is based on well-known principles of statistical inference that makes use of empirical 
data and empirically validated models [52], [83]. The limitations of this approach is that it only takes 
aleatory uncertainties into account and cannot be applied when the data is insufficient [33], [52]. This 
can be problematic for complex systems where epistemic uncertainty is high and in situations where 
data is scarce, e.g. for the risk analysis of UAS that have low data and high uncertainty associated with 
them. 
2.2.3.2. Bayesian Interpretation  
According to the  Bayesian school probability is “the rational degree of belief that one holds in the 
occurrence of an event” [34]. This is based on the concept of subjective probabilities; where probability 
is interpreted as “a number, expressing a state of knowledge or degree of belief that depends on the 
information, experience, and theories of the individual who assigns it” [52]. It is viewed as “a function 
not only of the event, but of the state of information. Different people may assign different probabilities 
and the probability assigned by any one person may change over time as new information is acquired” 
[52]. Probability quantifies the state of knowledge and represents the plausibility of an event or 
hypothesis [71]. Although subjective probabilities are judgmental in nature they are by no means 
arbitrary. They need to satisfy the same basic axioms as those in classical probability theory [52].  
The Bayesian approach uses both objective and subjective information to estimate probabilities, 
which are “conceived of as representing all aspects of a decision-maker’s lack of knowledge” [62]. The 
fact that it is capable of taking both objective and subjective measures of uncertainty into consideration 
[86] is one of the main advantages of this approach. In contrast to the Frequentist approach, the Bayesian 
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approach can be used when data is scarce [83] and can take both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties 
into consideration [33]. Furthermore, its use also allows the analyst to make use of all the available 
information to allow for better parameter estimation and improved decision making [33], [71].  
Due to the advantages above, the Bayesian approach has been used in a number of industries 
to evaluate and represent uncertainty. This includes: the space launch industry [87]–[92], nuclear power 
industry [93]–[97], fishery industry [98], ecological management industry [99]–[101] and bio 
management industry [102], [103], to name a few. Bayesian analysis techniques have also been applied 
in the field of aviation safety in the past. Specifically, through the use of a Bayesian Belief Network 
(BBN) to model accident causation, human-system interaction, and safety risks [104]–[106]. 
There are a number of concepts and tools that are fundamental to this Bayesian interpretation, 
such as, Bayes Theorem, Bayesian Credible Intervals, Bayesian hypothesis Testing and BBN. These 
concepts and tools are used throughout the thesis, in each of the individual chapters. A brief description 
of them is provided in Appendix D. For further details, the reader is directed to the individual references. 
2.2.4. Summary 
Based on the review conducted in this section, it is evident that there are two main types of uncertainty: 
epistemic uncertainty and aleatory uncertainty. This uncertainty can arise from a number of different 
sources as outlined in Table 5. In measuring uncertainty, the simplest and most common approach is 
through the use of probability theory [83]. Central to this is probability, which when applied to the 
representation of uncertainties, is subject to differing interpretations: that of the Frequentist (objective 
or classical interpretation), and the Bayesian (subjective interpretation)  [34], [85]. In the context of 
risk, uncertainty would relate to both components of risk, i.e., likelihood and magnitude of loss or 
severity. Bayesian methods are identified as the contemporary approach for representing uncertainty.  
2.3. The Concept of Risk 
A diverse array of definitions of risk are identified in the literature, some of which are summarised in  
Table 14 of Appendix C. In contrast to a hazard that simply exists as a source, a risk includes the 
likelihood of conversion of that source into actual delivery of loss, injury or some form of damage [38]. 
This section will provide a summary of some of the major definitions of risk (including those accepted 
in aviation safety literature) and their measurement (Table 15 of Appendix C).  
2.3.1. Definitions of Risk 
There is a negative connotation associated with risk and thus risk can be considered as “something that 
people fear or regard as negative” [107]. Based on an extensive review, Moller [62] describes three 
basic approaches to defining risk, specifically: the scientific, psychological and cultural approaches. 
While recognising the relevance of both the psychological approach and the cultural approach, the focus 
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of this study remains on the scientific approach to risk as used in aviation safety literature. The scientific 
or "objective" perspective considers risk to be a phenomenon that can be consistently studied and 
measured through the use of statistical and probabilistic tools. For further details on the other two 
approaches the reader is directed to [62]. 
On reviewing existing definitions of “objective risk” (e.g. [34], [38], [42], [47], [52], [62], [83], 
[107]), it is clear that there are two elements implicit in the concept of “objective risk”. Firstly, for risk 
to exist there must be “a potential source of damage or loss i.e. a hazard (threat) to a “target”, such as 
people or the environment” [49]. Secondly, there must be “uncertainty that the hazard translates from 
potential to actual damage, bypassing safeguards and protections” [83]. Risk exists when “there is the 
chance, but not the certainty” that something undesirable may happen [52]. These elements can further 
be broken down to include event or scenario, probability, consequence and uncertainty. 
In keeping with the two elements described above, Covello & Merkhofer [52] specify three 
conditions that need to be satisfied for a risk to exist. These include: a source of risk to introduce the 
risk agent into the system, an exposure process through which “people or the things they value may be 
exposed to the released risk agent” and a causal process by means of which exposures produce adverse 
consequences [52]. Each of these conditions can be viewed as “links in a risk chain” [108]. The 
quantification of risk requires the quantification of knowledge and uncertainty about each link in this 
chain [52]. There is no risk if any of these elements are absent [52]. 
Definitions such as [53], [86], [109] (Equation 1 to Equation 3 in Table 15 of Appendix C) define 
risk in terms of two components, probability and consequence. Kaplan and Garrick [38] provide the 
“triplet definition of risk”, which is widely accepted as a technical definition of risk (Equation 4 in 
Table 15 of Appendix C). Kaplan and Garrick [38] went on to make several advancements to this 
definition as can be seen in Equation 5 and Equation 6 in Table 15 of Appendix C, with the latter 
definition taking uncertainty into consideration. Other contemporary definitions of risk provided by 
Ayyub (Equation 7 in Table 15 of Appendix C) [34] and Aven (Equation 8 through to Equation 13 in 
Table 15 of Appendix C) [110] also include measures of uncertainty in the measures of risk. These 
definitions are however significantly more complicated. While going into such detail is only likely to 
strengthen the treatment of uncertainty within risk management processes, their complexity can make 
them difficult to apply in practical risk management settings.  
In its vernacular and broadest sense, risk  has been the subject of much discussion, and literature 
on the topic is abundant [25]. The definitions provided in Table 14 and Table 15 of Appendix C are 
only some of the many definitions of risk identified in the literature. The vernacular use of the term is 
too frequent, quite generic and generally vague, which is a potential source of confusion [25]. ICAO 
[25] suggests the use of a narrower term, “safety risk” to address some of this confusion, distinguishing 
the term and limiting its scope.  
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2.3.2. Measurement of Risk 
The literature review identified two common elements to most definitions of risk as being: probability 
and consequence (outcomes) (e.g. [53], [86], [109]). Severity is generally used to characterise the 
consequences [110]. A third element, an event (initiating event or scenario) (e.g. [38], [83]) is also often 
included in most definitions of risk. Uncertainty is not as common, but is identified in a number of 
contemporary definitions of risk (e.g. [34], [38], [110]) and is often expressed through probabilities 
[110]. There are thus four elements that need to be taken into consideration: event or scenario, 
probability, consequence and uncertainty. A number of approaches to measure each of these elements 
currently exist. In addition, there are a variety of methods used to combine these elements. To measure 
risk, we must assess its defining components, and measure the chance, its negativity and potential 
rewards or benefits [34]. 
The definitions of risk often make use of the term frequency instead of probability. According 
to Kaplan and Garrick [38], probability and frequency are two distinct terms. While probability is a 
numerical measure of a state of knowledge, a degree of belief or a state of confidence, frequency refers 
to the outcome of an experiment involving repeated trials. Probability (and frequency) can be measured 
in several ways. Nilsen and Aven [86] identify three distinct approaches to measure probability: the 
traditional approach (based on principles and methods of classical statistics), the classical approach with 
uncertainty analysis (also referred to as the probability of frequency framework) and the predictive 
Bayesian approach. These interpretations fall under the Frequentist interpretation and the Bayesian 
interpretation described in Section §2.2.3. The latter interpretation is more suitable for systems with 
limited operational data and unique operating conditions [86].  
Each failure of a system can have one or more consequences associated with it [34]. In many 
applications, it is appropriate to identify different types of damage or consequence [38]. In these cases, 
damage can be regarded as a multidimensional or vector quantity. These consequences can be in the 
form of financial loss, property damage, environmental damage and injury or fatality of human life. The 
MIL-STD-882E [47] defines loss in terms of damage to people, equipment or property, or the 
environment. These types of loss define the different domains of consequence [17]. They are quantified 
in terms of failure-consequence severities and make use of relative or absolute measures for various 
consequence types to facilitate risk analysis [34].  
In the engineering context, risk is often linked to the expected loss. However, this equates 
situations with high consequence and low probabilities to situations with low consequence but high 
probabilities, as long as the sums of the products of the possible outcomes and the associated 
probabilities are equal [110]. As described by Faber [109], the risk associated with an activity with only 
one event with potential consequences is the probability that this event will occur multiplied with the 
consequence, given the event occurs. Based on this approach to measuring risk, “if the likelihood of an 
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accident increases, so does the risk; likewise, if the severity of an outcome increases, so does the 
magnitude of the risk” [62]. According to Kaplan, it would be more accurate to measure risk as 
“probability and consequence” [38], this is in keeping with the ways risk is most commonly measured 
in standards and in scientific literature [110]. Examples of this approach can be found in [34], [38], 
[51], [110], [111]. ICAO [25] adopts a similar procedure with risk measured using likelihood and 
severity. 
2.3.3. A Contemporary Definition of Risk 
The classical view in decision theory distinguishes between situations with known probabilities such as 
coin tossing and situations where probabilities are unknown or only partially known; such as 
determining the probability of a major accident in a complex plant [62], [73]. While the risk associated 
with the former situation can be described with probabilities, the risk associated with the latter situation 
cannot. It involves epistemic uncertainty which “may not be reducible to a unique probability value in 
a rational way” [62]. It is thus imperative to move from a probability-based definition, to one that takes 
uncertainty into consideration. Examples of such definitions are provided in [34], [38], [110]. For a 
detailed list of definitions that take uncertainty into consideration refer to Table 14 of Appendix C. For 
details on the Frequentist and Bayesian approach the reader is directed to Section §2.2.3. 
2.3.4. Summary  
There is a progressive shift in the definition of risk from one based on probability towards one that take 
varying levels of uncertainty into consideration (e.g. [34], [38], [110]). Table 14 of Appendix C 
summarises some of these definitions. Taking all of the above into consideration, the definition of risk 
adopted in this thesis will be in keeping with those presented by Kaplan [38], Ayyub [34] and Aven 
[110] and will take uncertainty into consideration.  
2.4. Decision Theory 
In a SRMP decisions are generally made on the basis of risk assessment (discussed in Section §2.5). 
Decision theory describes the theory of rational decision making [112], [113]. The overall objective of 
decision theory is to “formulate hypotheses about rational decision making that are as accurate and 
precise as possible” [112]. Under decision theory, a rational decision-maker needs to make a choice 
between the available alternatives on the basis of their consequences [113]. There are two main branches 
of decision theory: descriptive decision theory and normative decision theory [112]–[115]. Descriptive 
theory seeks to describe and predict how decisions are actually made by individuals based on consistent 
rules [112], [115]. This is an empirical discipline, stemming from experimental psychology [112]. 
Normative theory on the other hand seeks to make prescriptions about what decisions a rational 
decision-maker should make [112], [115]. It identifies the best decision to make, assuming the decision-
maker is fully informed and able to compute with perfect accuracy, and is fully rational [114]. “How 
people actually behave is likely to change over time and across cultures, but a sufficiently general 
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normative theory can be expected to withstand time and cultural differences” [112]. For more details 
on each of these approaches the reader is directed to [112]–[115].  
2.4.1. Decision Making Under Uncertainty 
A risk-based approach to decision-making is required to provide a defensible basis for making 
decisions. Under a risk-based approach, objective decisions are made based on a systematic and 
objective assessment of the risk associated with different decision options. This risk-based approach 
helps identify the greatest risks and prioritises efforts to minimise or eliminate them [116].  
A deterministic approach to decision-making involves: identifying a group of failure event 
sequences leading to credible worst-case accident scenarios; predicting their consequences; and 
designing appropriate safety barriers which prevent such scenarios and protect from, and mitigate, their 
associated consequences [117]. In general, the use of conservative worst-case assumptions, that are 
characteristic of a deterministic approach, does not take the uncertainty associated with systems and 
their operation into consideration.  
A probabilistic approach to decision-making provides an effective way to analyse system safety 
that takes all feasible scenarios and their related consequences into consideration. These alternate 
scenarios will have probabilities associated with them, that need to be quantified in order to rationally 
and quantitatively handle uncertainty [116]. Under this approach, definitions of risk such as that 
provided by Kaplan and Garrick [38] are needed. This looks at risk as a set of three elements: scenario, 
likelihood and consequence, with uncertainty associated with the latter two components. Defining risk 
in this way supports risk management by: distinguishing between high-probability, low-consequence 
outcomes and low-probability, high consequence outcomes; allowing for proactive risk management 
controls; and helping identify areas where investment is needed to reduce uncertainty [118].  
The bottom line concern with decision-making under uncertainty is to provide the decision-
makers with a clearly informed picture of the problem upon which they can confidently reason and 
deliberate [83], [117]. Jaynes [119] describes the desiderata of rationality and consistency for plausible 
reasoning in the presence of uncertainty. The general preface is that decision makers can only make 
inferences (or propositions) about the state of the world based on the uncertain knowledge and 
information on hand. Bayesian inference provides a means for measuring uncertainty in relation to these 
hypotheses by producing information based on models, data, and other information [71]. Bayesian 
inference can also be used to progressively update the state of knowledge (degree of belief in the 
hypothesis) as new data or experience in the operation of the system are gained. For these reasons 
Bayesian techniques are used in the probabilistic assessment of the risks in industries like the space 
launch industry [87], [88], and the nuclear power industry [93]. Thus, to better account for uncertainties 
in decision making processes, a definition of risk and associated measures that account for uncertainty 
are needed. 
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2.5. Safety Risk Management Process 
Safety Risk Management (SRM) “encompasses the assessment and mitigation of safety risks” [25]. It  
involves “weighing the potential costs of risks against the possible benefits of allowing those risks to 
stand uncontrolled” [40] and is a control task “focused on maintaining a particular hazardous, 
productive process within the boundaries of safe operation” [120]. There are a number of definitions of 
SRM provided in the literature, some of which are summarised in Table 16 of Appendix C. ISO 
31000:2018 [121] defines the SRMP as, “the systematic application of policies, procedures and 
practices to the activities of communicating and consulting, establishing the context, and assessing, 
treating, monitoring, reviewing, recording and reporting risk”. Some common definitions of the SRMP 
from aviation safety literature can be found in  [26]–[28], [31], [56], [122]. 
2.5.1. Structure of the Safety Risk Management Process  
The main goal of risk management is not to reduce all risks to zero but rather to reduce risk to an 
acceptable level so that  routine risk management and cost-benefit analysis become sufficient to ensure 
overall safety and integrity [34], [107]. There are three main strategies to evaluate and manage risks. 
These are risk-based strategies, precautionary strategies and discursive strategies. For details on each, 
the reader is directed to [107]. In general, there are seven sub-processes that go into defining the SRMP 
outlined in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5: The safety risk management process, based on [111] 
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The international standard has recently been updated to include an additional process of 
recording and reporting as described in [121], however, in keeping with the definitions outlined in 
aviation safety literature, this research will only focus on the above seven mentioned sub-processes. 
Each of these sub-processes will be discussed in brief in the following sub-sections. Section §2.5.4 will 
look at the uncertainty associated with each of these processes. For further details on each of the sub-
processes, the reader is directed to [17], [25]–[28], [40], [66], [111], [121]. 
2.5.1.1. Establish the Context 
This is the process of “defining the external and internal parameters to be taken into account when 
managing risk, and setting the scope and risk criteria for the risk management policy” [111]. Recently, 
ISO 31000:2018 [121] stated that, while setting the risk criteria, “the nature and type of uncertainties 
that can affect outcomes and objectives (both tangible and intangible)” should be considered. The risk 
identification process involves consideration of a number of factors including the “cultural, social, 
political, legal, regulatory, financial, technological, economic, natural, and competitive environment” 
in which the system will operate [111]. The relationships with, and perception and values of the 
stakeholders is another key element of this process. In general, the process of establishing the context 
defines the input, desired outputs, and the boundaries and constraints on decisions made throughout the 
SRMP [17]. This is followed by the risk assessment process.  
2.5.1.2. Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is defined as “a systematic process for describing and quantifying the risks associated 
with hazardous substances, processes, action, or events” [52]. It is “a technical and scientific process 
by which the risks of a given situation for a system are modeled and quantified” [34]. It comprises of 
three sub processes: risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation [121]. According to ISO 
31000:2018 [121], “risk assessment should be conducted systematically, iteratively and collaboratively, 
drawing on the knowledge and views of stakeholders. It should use the best available information, 
supplemented by further enquiry as necessary”. The objective of the risk assessment process is to 
comprehensively characterise the risks associated with the operation of the system (risk identification) 
and consequently determine which of the characterised risks can be tolerated and which require 
mitigation or treatment (risk analysis and risk evaluation) [17].  
 The purpose of risk identification is to “find, recognize and describe risks that might help or 
prevent an organization achieving its objectives” [121]. According to ISO 31000:2018 [121], there are 
uncertainties that may affect one or more of these objectives that organisations should identify using a 
variety of techniques. In general, the risk identification process identifies how the system can fail, how 
these failures and conditions manifest as hazards, and the potential undesired outcomes that can result 
from the occurrence of the hazard [17]. Output from this process is a set of characterised scenarios. The 
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set of all scenarios identified with a given activity is described as the risk profile [17]. According to 
ISO 31000:2018 [121], “Relevant, appropriate and up-to date information is important in identifying 
risk”.  
The purpose of risk analysis is to “comprehend the nature of risk and its characteristics 
including, where appropriate, the level of risk” [121]. It describes the process of characterising the 
nature and level of the risks (likelihood and consequence) for each of the identified scenarios [17]. 
Likelihood and consequence are used to assess the risk based on a range of qualitative and quantitative 
scales [17]. Input to the risk analysis process are the scenario descriptions output from the risk 
identification process. In general, output from the risk analysis process are measures of the likelihood 
and consequence of risk. ISO 31000:2018 [121] also mentions the need to consider uncertainty in the 
risk analysis process.  
The purpose of risk evaluation is to “support decisions” [121].  Risk evaluation is essentially a 
decision-making process that requires decisions about the acceptability of risk to be made [37]. It is the 
process of comparing the results of risk analysis with the established risk criteria to determine whether 
additional action is required [121]. A number of decision making processes can be used within the risk 
evaluation process; including the ALARP and SFARP frameworks [66]–[68]. Based on this, safety risks 
can generally be assessed as being acceptable, tolerable or intolerable. For more details on this, the 
reader is directed to Ref. [25]. 
2.5.1.3. Risk Treatment 
Once the risks are assessed, they need to be treated. This process is called risk treatment and is also a 
decision-making process. The purpose of this process is to select and implement options for addressing 
risk [121]. It involves identifying, implementing, and evaluating suitable measures to reduce (mitigate, 
modify, treat or control) the risk [17]. The inputs to this decision-making process are measures of risks 
and assessments of the effectiveness, costs and benefits associated with available risk treatment options. 
The outputs are the specification of risks to be treated (the subjective decision function of ranking risks) 
and the specification of treatment options to be implemented for each specified risk (the subjective 
decision function involving the trading-offs of risks, costs and benefits) [37]. 
2.5.1.4. Monitor and Review 
The purpose of monitor and review is to “assure and improve the quality and effectiveness of process 
design, implementation and outcomes” [121]. Owing to the dynamic nature of risk, it is important to 
monitor and review the SRMP in response to changes in the risk. The process of monitoring and 
reviewing ensures the management of risks is constantly maintained and improved. It is undertaken at 
all stages of the SRMP. 
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2.5.1.5. Communication and Consultation 
Finally, the communication and consultation process ensures that the broader stakeholder concerns and 
the issues stemming from the lack of knowledge of the risks and the benefits associated with the 
operation are addressed [17]. The purpose of the communication and consultation process is to “assist 
relevant stakeholders in understanding risk, the basis on which decisions are made and the reasons why 
particular actions are required” [121]. Communication and consultation is key to “avoiding potential 
conflict in the safety decision-making process, for ensuring that stakeholder concerns are being 
addressed, and for reducing uncertainty in the decisions and outcomes” [17]. Like the monitoring and 
reviewing process, this process is also undertaken at all stages of the SRMP. 
2.5.2. Data Collection 
Data forms the basis on which risk assessment are made. Data can include information about “the 
possible failures, failure probabilities, failure rates, failure modes, possible causes, and failure 
consequences” [34]. Such information may not be available for new systems or technologies like UAS. 
This lack of data and information is a major source of epistemic uncertainty. In such cases, data from 
similar systems may be used. Alternatively, expert judgement can serve as a source of information if 
the above approaches are not applicable [34]. Combinations of the above can also be used to provide a 
more detailed analysis of the problem at hand. Referring to Table 5, it is clear that uncertainty can result 
from the inputs, data, outputs and use of expert judgement which all need to be taken into consideration 
while collecting data. It is important to identify and represent any uncertainty regarding the quality of 
the data, as this will assist in the decision-making process. When collecting data and statistics 
concerning the events it is of paramount importance to ensure that this data is as accurate, complete and 
consistent as possible.  
If extensive data are available, straightforward statistical analysis can be used to analyse the 
frequency and consequences of risks. When data are lacking, models need to be constructed [52]. It is 
often argued that insufficient data and scientific understanding limit the usefulness and effectiveness of 
risk assessment. However “while insufficient data and scientific understanding may rule out the use of 
some data-intensive risk assessment methods, it does not necessarily follow that other systematic 
methods designed to quantify uncertainty will not be helpful to decision makers” [52]. According to 
Zio & Pedroni [49], the lack of information, data, or knowledge, the existence of too much information, 
data or knowledge and the selection of an appropriate model to be used in the risk analysis process are 
all major sources of uncertainty that again need to be taken into consideration. This uncertainty can be 
classified as both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty and consequently require the adoption of a 
Bayesian approach to measure the uncertainty. The Bayesian approach uses both objective and 
subjective information  to estimate probabilities, which are “conceived of as representing all aspects of 
a decision-maker’s lack of knowledge” [62].  
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2.5.3. Quantitative Risk Assessment 
Risk assessments can be qualitative (descriptive or categorical treatments of information) or quantitative 
(mathematical analyses of numerical data) [123]. In situations where data, time or other resources are 
limited it may only be possible to conduct a qualitative risk assessment. However, in general 
quantitative risk assessments are preferred to qualitative risk assessments [123]. This is because 
quantitative methods “express risk in the language of numbers” which are more precise than words and 
provide “more useful inputs for a decision on what to do about risks” [52]. Quantifying risk helps risk 
managers make “coherent risk management decisions under uncertainties and within resource 
constraints” [33]. Example of quantitative risk models and tools that support this process for industries 
with low data can be found in [124], [125]. 
Within the context of quantitative risk assessment, two distinct approaches are defined in the 
literature: namely the deterministic approach and the stochastic approach. A deterministic approach is 
referred to as a point estimate approach while a stochastic approach is referred to as a probability 
approach. “The primary difference between these two approaches is in their description of the inputs to 
a risk assessment” [123]. The point-estimate approach uses single values (such as average) as inputs to 
a risk assessment and produces a single value for the risk estimate. The stochastic or probabilistic 
approach looks at all the available data. Instead of a single point estimate to describe the risk parameters, 
it uses probability distributions which look at a range of values and specifies the frequency of these 
values. These distributions are based on empirical data, knowledge, and even expert opinions if no other 
information is available. The output of this approach is a risk distribution “that characterizes the range 
of risk that might be experienced by an individual or population” [123]. There can be uncertainty 
associated with the accuracy and correctness of the assumed model describing a probability distribution 
or the parameters and data used to substantiate the model that needs to be taken into consideration.   
A powerful tool used by many industries to analyse the identified risks and uncertainties, is the 
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) tool. According to Paté-Cornell, “Engineering risk analysis generally 
relies on probabilistic tools designed to quantify and display uncertainties when the information base is 
incomplete” [33].  For example, when the risk of operations of nuclear power plants was assessed in 
the early nineteen seventies there had not been any nuclear accidents. Consequently these studies were 
based on PRAs which proved to be a definite improvement on previous deterministic approaches [33]. 
Even though the probabilistic approach is more complex, this method is preferred for quantitative risk 
assessments. This is because it takes account of “the variability and uncertainty in the information used 
to derive the risk estimate” [126].  
2.5.4. Uncertainty in the SRMP  
Uncertainty can pervade in all stages of the SRMP. The perception and values of the stakeholders are 
taken into consideration while establishing the context. Uncertainty influences the level of risk 
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perceived by the stakeholders and the risk treatment options adopted [17]. Having an effective 
communication and consultation process is important to addressing the uncertainty of the stakeholders 
[17]. There is however uncertainty associated with the communication and consultation process as well. 
This can be introduced through the communication of the model and its outputs to other stakeholders.  
A particular issue in the SRMP, especially for new and evolving systems such as UAS, is 
managing the uncertainty in the risk assessment process [17]. Zio & Pedroni [49] identify many factors 
which could lead to uncertainty in risk analysis that need to be taken into consideration based on [127], 
[128]. These factors will be taken into consideration in the proceeding discussion and include:  
• the lack of information, data, or knowledge;  
• the existence of too much information, data or knowledge; 
• the selection of an appropriate model to be used in the risk analysis process; 
• the conflicting nature of the data (due to errors in the data or due to the fact that some of the 
data is not relevant); 
• the bias in the model chosen by the analyst; 
• the measurement errors made by the analyst performing the measurement;  
• the subjectivity of the way the analyst interprets the available information and data; 
• the language used by the analyst (due to the interpretation of the language used by the analyst). 
According to ISO 31000:2018 [121], successful implementation of the SRMP through 
engagement of stakeholders, enables organisations to explicitly address uncertainty in decision-making, 
while also ensuring any new or subsequent uncertainty can be taken into account as it arises. 
2.5.4.1. Uncertainty in the Risk Identification Process 
A number of different tools, data and techniques can be used to identify and characterise a risk-profile 
that is output from the risk identification process. Risk identification tools can be classified as historical 
(i.e. review of accident and incident data), brainstorming (e.g. elicitation of knowledge from domain 
experts), and systematic (e.g. formal tools and processes) techniques [31]. Referring to Section §2.2.2 
and Zio and Pedroni [49], it can be seen that the scarce availability of data, imprecision of the data and 
information available on the system, measurement errors, use of subjective expert judgement and even 
the models and tools used in this process are all potential sources of uncertainty that need to be taken 
into consideration in the risk identification process. In general, models are approximate and simplified 
representations of reality and is a potential source of uncertainty to the overall analysis. In addition, the 
processes used for the identification of the hazards themselves and the contributing failures and 
conditions that result in these hazards are additional sources of uncertainty that need to be addressed. 
Uncertainty can also arise due to the possibly incomplete identification of the hazards [49]. The final 
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component of risk identification is assessing the potential consequence. Consequences can be in the 
form of damage to people, equipment or property, or the environment (domains of consequence) [47]. 
The qualitative and quantitative spectrum of consequences (severity) needs to be defined for each 
domain of consequence identified. The use of limited data, expert opinion and decision criteria to assess 
these potential consequences is another source of uncertainty that needs to be taken into consideration 
in this sub-process. 
2.5.4.2. Uncertainty in the Risk Analysis Process 
Uncertainty in the quantitative analysis of the accident sequence typically affects “the values of the 
conditional probabilities of events comprising the accident scenarios”, “the modelling of the accident 
scenarios by means of traditional event tree and fault tree methodologies”, and “the consequences of 
the accident scenarios” [49].  
An event can have “multiple causes and consequences and can affect multiple objectives” 
[121]. The potential outcomes of a given risk scenario are mapped to the consequence levels (qualitative 
or quantitative) [17]. The limited data and use of expert judgement in this process is a potential source 
of uncertainty. Mathematical models that are usually translated to computer codes are often used to 
determine a quantitative estimate of the consequence. This can be a potential source of uncertainty 
including aleatory parametric uncertainty, epistemic parametric uncertainty and epistemic model 
uncertainty. For further details on each, the reader is directed to [49]. In addition, as there can be more 
than one consequential outcome associated with the occurrence of a single risk scenario, the mapping 
is typically based on the worst-possible outcome identified. This implies strong elements of 
“subjectivity and arbitrariness in the definition of the accidental events, which may lead to the 
consideration of scenarios characterized by really catastrophic consequences, although highly unlikely” 
[49]. This may prove to be a conservative approach that fails to take the uncertainty associated with the 
process into consideration.  
Assessments of the likelihood of occurrence can be based on a range of information sources 
including incident and accident data, component reliability data and expert knowledge. Referring to 
Section §2.2.2 and Zio and Pedroni [49], it can be seen that the limited data, use of expert judgement 
and even the models and tools used in these processes are all potential sources of uncertainty that need 
to be considered. Epistemic uncertainties may arise due to 1) the lack of knowledge and/or data on the 
physical phenomena involved and/or 2) the limited or (possibly) null operating experience of the 
corresponding component or system over the wide range of conditions encountered during the operation 
of the system [49]. This typically affects the values of the probabilities and frequencies of the events 
included in the accident scenarios of interest and is a particular problem for systems employing new 
technologies [49]. This is another source of uncertainty that needs to be recognised. 
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2.5.4.3. Uncertainty in the Risk Evaluation Processes 
Risk evaluation involves decision-making in relation to the risks associated with the accident scenarios 
identified and quantified in the previous step. As there is uncertainty in the outputs of the risk analysis 
process, this inputs into the risk evaluation process as well. Consequently, a risk-based decision-making 
process that takes this uncertainty into consideration is required. By accounting for the potential 
uncertainty in the inputs to the risk evaluation process, it is possible to base decisions in relation to the 
acceptability (or need for mitigation) of risk (uncertainty and consequence). Consequence could be 
expressed in terms of the potential losses associated with different potential decision outcomes.  
The risk evaluation process compares the results of the risk analysis with the established risk 
criteria to determine whether additional action is required [121]. A number of decision-making 
processes can be used within the risk evaluation process; including the ALARP and SFARP 
frameworks. For details on each the reader is directed to [66]–[68]. Focusing on the ALARP framework, 
determining that risks have been reduced to a level ALARP involves: an assessment of the risk to be 
avoided; of the sacrifice or costs (e.g., in money, time, and trouble) involved in taking measures to treat 
that risk; and a comparison of the two components to see if there exists a gross disproportion [68]. There 
are “psychological, social, and practical difficulties in the specification and sole use of quantifiable 
criteria” within the ALARP framework [17]. Clothier et. al. [69] identify various difficulties in applying 
the ALARP framework to the UAS sector. As described in [69] most of these challenges arise due to 
uncertainty in assessments and decision criteria, which are not currently accounted for in the ALARP 
process. Consequently, qualitative frameworks that focus on demonstrating that all reasonably 
practicable measures have been undertaken to reduce a risk as opposed to making quantifiable 
comparisons of the assessed risks are adopted. The limited operational data, decision criteria, 
assumptions and use of expert judgement are sources of uncertainty that need to be taken into 
consideration. As described in Section §2.2.2 and Zio and Pedroni [49], uncertainty in the framework 
used to model this process (e.g. ALARP framework) is also a source of aleatory uncertainty that needs 
to be considered. 
One final source of uncertainty that has not been discussed yet is that associated with the 
adoption of risk matrices. While the adoption of a risk matrix is standard practice in industry, there is 
potential uncertainty associated with the application of this risk matrix which is being propagated 
throughout the SRMP. Cox [129] highlights some of the limitations associated with the adoption of 
such risk-matrices. While addressing them is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to 
understand the uncertainty associated with them and how it impacts this sub-process. 
2.5.4.4. Uncertainty in the Risk Treatment Processes 
Risk treatment involves decision-making in relation to the evaluated risks. As there is uncertainty in the 
outputs of the risk evaluation process, this inputs into the risk treatment process as well. Consequently, 
  
 
© Copyright Achim Washington 2019  45 
 
a risk-based decision-making process that takes this uncertainty into consideration is required. Those 
risk scenarios that are not tolerable need to be reduced (mitigated, modified, treated or controlled) [17]. 
As multiple risk scenarios may exist, the treatment options also need to be prioritised. The uncertainty 
in the output data, use of expert judgement and inadequacies in the model are all sources of uncertainty 
that need to be further considered while undertaking the risk treatment process.   
2.5.4.5. Uncertainty in the Safety Decision-making Process 
It is suggested that the manner in which uncertainty is treated in a risk analysis depends on the level of 
uncertainty present [33]. Paté-Cornell’s framework provides a generic high-level way of describing the 
degree to which risk assessments characterise and present uncertainties to support decision making [33]. 
Paté-Cornell’s [33] framework for describing the “six levels of treatment of uncertainties in risk 
analysis” is summarised in Table 6. While the quantification of uncertainties is desirable and should be 
part of a risk assessment, a full uncertainty analysis can often prove to be a “difficult and costly 
enterprise” and should only be undertaken if it is relevant to risk management [33].  
Table 6: Treatment of uncertainties (adapted from [33]) 
Level Description Example 
0 Does not require any quantification of risk. Only involves the 
detection of potential hazards and identification of the different 
ways in which the system can fail, without attempting to 
quantitatively assess the risk. 
Hazard detection and failure 
modes identification (e.g. 
Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis (FMEA)). 
1 Based on the accumulation of worst-case assumptions. Yields, 
in theory, maximum loss level. Does not involve any notion of 
probability. 
Identification of worst-case 
conditions. 
2 Evaluation of the worst possible conditions that can be 
reasonably expected when there is uncertainty about what the 
worst case could be or when the worst case is so unlikely that it 
is meaningless. Such assessments usually do not involve the 
assessment of probabilities. 
Evaluation of ‘plausible upper 
bounds’ or ‘quasi-worst 
cases’. 
3 Relies on ‘best estimates’ and/or on a central value (e.g. mean, 
median or mode) of the outcome (e.g. loss) distribution, 
generally through ‘best estimates’, of different variables. The 
disadvantage of central values is that the risk is still 
characterized by a single point estimate.  
Best estimates of central 
values or the Maximum 
Likelihood Estimates (MLE) 
of the parameter. 
4 Makes use of PRA to obtain a probability distribution based on 
best estimates of the models and parameter values. Classical 
Frequentist methods are used to take account of aleatory 
uncertainties. It includes both epistemic and aleatory 
uncertainties, however the use of a single risk curve limits the 
information available.  
PRA (also referred to as 
Quantitative Risk Assessment 
(QRA) or Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment (PSA)) and a 
single risk curve. 
5 Uncertainties about fundamental hypotheses are displayed by a 
family of risk curves. Could be done by using Bayesian 
inference on the existing data. Alternately, a group of experts 
could be individually asked to use their preferred model to 
provide risk assessments and to provide their estimations of 
parameter values for a given model. 
PRA and multiple risk curves. 
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2.5.5. Risk Management in the Aviation Industry 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) advocates the adoption of SRM procedures to 
identify the hazards and mitigate the risks posed by systems [25]. This involves the two key concepts 
of a State Safety Programme (SSP) and a Safety Management System (SMS). A clear understanding of 
the relationship between an SSP and an SMS is essential for concerted safety management action within 
States [25]. Each State is required to establish a SSP in order to achieve an acceptable level of safety as 
established by the State. Example descriptions can be found in [25]–[28]. This involves “an integrated 
set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety” [3].  
The ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) [25] provides guidelines to the States on the 
procedures for the development and implementation of a SSP in accordance with the international 
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) contained in Annexes 1, 6, 8, 11, 13 and 14. The main 
objective of a SMS is to foster a sound safety culture across all levels in the organisation by relying, 
amongst other things, on a systematic and effective (informed) risk management process. A SMS is “a 
system to assure the safe operation of aircraft through effective management of safety risk” [122]. One 
of the outcomes of a SMS is a documented safety case necessary to obtain approvals for operation. As 
part of the SMS, operators need to identify hazards and specify how safety risks will be managed. As 
specified in the ICAO [25], a SMS should comprise of four basic components: safety policy and 
objectives, safety risk management, safety assurance and safety promotion. The focus of this thesis is 
on the SRMP. In general, aviation industry follows the standard SRMP as described in Section §2.5. 
For more details, the reader is directed to [25]. 
Existing aviation safety regulatory and associated guidance materials are reviewed to ascertain 
how risk and in particular uncertainty is characterised and addressed within the aviation safety 
framework. ICAO [25] define safety risk as, “the assessment, expressed in terms of predicted 
probability and severity, of the consequences of a hazard, taking as reference the worst foreseeable 
situation”. The definitions adopted by CAA [31], FAA [26], CASA [27], [28] and EASA [32] can be 
found in the individual references. Based on these definitions it can be seen that, in general, there is no 
mention of uncertainty. Risk is measured in terms of probability (likelihood) and consequence 
(severity). A standard risk-matrix is used in the risk assessment process [17]. This can prove to be a 
limiting factor, especially when dealing with new and evolving technologies such as UAS that have 
uncertainty associated with them. To better account for the uncertainty in the aviation sector, the 
definitions of risk outlined in aviation safety literature needs to be aligned with more contemporary risk 
concepts as described in Section §2.3. 
In addition to the probability and consequence associated with a particular event, contemporary 
definitions incorporate uncertainty into their definitions of risk (e.g. [34], [38], [110], [121]). In taking 
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this uncertainty into consideration, contemporary approaches adopt a Bayesian approach to measuring 
uncertainty while measuring risk [86]. The SRMP adopted by aviation safety regulatory bodies [25]–
[28], [31], [32] generally make the assumption of a worst-case consequential outcome and tend not to 
take uncertainty into consideration in the risk analysis process [25], [31]. This approach is often referred 
to as a structuralist defense-in-depth-approach [49]. Within this approach, safety margins against the 
identified scenarios are enforced “through conservative regulations of system design and operation, 
under the creed that the identified worst-case, credible accidents would envelop all credible accidents 
for what regards the challenges and stresses posed on the system and its protections” [49]. 
Consequently, the adoption of a Frequentist approach to measuring probability and in turn risk is more 
common practice for quantitative assessments. This is not in keeping with contemporary definitions of 
risk [34], [38], [110]. Referring to Paté-Cornell’s [33] “six levels of treatment of uncertainties in risk 
analysis”, it can be seen that in general, the level of uncertainty taken into consideration in the aviation 
industry is Level 2. It involves evaluation of the worst possible conditions that can be reasonably 
expected when there is uncertainty about what the worst case could be or when the worst case is so 
unlikely that it is meaningless [33].  
As objective assessments of the uncertainty are generally not input into the aviation safety risk 
management decision-making processes (i.e. risk evaluation and risk treatment), there is potential for 
subjectivity in the decision-making processes. If the aviation industry is going to move towards a risk-
based approach to developing regulations (rule-making) [25]–[28], [31], [32] and there is uncertainty 
associated with this risk, then it is important to adopt a risk-based approach that takes uncertainty into 
consideration in the decision-making processes that follow. Adopting a risk-based approach to decision-
making would provide a defensible basis for making decisions and help identify the greatest risks and 
prioritise efforts to minimise or eliminate them [116].  
Aviation safety risk assessments make use of a broad array of data (e.g. accident and incident 
data, events, non-conformance or deviations, etc.). These data can originate from a variety of sources 
(e.g. historical data, expert judgement, etc.) and are used in both the development of models and as 
input to the models. Both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties are inherent to the risk assessment 
process. Further, there is potential uncertainty associated with the setting of safety criteria, and in 
assessment of the effectiveness of risk treatments against these criteria. Uncertainty can also be 
introduced through the communication of the model and its outputs to other stakeholders. For example, 
aleatory uncertainty arising due to homophony, linguistic or lexical ambiguity, channel distortion, trust, 
etc. Owing to the importance of the data quality, ICAO [25]  does recommend organisations assess the 
data using certain criteria: validity, completeness, consistency, accessibility, timeliness, security and 
accuracy. This would ensure the data used is of the highest quality, thus reducing the uncertainty 
associated with it. 
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2.6. Risk-based Regulation in the Aviation Industry 
National Aviation Authorities (NAA) policy and rule-making activities follow a risk-based approach, 
whereby a safety argument is provided to support and justify the development of airworthiness 
regulations [16]. A risk-based approach in the aviation industry acknowledges that regulations are 
merely the embodiment of the outcomes of a risk management process [16], specifically: “they are legal 
requirements relating to how various stakeholders should go about treating safety risks; requirements 
relating to the implementation of controls or measures to modify, mitigate, or otherwise reduce the 
risk”. Risk management should drive the development of regulations, ensuring a clear traceability 
between the legislated requirement and the risks it is in place to manage. The intended outcome is a 
framework of regulations and standards that has a defensible and objective basis in risk. 
Aviation regulatory bodies such as ICAO, FAA, EASA, CASA and CAA [25]–[28], [31], [32] 
take the risks associated with the operation of aviation systems into consideration when developing 
regulations (i.e. rule-making). However, it was found that existing aviation SRMP do not adequately 
account for uncertainty. Based on the review conducted in Section §2.5.4, it was made clear that 
uncertainty is inherent in all steps of the SRMP. Thus, in moving towards a contemporary definition of 
risk, it is important to take this uncertainty into consideration in the risk-based approach to rule-making 
adopted by aviation regulatory bodies. This uncertainty in the performance assessments in the SRMP 
also results in uncertainty in the regulatory decision-making processes of compliance assessment and 
compliance finding.  
Compliance assessment is the process of assessing the traits or properties of a system (or 
process) that are needed to verify requirements. In general, the current compliance assessment processes 
used in the aviation sector are subjective and make use of deterministic binary “pass or fail” processes 
to make compliance assessments. These processes are often unable to take the uncertainty in the 
performance assessments that are input into the compliance assessment process into consideration. This 
leads to risk and uncertainty in the outputs of the compliance assessment process. 
 Compliance finding is a deterministic decision-making process where the system is deemed 
compliant if it meets the necessary conditions of the regulation or standard, and all the necessary 
documentation on the assessment outcomes, people, tools, and data used are provided to have adequate 
assurance in that assessment. However, this assurance (confidence) tends to be subjective. The binary 
outputs from the compliance assessment process are input into the compliance finding process. As there 
is uncertainty in these outputs, there is also potential risk and uncertainty associated with the decision-
making process of compliance findings. Current compliance approaches do not objectively account for 
uncertainty in the state of compliance. A decision maker uses a subjective and somewhat “black box” 
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process for making compliance findings. Currently, aviation decision makers cannot account for 
compliance risk for all possible compliance decision outcomes, which can include [2]: 
1. Certifying the system as compliant when it is in fact compliant; a desirable outcome; 
2. Certifying the system as compliant when it is in fact non-compliant. This is the least desirable 
outcome, which can lead to the operation of a system that does not meet the minimum safety 
standards; 
3. Not certifying a system as compliant when it is in fact compliant. This is a less than desirable 
outcome where an unnecessary cost is borne by the system manufacturer; 
4. Not certifying a system as compliant when it is in fact non-compliant; a desirable outcome; 
5. Requiring further data and analysis to be undertaken when the system is in fact compliant. This 
is a less than desirable outcome where an unnecessary cost is borne by the system manufacturer; 
6. Requiring further data and analysis when the system is in fact non-compliant; this is a less than 
desirable outcome where an unnecessary cost is borne by the system manufacturer in 
undertaking additional assessment on a non-compliant system. 
A means to take this uncertainty into consideration in both the compliance assessment and 
compliance finding regulatory processes is thus required. Extending the risk-based approach to the 
regulatory processes of compliance assessment and compliance finding will allow for this uncertainty 
to be taken into consideration and support compliance findings to be made based on compliance risk.  
In the aviation industry, ICAO [25] outlines certain criteria that enforcement decisions must 
follow. They must: a) be fair and follow due process; b) be transparent to those involved; c) take into 
account the circumstances of the case and the attitude/actions of the service provider when considering 
action; d) take consistent actions/decisions for like/similar circumstances; and e) be subject to 
appropriate internal and external review [25]. Whilst these principles apply to regulatory enforcement, 
they can be identified as desirable traits of any other regulatory process. Taking this into consideration, 
the objectivity, transparency, and consistency of the normative approach to decision-making make them 
particularly suited to the aviation industry. Subsequently, this approach will be used in any decision-
making process adopted in this thesis. It is important here to note that, as uncertainty forms such an 
integral part of the concept of risk, the decision-making process adopted will take uncertainty into 
consideration.  
2.7. Risk-based Regulation in the UAS Industry   
The case study of UAS is used as a practical example to develop and illustrate the theoretical 
contributions of this thesis. This is a pertinent example, as NAA have advocated the adoption of risk-
based principles for the regulation of the sector [10], [11], [13]–[15]. Such a risk-based approach “marks 
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a significant change in the way aviation safety regulations are developed, becoming proportionate to 
the risks they aim to address” [130].  
2.7.1. Uncertainty in the UAS industry 
The UAS industry is an area in the aviation sector that has been receiving a considerable amount of 
attention in recent years. UAS are inherently different to Conventionally Piloted Aircraft (CPA) [7] and 
are quite diverse in terms of size, performance and risk. They have a number of applications [4]. Like 
any new technology, it takes some time to build a comprehensive state of knowledge in the technology 
and its associated operational risks. For UAS this situation is compounded by the low data needed to 
inform estimates of UAS reliability, which arises due to: 1) changing system design baselines; 2) the 
use of components that are not designed to standards and subject to quality assurance; 3) the non-
homogeneity of the UAS fleet (i.e., the diversity of designs and their concepts of operation, which limits 
the conclusions which can be drawn from aggregating data across types). There are a number of other 
factors that limit the amount of operational data available on UAS (refer to [1]) that can impact their 
certification. As a consequence, there is a considerable amount of uncertainty associated with these 
systems.  
As a result of the differences that exist between UAS and CPA, there is a general lack of 
knowledge and operational data, and a lack of trust in the knowledge and data that is available on these 
systems; both of which are needed to support airworthiness assessments and compliance regulatory 
processes (compliance assessment and compliance finding) for UAS. There can be considerable 
uncertainty associated with the certification of civil or commercial UAS, which in turn can lead to high 
certification risk (i.e., the risk associated with certifying a UAS as compliant, and therefore safe for 
operation, when indeed it is not). It is thus clear that there is a need for a comprehensive approach to 
characterise and incorporate uncertainty in not only the development of regulations for UAS but the 
compliance assessment and compliance finding regulatory processes that follow. 
Under the risk-based approach, models that comprehensively capture the nature of the risks 
posed to people and property on the ground are essential to the development of airworthiness and 
operational regulations for UAS. These models are referred to as Ground Risk Models (GRM) and form 
the first area of focus for this thesis. The risks posed to people and property situated on the ground are 
largely managed through the development and promulgation of regulations that provide assurance in 
the airworthiness of the UAS [6]. When coupled with operational regulations (e.g., restrictions in terms 
of when and where UAS can operate), airworthiness regulations can more effectively manage the risks 
posed to people and property overflown [6]. Not all UAS types may be required to meet prescriptive 
codes of airworthiness requirements in order to be safe for operation (e.g., Open category of UAS as 
defined in [18]). Those that do however, will likely be required to show compliance to SSR, also 
referred to as Part 1309 regulations. This forms the second area of focus for this thesis.  
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2.7.2. Ground Risk Models 
GRM describe the magnitude of risk to entities of value (EoV) (e.g. people and property) in the regions 
overflown by an Unmanned Aircraft (UA) due to the realisation of one or more of the scenarios 
illustrated in Figure 6. With the exception of [131], none of the reviewed GRM address secondary 
hazards, and hence the scope of the review is limited to the primary risk scenario of a direct impact 
between an UA (or its components) and one or more EoV on the ground (refer to Chapter 3 for detailed 
review of GRM). 
 
Figure 6: Ground risk scenarios for UAS [132]  
 Based on the review, seven component-models could be identified in these GRM as illustrated 
in Figure 7. These include the failure model, impact location model, recovery model, stress model, 
exposure model, incident model and harm model.  
 
Figure 7: General components of a ground risk model for UAS [132] 
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Chapter 3 provides an extensive review of the current state-of-the-art in ground risk modelling 
for UAS operations. By identifying each of the sub-models that go into developing GRM and relating 
them to various aspects of the aviation regulatory framework, this work also provides a means for 
identifying where future research efforts need to be focused and how this will potentially influence the 
ongoing development of regulations for the sector. For the sake of brevity, this review has not been 
repeated here. For further details refer to Chapter 3. 
2.7.3. System Safety “Part 1309” Regulations 
System safety “Part 1309” regulations are intended to supplement prescriptive standards on the design, 
manufacture, and installation of aircraft components. At a high-level, the SSR specify the requirement 
for [133]:  
1. A documented analysis showing that equipment and systems perform as intended under 
foreseeable operating and environmental conditions; 
2. The adoption of principles from fail-safe and fault-tolerant design [134]; and 
3. The demonstration (through a documented qualitative or quantitative analysis) that the expected 
frequency of failure of equipment and systems, when considered separately and in relation to 
other systems, is inversely-related to the severity of its effect on the safe operation of the system. 
This is commonly referred to as the System Safety Performance Requirements (SSPR). 
A complete description of the Part 1309 regulations can be found in [21], [22], [135]–[138] and 
associated guidance material [35], [134].  
As the SSR form an integral part of this research, each of the papers published in Chapter 0 to 
Chapter 7 provide a more detailed review of these regulations, with particular emphasis placed on the 
SSPR. Again, for the sake of brevity this detail has not been repeated here. For more details, the reader 
is directed to the individual chapters.  
2.8. Analysis of Literature and Summary of Findings  
The literature review presented in this chapter was intended to supplement rather than replace the 
extensive literature reviews undertaken in each of the proceeding chapters. The focus of this section is 
to provide a high-level linkage between the elements of the literature review, showing how, as a whole, 
it helps identify the research gaps, motivating the particular direction of research. A high-level 
breakdown of this chapter is provided in Figure 8, showing the linkage between the individual sections. 
The arrows help highlight how different sections influence each other. For example, in order to 
understand the overall concept of risk, it was important to have a clear understanding of various 
fundamental concepts and the concept of uncertainty. This relationship can clearly be seen in Figure 8. 
Each of these theoretical concepts are then linked to the various regulatory processes of interest, with 
the case study application also identified. Again, these relationships are highlighted in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8: High-level breakdown of literature review highlighting case-study applications 
2.8.1. Fundamental Concepts  
The literature review undertaken in this section identified a set of fundamental concepts that are integral 
to the definition of risk. These fundamental concepts include: event and scenario; hazard, consequence; 
accident, incident and mishap; and safety. Based on the review of these concepts a number of important 
conclusions were drawn which directly helped in addressing the main research questions of this thesis.  
Firstly, on review of the literature, both general and aviation specific, it was seen that there 
exists a considerable amount of diversity amongst the definitions used to describe these concepts. This 
diversity has the potential to lead to uncertainty in the interpretation of each of these concepts. This 
clearly highlighted the need to adopt a uniform set of definitions that could be used throughout the 
thesis. Where possible definitions adopted by aviation safety authorities are used throughout this thesis. 
These fundamental concepts along with the concept of uncertainty (introduced in the following section) 
help in the development of a clearer understanding of the overall concept of risk.  
Secondly, in relation to the consequence, it was observed that arriving at a clear and uniform 
understanding of the type and degree of loss is a subjective process that depends on the values held by 
an individual or the community at large. This subjectivity leads to uncertainty in the type and level of 
loss which could inevitably lead to the imposition of overly conservative restrictions to mitigate or 
manage the risk. It was thus concluded that a means to take this uncertainty into consideration is needed.  
Finally, in relation to the concept of safety, it was observed that there are two main 
interpretations of safety: absolute safety and relative safety. While in an ideal world, absolute safety is 
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the condition one would want to strive towards (as it implies that the risk has been completely 
eliminated), it is not always possible to achieve this owing to the uncertainty associated with most real-
world systems. The relative definition of safety takes this uncertainty into consideration and is based 
on the assumption that the risk can be reduced or controlled to an acceptable level in accordance with 
an agreed set of management principles. It was thus concluded that this relative interpretation of safety 
would be adopted in this thesis, as is common practice in aviation safety literature.  Understanding this 
relative definition of safety was extremely important as it forms the basis of most management 
principles (e.g. ALARP and SFARP frameworks) that are fundamental to the SRMP. 
2.8.2. The Concept of Uncertainty 
This section focused on the concept of uncertainty. While this in itself is fundamental to the definition 
of risk, it was reviewed independently as it is an integral part of this research and as such required 
further detail. The review involved: identifying the various types of uncertainty; sources of uncertainty; 
and means of measuring uncertainty. Based on the review a number of conclusions were drawn. 
Firstly, it was observed that there are two main types of uncertainty: aleatory uncertainty and 
epistemic uncertainty. Aleatory uncertainty is inherent to most systems (such as UAS) and the models 
used to evaluate the risks posed by them. Similarly, the limited data associated with new and evolving 
systems such as UAS is a potential source of  epistemic uncertainty that needs to be considered (other 
sources of uncertainty were also identified). On critically analysing both of these types of uncertainty 
and relating it to the overall aims and objectives of the thesis and the case study application of UAS, it 
was concluded that any treatment of uncertainty would require both of these types of uncertainty to be 
considered.  
Next, based on the extensive literature review undertaken, multiple sources of uncertainty were 
identified. These sources include the: input and data; model and engineering system; output; decision 
criteria; acknowledged inadequacies; unknown inadequacies; expert judgements. Each of these sources 
are inherent to the SRMP which in itself is central to the risk-based approach to the regulation of the 
industry. Taking the case study application of UAS into consideration, it was thus concluded that any 
risk-based approach to the regulation of the industry must take the uncertainty associated with this 
process into consideration (or at a minimum recognise its existence).  
Finally, a means of measuring the identified types and sources of uncertainty was needed. Based 
on the extensive literature review undertaken it was observed that the main approach to measure 
uncertainty is through probability theory. Taking this into consideration, it was observed that there are 
two main interpretations of probability, the Frequentist interpretation and the Bayesian interpretation. 
When looking at the case study application of UAS, it is evident that these systems are characterised by 
limited data and high uncertainty (both epistemic and aleatory). It was thus concluded that applying a 
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Frequentist interpretation of probability to measure the uncertainty associated with these systems would 
not be suitable. The Bayesian interpretation provides a suitable alternative as it not only takes both 
aleatory and epistemic uncertainty into consideration, but it can also be used for applications where 
there is limited data, such as in the UAS industry. Other industries such as the space launch industry, 
nuclear power industry, fishery industry, ecological management industry, bio management industry 
and even the aviation industry, that are similar to the UAS industry in that they have limited data and 
high uncertainty associated with them have also adopted this Bayesian approach. This provided added 
confidence that such an approach would be suitable for the case study application of the UAS industry. 
In addition to helping describe the overall concept of risk, the fundamental theory and 
knowledge gained in this section was used to help identify the research gaps that exist in the literature. 
As uncertainty is such an integral part of the definition of risk, a means to take this uncertainty into 
consideration is needed. This was an important conclusion drawn from the literature as it helped 
highlight the limitations of the current SRMP and the risk-based approach to the regulation of the 
aviation industry currently adopted.  
2.8.3. The Concept of Risk 
The concept of risk is central to the adoption of a risk-based approach to the regulation of the industry. 
Each of the fundamental concepts described in Section §2.1 along with the concept of uncertainty 
detailed in Section §2.2 were used in the analysis of the concept of risk. The section not only identifies 
a variety of definitions of risk but also shows how risk can be measured taking the various elements 
that go into defining this concept into consideration. Based on this review it was observed that there is 
a considerable amount of diversity that exists between these definitions. This diversity existed not only 
in terms of the elements that go into defining risk but also in terms of how these elements can be 
combined together to describe the risk. Earlier definitions of risk were based on probability and 
consequence, with risk being measured in terms of the product of these two elements. However this 
approach equated low probability and high consequence events with high probability and low 
consequence events, which proved to be limiting. To address this shortcoming later definitions 
described risk as a set of three element: scenario; probability; and consequence. Building on this, more 
contemporary definitions of risk were also found to take uncertainty into consideration. There was a 
clear shift of the definitions from ones based on probability to ones that account for uncertainty. In 
adopting the risk-based approach to the regulation of the industry and evaluating the SRMP, it was thus 
imperative to evaluate how uncertainty is currently taken into consideration. Most definitions of risk 
used in aviation safety literature do not mention uncertainty. This is not a major limitation when dealing 
with CPA, as these systems have acquired a considerable amount of data over the years. In addition to 
this, as the EoV are onboard the aircraft, the potential consequence associated with a failure is always 
going to be high. Hence assessing for the worst-case consequential outcome is desirable, and the 
uncertainty associated with this may not need to be considered. When dealing with UAS, as the EoV 
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are on the ground or on-board other aircraft, the consequence associated with a failure can vary 
significantly. Hence to negate the need for overly conservative restrictions on these systems, and the 
associated costs, it is imperative to take the uncertainty associated with these risk estimates into 
consideration. It was thus concluded that uncertainty (both aleatory and epistemic) needed to be 
accounted for in any definition of risk adopted as part of this thesis.  
2.8.4. Decision Theory 
Decision making is an integral part of the SRMP, where decisions are made based on the risk 
assessments. A risk-based approach to decision-making is required to provide a defensible basis for 
making decisions. Decision theory describes the theory of rational decision making and hence it is 
important to have a clear understanding of this theory. This was the main focus of this section. Based 
on the review undertaken it was observed that there are two main branches of decision theory: 
Descriptive decision theory and Normative decision theory. While the Descriptive decision theory seeks 
to describe how decisions are actually made by individuals based on consistent rules, normative 
decision theory looks to make prescriptions about what decisions a rational decision-maker should 
make. Taking this into consideration it was concluded that a normative approach to decision theory 
would be more suitable in adopting a risk-based approach to the regulation of the UAS industry.  
As uncertainty is an integral part of the definition of risk, it was concluded that it is important 
to take uncertainty into consideration in any decision-making process that underpins the risk-based 
approach to the regulation of the industry. A deterministic approach to decision-making makes use of a 
conservative worst-case assumption and hence does not take the uncertainty associated with a system 
and its operation into consideration. A probabilistic approach however provides an effective way to 
analyse system safety that takes all feasible scenarios and their related consequences into consideration, 
thus accounting for the uncertainty. This provides the decision maker with a clearly informed picture 
of the problem upon which they can confidently reason and deliberate. It was thus concluded that in 
using normative decision theory it was imperative to adopt a probabilistic approach to decision-making. 
Relating this back to the review on uncertainty undertaken in Section §2.2, it is clear that a Bayesian 
approach would consequently need to be adopted to take the uncertainty associated with this process 
into consideration. Other industries such as the space launch industry and nuclear industry adopt similar 
procedures, which provides added confidence in the chosen approach.  
2.8.5. Safety Risk Management Process  
The overall aim of the thesis is to “Improve regulatory outcomes under the new paradigm of risk-based 
regulation, through providing a conceptual framework for the rational, transparent and systematic 
treatment of uncertainty in the risk assessment and regulatory decision-making process”. Central to this 
is the SRMP. The reviews undertaken in Section §2.1 to Section §2.4, laid the foundations that were 
necessary to help in the critical analysis of the SRMP. Each of these concepts were used to get a better 
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understanding of the SRMP and helped identify the research gaps that existed in the literature. The 
section starts by introducing the SRMP and each of the sub-processes that go into defining this process. 
As data forms such an integral part of any SRMP, the process of data collection was also explored here. 
Taking this into consideration, the concept of quantitative risk assessment was also introduced.  
Based on the review of the concept of risk undertaken in Section §2.3, it was observed that 
most contemporary definitions of risk take uncertainty into consideration. However, on reviewing the 
SRMP it was seen that in general there is no mention of uncertainty. It was thus concluded that a means 
to take the uncertainty associated with the SRMP was needed. This led to the first research question, 
“What are the uncertainties associated with the safety risk assessment process and how are they 
addressed within the current aviation safety risk management and regulatory development processes?”. 
In order to help answer this question, a more in-depth review of the SRMP to help identify the different 
sources of uncertainty (both epistemic uncertainty and aleatory uncertainty) associated with the SRMP 
was needed. The review of uncertainty undertaken in Section §2.2 provided the necessary information 
in relation to the concept of uncertainty to help in this endeavour. Applying this to the SRMP, a number 
of different sources of uncertainty were identified in relation to each of the sub-processes.  
As there is uncertainty in the risk identification and risk analysis process, and this is generally 
not taken into consideration (or where considered, accounted for by assuming a worst-case 
consequential outcome), it is evident that this uncertainty will be input into the risk evaluation process. 
Consequently a risk-based approach to decision-making that is capable of taking uncertainty into 
consideration is needed. However, as was observed from the literature, in general, there is no uncertainty 
accounted for in this decision-making process. Similarly, uncertainty in the risk treatment process, 
which is also a decision-making process, is also not taken into consideration. It was thus concluded that 
a means of taking the uncertainty in the decision-making process into consideration is needed. This led 
to the second research question, “How can uncertainty associated with the SRMP be accounted for in 
existing aviation rule-making and compliance processes?”. The review of decision theory undertaken 
in Section §2.4, helped identify different approaches that could be used to this accord. If the aviation 
industry is going to move towards a risk-based approach to the development of regulations and there is 
uncertainty associated with this risk (as is the case with UAS), then it is evident that it is important to 
adopt a risk-based approach that takes uncertainty into consideration in not only the rule-making but 
also the decision-making processes that follow. 
2.8.6. Risk Management in the Aviation Industry 
The SRMP and the sub-processes that go into defining this process are used to get a better understanding 
of what is meant by risk-based regulation and how it is applied in the aviation sector. This is summarised 
in Section §2.6. Based on an extensive review undertaken, it was observed that NAA policy and rule-
making follow a risk-based approach, whereby a safety argument is provided to support and justify the 
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development of airworthiness regulations. The intended outcome is a framework of regulations and 
standards that has a defensible and objective basis in risk. While risk is taken into consideration in this 
process, it was concluded that the SRMP that underpins this approach generally makes the assumption 
of a worst-case consequential outcome and tends not to take uncertainty into consideration.  
The uncertainty in the performance assessments in the SRMP also results in uncertainty in the 
regulatory decision-making processes of compliance assessment and compliance finding. The 
compliance assessment approaches adopted in the aviation sector were found to be subjective, making 
use of a deterministic binary “pass or fail” process. This is often unable to take the uncertainty in the 
performance assessments that are input into the compliance assessment process into consideration. The 
compliance finding process adopted by the aviation sector is also a deterministic decision-making 
process that is generally unable to take the uncertainty associated with this process into consideration. 
A decision maker uses a subjective and somewhat “black box” process for making compliance findings, 
with the decision maker unable to account for the compliance risk for all possible decision outcomes.  
As identified previously, uncertainty is inherent to the definition of risk and hence in adopting 
a risk-based approach to the development of regulations it is of paramount importance to take this 
uncertainty into consideration. It was thus concluded that in order to better account for the uncertainty 
in the aviation sector, the definitions of risk outlined in aviation safety literature needed to be aligned 
with more contemporary risk definitions (examples of such contemporary definitions of risk were 
identified previously in the literature review). A means of taking the uncertainty into consideration in 
not only the rule-making process but also the compliance assessment and compliance finding decision-
making processes that follow is needed.  
On relating this back to the uncertainty theory described in Section §2.2, it was evident that a 
Bayesian approach would need to be adopted here to take both the epistemic and aleatory uncertainties 
associated with these processes into consideration. In addition to this, to aid in the decision-making and 
account for the associated uncertainties, the normative decision theory identified in Section §2.4 would 
need to be explored further. By extending the risk-based approach to the compliance assessment and 
compliance finding processes and ensuring that uncertainty in each of the three processes is considered, 
this framework will be able to support compliance findings based on compliance risk. This is 
particularly important for new and evolving technologies such as UAS that have limited data and high 
uncertainty associated with them.  
2.8.7. Risk-based Regulation of the Aviation Industry 
From the preceding discussion, it was made evident that not only is it important to extend the current 
understanding of risk-based regulation from a risk-based approach to rule-making to a risk-based 
approach to compliance assessment and compliance finding as well, but in keeping with contemporary 
definitions of risk, it is important to take the uncertainty associated with each of these three processes 
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into consideration. This led to the overall aim of the thesis, which was to “improve regulatory outcomes 
under the new paradigm of risk-based regulation, through providing a conceptual framework for the 
rational, transparent and systematic treatment of uncertainty in the risk assessment and regulatory 
decision-making process”. In order to achieve this aim, it was important to narrow the scope of the 
discussion by focusing on a particular case study example.  
On reviewing NAA policy and rule-making activities, it was observed that a risk-based 
approach is adopted, whereby a safety argument is provided to support and justify the development of 
airworthiness regulations. The intended outcome is a framework of regulations and standards that has 
a defensible and objective basis in risk. On critically analysing this risk-based approach to rule-making, 
it was observed that while a risk-based approach is indeed adopted, there is no mention of uncertainty. 
In addition to this, it was observed that such risk-based principles were not applied to the compliance 
assessment and compliance finding processes that follow. The current compliance assessment process 
tends to be subjective and make use of deterministic binary “pass or fail” processes to make compliance 
assessments. The compliance finding process is also a deterministic decision-making process, where 
the decision maker uses a somewhat “black box” approach to make compliance findings. There is 
uncertainty associated with both of these processes that is not taken into consideration. It was thus 
concluded that in order to account for this uncertainty, it was important to extend the current 
understanding of risk-based regulation to include a risk-based approach to compliance assessment and 
compliance finding as well. This will allow for compliance findings to be made based on compliance 
risk and provide a means of taking the uncertainty into consideration.  
2.8.8. Risk-based Regulation of the UAS industry   
Based on the literature review presented thus far, it is evident that: 1) risk-based regulation warrants the 
consideration of more than just a risk-based approach to rule-making, it must also include a risk-based 
approach to compliance assessment and compliance finding; 2) the SRMP is central to the adoption of 
a risk-based approach to the regulation of the industry; 3) the concepts of risk, uncertainty and decision 
theory are central to the SRMP; 4) uncertainty is central to most contemporary definitions of risk; and 
5) the current SRMP adopted by aviation regulatory bodies does not take uncertainty into consideration 
in the risk assessment and compliance decision-making processes. Each of these findings helped 
motivate the particular research direction of this thesis.  
2.8.8.1. Uncertainty in the UAS industry 
In order to limit the scope of the discussion and make significant contributions to theory, as mentioned 
previously, it was considered important to focus the research efforts on a particular case study 
application. As uncertainty is central to the overall research objectives, the case study application would 
need to look at the regulatory approach applied to a new and evolving system that is characterised by 
limited data and high uncertainty. While there are a number of examples of such systems in the industry, 
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the case study application of UAS was selected. UAS are not only inherently different to CPA but are 
also quite diverse in their size, performance and level of risk posed by their operations. In addition to 
this, there are a number of other factors that were identified that limit the amount of operational data 
available on these systems. Consequently there is a considerable amount of uncertainty associated with 
these systems. Furthermore, there is uncertainty associated with the certification of these systems, which 
in turn can lead to high certification risk. This made them the ideal case study application for this thesis.  
In applying a risk-based approach to the regulation of these systems, models that 
comprehensively capture the risks posed by these systems to people and property on the ground are 
needed. These models, referred to as GRM, are essential to the development of airworthiness and 
operational regulations for UAS and form the first area of focus for this research. Not all UAS types 
may be required to meet prescriptive codes of airworthiness requirements in order to be safe for 
operation (e.g., Open category of UAS as defined in [18]). Those that do however, will likely be 
required to show compliance to SSR, also referred to as Part 1309 regulations. This forms the second 
area of focus for this thesis. While a detailed review of both of these components are provided in the 
individual chapters, a summary of some of the findings that supported the particular research direction, 
that were identified in the individual chapters are outlined below. 
2.8.8.2. Ground Risk Models  
The focus of this section and the associated chapter (Chapter 3) is on the first research question; “What 
are the uncertainties associated with the safety risk assessment process and how are they addressed 
within the current aviation safety risk management and regulatory development processes?”. From the 
preceding discussion it was seen that uncertainty is inherent to most contemporary definitions of risk. 
Hence in developing a model to comprehensively capture the risks posed by UAS to people and property 
on the ground it is important to take the uncertainty associated with these systems and their operation 
into consideration. The review on GRM was used to first identify the different component models that 
go into defining the overall GRM. Based on the review seven component models were identified, 
namely, failure model, impact model, recovery model, stress model, exposure model, incident stress 
model and harm model. Each of these models were then reviewed independently to provide a detailed 
description of the component-model; a review of the literature associated with the component model, 
highlighting the assumptions made in relation to the component model; a description of how the 
component model was substantiated in the literature; a summary of how uncertainty is represented in 
the component-model (based on Paté-Cornell’s framework [33]); and a clear linkage between the 
component model and the regulations, highlighting not just the component of the regulations that are 
affected but also how the associated assumptions and uncertainty impacts these regulations. Based on 
this review several conclusions were drawn in relation to each of the component models. For details on 
this, the reader is directed to the individual chapter. In addition to this a number of high-level findings 
were made based on the review. These findings were in relation to the diversity between the models, 
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the use of conservative assumptions and the treatment of uncertainty. For details the reader is again 
directed to Chapter 3.  
2.8.8.3. System Safety Regulations   
The focus of this section and the associated chapters (Chapter 4 to Chapter 7) is on the second research 
question,  “How can uncertainty associated with the SRMP be accounted for in existing aviation rule-
making and compliance processes?”. Narrowing the scope further, the particular part of the SSR that is 
of interest to this thesis is the SSPR.  
The main findings in relation to the literature on SSR are made in Chapter 4. Here the SSR 
process are introduced for the first time highlighting the particular component of interest for the 
research, namely, the SSPR compliance process. On critically analysing the Traditional SSPR 
compliance process, the various sources of uncertainty associated with the SSA, CA and CF processes 
were identified, and the limitations of the assumptions made in relation to them highlighted. From the 
discussion presented in Section §2.2, it was clear that a Bayesian approach would be adopted to take 
this uncertainty into consideration. Following this, Chapter 4 then goes on to describe how Bayes 
theorem would be used to take the uncertainty in the APFH of the system into consideration and how 
the outputs from the SSA process would vary accordingly. As there was uncertainty in the outputs of 
the SSA process, this would input into the CA and CF processes and hence a means to take this 
uncertainty into consideration in each of these sub-processes would also be required. A further analysis 
of the Traditional SSPR compliance process however found that uncertainty was not considered in 
either of these sub-processes. From the preceding discussion it was made evident that uncertainty is 
inherent to most contemporary definitions of risk. It was thus concluded that in adopting a risk-based 
approach to the regulation of the industry, it was important to take the uncertainty associated with each 
of the sub-processes into consideration. The Extended SSPR compliance process developed looked to 
address these limitations and take some of the uncertainty associated with these processes into 
consideration. Various concepts fundamental to the adoption of Bayes theorem are discussed, including 
the selection of the prior and likelihood distributions and the implications of using conjugate and 
uninformed priors. Other concepts such as Bayesian hypothesis testing and normative decision theory 
are also discussed in this chapter, with the mathematics on how to apply them also described.  
The Extended SSPR compliance process had certain limitations which were addressed in 
subsequent chapters. It makes use of a Poisson distribution which assumes a constant failure rate and it 
only takes the uncertainty associated with one of the outputs of the SSA process into consideration, i.e. 
the uncertainty associated with the APFH . To address these limitations, further analysis on uncertainty 
and its treatment was required. The literature review presented in Chapter 5 looks to provide further 
insight with regards to the selection of the likelihood distribution and shows how alternate distributions 
such as the Weibull distribution can be used to take the unique characteristic associated with UAS into 
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consideration. Chapter 6 introduces the concept of BBN and clearly describes how this can be used to 
take the uncertainty in the remaining outputs of the SSA process into consideration, allowing for the 
highest level of treatment of uncertainty with respect to the SSPR compliance process. It thus presents 
the Proposed SSPR compliance process. For details on each of these contributions, the reader is directed 
to the individual chapters.  
In addition to helping answer elements of the first research question, this section and the 
associated chapters clearly identify the sources of uncertainty in the aviation safety compliance 
assessment and compliance finding processes and show how they are currently managed. It also clearly 
shows how the uncertainties in each of these sub-processes can be represented and accounted for, to 
support more objective and consistent regulatory outcomes. This research highlights some of the 
potential benefits of the extended risk-based philosophy in the aviation sector. Thus it is clear that this 
section and the associated chapters clearly address each of the elements of the second research question. 
2.8.9. Summary 
From the literature review it was made clear that:  
1. The aviation SRMP does not provide a systematic way for managing uncertainty in the safety 
risk assessment and decision-making processes, i.e. there is a risk to the compliance decisions;  
2. Existing aviation rule-making and compliance processes have no means for accounting for the 
uncertainty inherent in a SRMP.  
If the SRMP is to be used for risk-based rule-making for industries like UAS, then more 
comprehensive treatment of uncertainty is needed. Further, if assessments of performance are uncertain, 
a method for making compliance assessments and compliance findings, accounting for these 
uncertainties is needed. This effectively extends the concept of risk-based regulation from just rule-
making to the compliance decision-making regulatory processes of compliance assessment and 
compliance finding, thus allowing compliance findings to be made based on compliance risk. This leads 
to the two research questions:  
1. What are the uncertainties associated with the safety risk assessment process and how are 
they addressed within the current aviation safety risk management and regulatory 
development processes? 
2. How can uncertainty associated with the SRMP be accounted for in existing aviation rule-
making and compliance processes? 
By answering these questions, this thesis endeavours to improve regulatory outcomes under the new 
paradigm of risk-based operations, though providing a conceptual framework for the rational, 
transparent and systematic treatment of uncertainty in the risk assessment and regulatory decision-
making process.   
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3. A Review of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Ground Risk Models 
 
Figure 9: Concept image of an unmanned aircraft operation over Piccadilly Circus, London, UK 
Image Copyright © Achim Washington 
“Trouble in the air is very rare. It is hitting the ground that causes it” 
Amelia Earhart (1897-1939) 
This chapter titled: “A Review of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Ground Risk Models” focuses on 
Research Question 1.1 and Research Question 1.2. It develops a conceptual framework for describing 
the component-models of GRM with the aim of providing a general theoretical basis for the systematic 
development and analysis of the models proposed in the literature. The paper conducts an in-depth 
review of the state of the art in UAS GRM and uses this to evaluate the risks posed by the operation of 
UAS to people and property on the ground. This helps identify the various sources of uncertainty 
inherent in the safety risk assessment process (Research Question 1.1). It then relates the GRM and 
component sub-models to the regulations to show how the uncertainty in these sub-models and the 
conservative assumptions used to manage them, impact different components of the regulations 
(Research Question 1.2). By clearly identifying the different levels of treatments of uncertainty and 
highlighting the limitations associated with the lower levels of treatment of uncertainty, the chapter also 
addresses elements of Research Question 1.3.  
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There is much effort being directed towards the development of safety regulations for unmanned aircraft systems
(UAS). National airworthiness authorities have advocated the adoption of a risk-based approach, whereby reg-
ulations are driven by the outcomes of a systematic process to assess and manage identiﬁed safety risks. Subse-
quently, models characterising the primary hazards associated with UAS operations have now become critical to
the development of regulations and in turn, to the future of the industry. Key to the development of airworthiness
regulations for UAS is a comprehensive understanding of the risks UAS operations pose to people and property on
the ground. A comprehensive review of the literature identiﬁed 33 different models (and component sub models)
used to estimate ground risk posed by UAS. These models comprise failure, impact location, recovery, stress,
exposure, incident stress and harm sub-models. The underlying assumptions and treatment of uncertainties in
each of these sub-models differ signiﬁcantly between models, which can have a signiﬁcant impact on the
development of regulations. This paper reviews the state-of-the-art in research into UAS ground risk modelling,
discusses how the various sub-models relate to the different components of the regulation, and explores how
model-uncertainties potentially impact the development of regulations for UAS.1. Introduction
UAS are a rapidly growing sector of the aviation industry. However,
as with any new technology, UAS still face a number of challenges,
resulting in the imposition of a signiﬁcant amount of operational re-
strictions on them [1–4]. Of these challenges, perhaps the most signiﬁ-
cant non-technical challenge facing the UAS sector is the absence of a
suitable regulatory framework aimed at governing the safety of their
operations [3,4]. In the interim, the de facto stance taken by regulatory
bodies the world over is to apply existing standards and regulations
developed for conventionally piloted aircraft (CPA) to UAS. However,
owing to the inherent differences that exist between UAS and CPA [5], it
is widely acknowledged that the “off-the-shelf” approach will not result
in an effective airworthiness regulatory framework for UAS [4]. Owing to
the diversity that exists amongst UAS, it is also acknowledged that the
application of a “one size ﬁts all” approach to the airworthiness of UAS
will prove problematic [4]. Regulations tailored to the operation of UAS
are required [4,6,7].
The European Aviation Safety Authority (EASA) and Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) have recently recognised the importance ofashington), reece.a.clothier@boeing
r at RMIT University.
system (UAS).adopting a “risk-based” approach to the development of a regulatory
framework for Unmanned Aircraft (UA)2 [8]. A risk-based approach ac-
knowledges that regulations are merely the embodiment of the outcomes
of a risk management process [9], speciﬁcally: “they are legal re-
quirements relating to how various stakeholders (e.g., UAS operators)
should go about treating safety risks; requirements relating to the
implementation of controls or measures to modify, mitigate, or otherwise
reduce the risk”. As such, risk management (and its sub-processes) should
drive the development of regulations, ensuring a clear traceability be-
tween the legislated requirement and the risks it is in place to manage.
The intended outcome is a framework of regulations and standards that
has a defensible and objective basis in risk.
The risk management process is deﬁned in Ref. [10] and its general
application to UAS is described in Ref. [11]. The risk assessment process
entails the sub-processes of risk identiﬁcation, risk analysis and risk
evaluation [10]. In the context of UAS, the outcomes are assessments of
the risk associated with the two primary hazards of:
 A collision or near collision between a UA and another aircraft
(whether the other aircraft is in the air or on the ground);.com (R.A. Clothier), jose.silva@rmit.edu.au (J. Silva).
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A. Washington et al. Progress in Aerospace Sciences 95 (2017) 24–44 The impact of the UA, or its components, with people or structures
situated on the ground [9,11].
The scope of this paper is limited to risk models characterising the
latter of these two hazards. The risk posed to people and property on the
ground is largely managed through the development and promulgation
of regulations that provide assurance in the airworthiness of the UAS [4].
As described in Ref. [4], airworthiness regulations can be combined with
operational regulations (e.g., restricting where and when UAS can be
operated) to more effectively manage the risks posed to people and
property overﬂown. Under the risk-based approach, models that
comprehensively capture the nature of the risks posed to people and
property on the ground are essential to the development of airworthiness
and operational regulations for UAS.
The risk scenarios associated with the hazard of a ground impact are
illustrated as connected pathways in Fig. 1. A variety of models for
assessing the risks associated with each of the scenarios illustrated in
Fig. 1 are identiﬁed in the literature. Thus, the objectives of this paper
are to:Fig. 1. UAS ground
251. Provide a comprehensive review of existing models;
2. Describe how the components of these models relate to different el-
ements of safety regulation for UAS; and
3. Identify where future research into the development of models is
needed to support the development of effective regulations for UAS.
A general overview of the sub-models comprising the ground risk
model (GRM) is presented in Section x2. The various ways in which the
components of these models can be used to inﬂuence the development of
regulations is also presented. Section x3 then provides some general
points of discussion on each of the component models, followed by a brief
summary of some of the major ﬁndings observed, presented in Section x4.
Concluding remarks are then presented in Section x5.
2. UAS ground risk models
GRMs describe the magnitude of risk to entities of value (EoV) (e.g.
people and property) in the regions over-ﬂown by an UA due to the
realisation of one or more of the scenarios illustrated in Fig. 1. With therisk scenarios.
Fig. 2. General components of a ground risk model for UAS.
Table 1
Treatment of uncertainties (adapted from Ref. [13]).
Level Description Example
0 Does not require any quantiﬁcation of risk. Only involves the detection of potential hazards and
identiﬁcation of the different ways in which the system can fail, without attempting to quantitatively
assess the risk.
Hazard detection and failure modes identiﬁcation (e.g. Failure Mode
and Effect Analysis (FMEA)).
1 Based on the accumulation of worst-case assumptions. Yields, in theory, maximum loss level. Does not
involve any notion of probability.
Identiﬁcation of worst case conditions.
2 Evaluation of the worst possible conditions that can be reasonably expected when there is uncertainty
about what the worst case could be or when the worst case is so unlikely that it is meaningless. Such
assessments usually do not involve the assessment of probabilities.
Evaluation of ‘plausible upper bounds’ or ‘quasi-worst cases’.
3 Relies on ‘best estimates’ and/or on a central value (e.g. mean, median or mode) of the outcome (e.g.
loss) distribution, generally through ‘best estimates, of different variables. The disadvantage of central
values is that the risk is still characterised by a single point estimate.
Best estimates of central values or the maximum likelihood estimates
(MLE) of the parameter.
4 Makes use of probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) to obtain a probability distribution based on best
estimates of the models and parameter values. Classical Frequentist methods are used to take account
of aleatory uncertainties. It includes both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties, however the use of a
single risk curve limits the information available.
PRA (also referred to as quantitative risk assessment (QRA) or
probabilistic safety assessment (PSA)) and a single risk curve.
5 Uncertainties about fundamental hypotheses are displayed by a family of risk curves. Could be done by
using Bayesian inference on the existing data. Alternately, a group of experts could be individually
asked to use their preferred model to provide risk assessments and to provide their estimations of
parameter values for a given model.
PRA and multiple risk curves.
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ards, and hence the scope of this review is limited to the primary risk
scenario of a direct impact between an UA (or its components) and one or
more EoV on the ground.
The literature review identiﬁed 18 GRMs for UAS. Based on the re-
view, seven component-models could be identiﬁed in these GRMs as
illustrated in Fig. 2. It is important to note that not all of the reviewed
GRMs explicitly implement all seven of the component models. In many
cases, the component models are implicitly considered in the model as-
sumptions. The review of the literature also identiﬁed research into the
characterisation of one or more of these component models (15 addi-
tional models identiﬁed). These models could be used as part of a GRM
and hence are also included in the review.
The setting of appropriate regulations requires an understanding of
how the various models identify and manage uncertainty. For example,
whether the model is based on worst case assumptions, and hence rep-
resents a conservative position for the setting of regulations. A frame-
work for systematically describing the treatment of uncertainty in
modelling is thus needed. In this paper Pate-Cornell's [13] framework for
describing the “six levels of treatment of uncertainties in risk analysis” is
used to assess how each of the reviewed models manages uncertainty.
This framework is summarised in Table 1.2.1. Failure model
The ﬁrst sub-model of a GRM is the failure model. The failure model
describes the uncertainty in the occurrence of failure modes given a26particular system conﬁguration, environmental conditions, and mission
proﬁle. Each failure (deﬁned as any event causal to the occurrence of a
particular failure mode potentially leading to a ground impact) can result
in one or more failure modes. Literature [14] deﬁne four high level
failure modes relevant to the hazard of UA ground impact, speciﬁcally:
1. Unpremeditated descent scenario (UDS) – a failure (or combina-
tion of failures), which results in the inability of the UA to maintain a
safe altitude above the surface or distance from objects and structures;
2. Loss of control (LOC) - a failure (or combination of failures), which
results in loss of control of the UA and may lead to impact at high
velocity;
3. Controlled ﬂight into terrain (CFIT) - when an airworthy UA is
ﬂown, under the control of a qualiﬁed remote pilot (RP) or certiﬁed
autopilot system, unintentionally into terrain (water, structures, or
obstacles);
4. Dropped or jettisoned components (DOJC) - failures that result in a
component of the UA (including its payload or stores) being dropped
or jettisoned from the UA.
Input to the development of a failure model is a list of potential
failures (e.g., loss of propulsion, loss of power, human error, bird strike,
etc.), their contributing conditions (e.g., environmental and mission fac-
tors), and their associated failure modes (e.g., impact or the continued
safe operation of the UA). The output from this model are measures
describing the uncertainty in the occurrence of one or more of the four
high level failure modes.
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model of the reliability of a component, sub-system(s), or the UAS as a
whole. Different assumptions and underlying models will lead to
different output measures (e.g.measures of the “system failure rate” [15],
“probability of failure” [16], or “probability of loss of aircraft” [17]). The
failure models identiﬁed in the literature are summarised in Table 2 of
Appendix A.
2.1.1. Review of failure models
Of the 17 failure models identiﬁed in the literature, only two explored
different types of failures and failure modes. The model presented by
Burke et al. [16] takes two failure modes into consideration. The ﬁrst
being UDS (e.g. resulting from failure of propulsion system) and the
second a LOC (e.g. resulting from main spar buckling under load, failure
of all ﬂight control systems, loss of a ﬂight critical control surface, etc.).
Similarly Barr et al. [18] looks at multi-dependent failures resulting in
LOC and CFIT failure modes. The majority of models however assume a
single system-level failure and associated failure mode.
The type of failure mode is a signiﬁcant factor in determining the
nature of the risk to the EoV; directly inﬂuencing the impact location,
recovery, and stress component-models. For example, there is more likely
to be control over the impact location for those failures classiﬁed as
having a UDS failure mode over those classiﬁed as having a CFIT or LOC
failure mode. A single failure can also give rise to more than one failure
mode. For example, a LOC can lead to the over-stressing of the airframe,
and in turn, the realisation of a DOJC failure mode. Such “second order”
considerations (dependencies between failure mode models) have not
been addressed in any of the reviewed models.
Another assumption made by all of the reviewed models is that the
likelihood of occurrence of the failure (or in most cases, the expected rate
of occurrence) is assumed constant. Subsequently, potential variations in
the likelihood of failure with factors such as phase, duration, environ-
mental conditions, or mission ﬂight proﬁle are not considered. In addi-
tion to this, for a population of UAS, a constant failure rate ignores the
fact that once a failure occurs the operator is likely to adopt measures to
counter this failure in the future. Furthermore, it fails to recognise that
some UAS might have recovery measures put in place to address these
failures (e.g. use of redundant systems).
2.1.2. Substantiation of models
The failure models were substantiated using one of two methods:
1. Historical failure or accident and incident data;
2. Expert opinion.
Determining the probability of failure of the aircraft using historical
data involves simply accounting for the number of mishaps an aircraft
platform (UA or CPA) has over a given period of time and then dividing
these mishaps by the number of ﬂight hours the platform has over the
same period of time [15]. Different sources of data can be used for this,
including historical data for manned aircraft [19–21] and manufacturer
speciﬁcations [22,23].
There is limited reliability data available on UAS owing to the relative
infancy of the technology and the diversity that exists amongst these
systems. Thus the use of a system/functional approach to determine the
failure rate of the system might prove to be more suitable for UAS. Burke
et al. [16] and Hayhurst et al. [24] provide examples of functional and
structural decompositions of UAS that can be used to develop such a
model. A similar approach is applied in the space launch industry [25,
26], that also shares the problem of low data and high uncertainty. While
a greater level of structural/functional decomposition would increase the
potential sources of data that can be used in the model, reliability data at
this level may not be available or may come at a signiﬁcant monetary cost
[16]. Thus a proper balance between these two aspects must be reached
while developing these models.
In general, the use of historical data may not be appropriate for27rapidly evolving systems such as UAS. In these instances, the elicitation
of expert opinion which makes use of system/functional level data may
be used. The models presented by Refs. [20–22,27–29], implicitly make
use of expert opinion in determining the failure rate of the system. Some
of the models base the results on past knowledge gathered through his-
torical data. Details on how the expert data were elicited are scarce and as
such adds uncertainty to the model. Knott et al. [15] make use of a
Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) to determine the probability of loss of
the aircraft. Other approaches, including Fault Tree Analysis (FTA),
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality
Analysis (FMECA) can also be used to evaluate the reliability of the
system. More recently, Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) have also been
adopted (e.g. Refs. [18,30]) to this effect.
The elicitation of expert opinion and the adoption of a functional or
structural decomposition of a UAS provide a mathematical basis for
determining the failure rate of a system taking system speciﬁc data into
consideration. Existing models have however not accounted for the
failures due to human error, which has been determined as a contributing
factor in 60.2% of UAS mishaps [31]. As such, the results from these
models are likely to underestimate the mishap rates when compared to
historical mishap rates [15].
2.1.3. Representation of uncertainty
There is signiﬁcant uncertainty (epistemic and aleatory) in the
identiﬁcation and modelling of failures for UAS. This uncertainty arises
due to a lack of reliability data, the changing system conﬁgurations, use
of non-certiﬁed components, and limited operational experience [5].
The process of identifying and modelling the occurrence of failures is
a key source of uncertainty in the generation of a GRM. Speciﬁcally,
whether the set of identiﬁed failures is complete and whether the model
(or assumptions) characterising the uncertainty in the occurrence of a
failure provide an accurate representation of the failure phenomena
being studied. The absence of a formal accident and incident reporting
framework, particularly for small UAS, may prove to be a major source of
data uncertainty for these models. A majority of the studies make use of
data points based on self-reports, thus negating the impact of data un-
certainty on the model (e.g. Refs. [18,30]). Further, many of the existing
models make use of accident, incident and failure data from CPA to
inform the development of their models. The use of such data implicitly
assumes adequate similarities exist between the conditions contributing
to failures (and resulting failure modes) between manned and unmanned
aircraft. The validity of such assumptions are not explored in the
literature.
Failure to account for both the epistemic and aleatory uncertainties
could directly impact the level of risk posed by these systems. From
Table 2, it can be seen that, the highest treatment of uncertainty is
described by Ancel et al. [30] and Barr et al. [18] and is classiﬁed as
‘Level 4’. While these models do make use of a Bayesian approach to take
the uncertainty into consideration, the outputs are still represented as
point values. Similarly, the models presented by Lum and Waggoner
[22], Lum et al. [23] and Bradley and Hillestad [32] are classiﬁed as
‘Level 3’. While classiﬁed as ‘Level 3’, all of these models were based on a
number of conservative assumptions, the compounding effect of which is
not explored. This will have an impact on the setting of appropriate
regulations moving forward.
2.1.4. Relationship to regulations
Failure models drive all aspects of the technical airworthiness and
certiﬁcation of UAS and its associated equipment. This includes mini-
mum design performance criteria and requirements on the ongoing
airworthiness (i.e., maintenance) of the system. Those failure modes
associated with human performance will be key to determining medical,
training, and duty requirements for the remote crew. The failure model
will also be important in the setting of system safety objectives (Part
1309 requirements) and for showing compliance to them. System safety
regulations are intended to supplement prescriptive standards on the
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level, they specify the requirement for [33]:
1. A documented analysis showing that equipment and systems perform
as intended under foreseeable operating and environmental
conditions;
2. The adoption of principles from fail-safe and fault-tolerant design
[34]; and
3. The demonstration (through a documented qualitative or quantitative
analysis) that the expected frequency of failure of equipment and
systems, when considered separately and in relation to other systems,
is inversely-related to the severity of its effect on the safe operation of
the system. This is commonly referred to as the system safety per-
formance requirement (SSPR).
A complete description of the Part 1309 regulations can be found in
Refs. [24,35–39], and associated guidance material [34,40]. Guidelines
on the system safety assessment process and accepted assessment tools
and techniques can be found in Refs. [37,38,41,42]. The failure model
combined with assumptions in relation to the other component-models,
are key to establishing appropriate failure probability objectives for
UAS. A mapping between the existing failure modes (i.e., UDS, LOC,
CFIT, and DOJC) and the failure severity levels deﬁned in Part 1309
regulations (e.g., Catastrophic, Hazardous, Major, Minor, No Safety Ef-
fect) must be established. Once established, the most probable failure
mode assigned to an identiﬁed failure would be used to determine its
failure condition severity level. This can then be used to establish the
appropriate failure probability objective for the particular component/
sub-systems associated with the particular failure.
The effect of conservative assumptions underlying the development
of UAS failure models is two-fold. Firstly, they will lead to the estab-
lishment of more stringent failure probability objectives for UAS. Sec-
ondly, the same models are used to then show compliance with these
objectives. As such, conservative modelling assumptions can lead to
overly conservative design performance criteria for components.
2.2. Impact model
The impact model characterises the spatial-temporal uncertainty in
the location of UA impact and the size of the area impacted (referred to as
the lethal area) given the occurrence of a failure. Some models assume
that the UA will impact at a single point (no uncertainty), others assume
that there are a number of potential locations the UA can impact, given a
particular trajectory. The latter approach deﬁnes a boundary within
which all the potential impact locations of the UA lie. This boundary is
based on a number of factors (e.g. maximum glide distance) and the area
within it is called the impact area. The location of impact and size of the
lethal area depends on the trajectory of the UA (or its components for
DOJC failure modes), which is determined by the:
1. Initial conditions at the time of failure (e.g., position, velocity,
attitude);
2. Failure mode (i.e., UDS, LOC, CFIT or DOJC);
3. Type of UA (e.g., ﬁxed wing, blimp, multi-rotor, helicopter, etc.);
4. Input made by a RP, auto-pilot, or recovery system (including pre-
programmed behaviours);
5. Activation of mitigation devices (e.g., parachutes, air bags, destructive
ﬂight termination systems, etc.); and
6. Environmental factors (e.g., wind, terrain).
The choice of initial conditions serves to bound the potential distri-
bution of impact locations. For example, if a ﬁxed-wing UA experiences a
loss of power, it is likely that it will still be able to glide a certain distance
before impacting the ground. The key factors determining the impact
point being, the glide performance of the UA, the initial altitude at the
time of the failure, and the prevailing wind conditions.28The particular failure mode will determine the degree of controlla-
bility on-board control systems or the RP has over the UA, and in turn, the
location of impact. A range of trajectory models would be required to
accurately represent the uncertainty in the impact location for different
failure modes. For example, a ballistic trajectory model may be appro-
priate for DOJC failure modes whereas more complex dynamic models
would be required to represent other failure modes like a LOC or UDS.
The type of UA will be a key factor in determining its trajectory under
a given failure mode. For example, a loss of power for a multi-rotor UA is
likely to lead to a LOC failure mode, and in turn an impact distribution
characterised by the free fall characteristics of the UA skewed in the
direction of its initial velocity vector. Whereas a loss of power on a ﬁxed
wing UA will result in a UDS failure mode, which will have a much larger
impact distribution characterised by the glide and turn performance of
the aircraft (e.g. Ref. [43]).
Inputs to the system made by the RP or autopilot systems post-failure
will also inﬂuence the impact distribution. For example, many missions
have pre-deﬁned ﬂight termination sequence or automated functionality
that attempt to recover the UAS to a speciﬁed location. The designation
of recovery or ditching areas will tend to skew the likely impact distri-
bution for those failure modes where there remains a degree of
controllability over the UA (i.e., lead to multi-modal spatial impact dis-
tributions). Other auto-scripted features such as return to launch or hold
over an area will have a similar effect on the impact probability
distribution.
The activation of parachutes and other forms of ﬂight termination
systems will inﬂuence the spatial and temporal characteristics of the
impact distribution in a similar manner (e.g. Ref. [44]). It will also be
necessary to model human pilot performance (situational awareness,
decision making and action) post the occurrence of the failure for those
situations where the contingency behaviours are not automated.
Operational factors (e.g. wind, terrain, weather, and visibility) will
contribute to the uncertainty in the trajectory of the UA, and in turn, its
impact location. The underlying terrain and structures will also be key
factors in determining the impact location for CFIT failure modes.
The UA is not a point mass and numerous approaches have been
proposed for describing the size of the region on the ground exposed to
the potentially harmful characteristics of the UA. This is commonly
referred to as the casualty or lethal area. The size and factors going into
the determination of the lethal area depend on the EoV, the type of stress
being considered (refer to Section x2.4), the mechanism for harm being
considered (refer to Section x2.7), the characteristics of the UA (e.g.,
dimensions) and its trajectory immediately prior to impact (e.g., steep
vertical dive, or shallow glide). For blunt force or crushing harm mech-
anisms, the lethal area is often determined based on the dimensions of
the UA and the radius of an upright person. If the mechanism for harm
was a blast wave, then a radius relating to the propagation of the shock
wave centred on the point of impact, would need to be deﬁned.
2.2.1. Review of impact models
The literature review revealed 24 impact models (Table 3 of Appen-
dix A) used to evaluate the impact location and lethal area of the UA,
given the occurrence of a failure. With the exception of [17,45], each of
these models used a geometric approach to evaluate the impact model.
This in turn required input parameters in the form of position, velocity,
attitude, etc.
The impact location distribution is highly dependent on the failure
mode, however, the majority of identiﬁed models failed to specify the
type of failure mode(s) considered. Of those models that did, most
assumed catastrophic failure conditions, and subsequently assumed
either a LOC or UDS failure mode.
Impact distribution models based on ﬁxed wing conﬁgurations were
assumed for a majority of the models. The models described in Refs.
[12,20,30,46–52] however also looked at multi-rotor conﬁgurations in
evaluating the impact model. As previously described, the type of the UA
has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the nature of the impact distribution.
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A number of the existing models (e.g. Refs. [29,48,52,53]) do not take
the size of the lethal area into consideration, assuming the impact occurs
at a ﬁnite point in space and time. This assumption limits the risk eval-
uation to that of individual risks (i.e., further assumptions must be made
in order to evaluate measures of group or collective risk). Models like
those presented in Refs. [16,23,54] provide calculations of the lethal
area, which differs from the impact area by including overlapping di-
mensions of the EoV. Finally, with the exception of [44] there were no
existing models accounting for impact location given the activation of a
contingency mechanism (e.g., parachute, auto-rotation, etc.).
2.2.2. Substantiation of models
A summary of impact models reviewed is provided in Table 3 of
Appendix A. Melnyk et al. [17] describe two methods used to substan-
tiate these models, speciﬁcally:
1. Hypothetical prediction models (geometry based); and
2. Empirical prediction models (weight, size, or category based).
The hypothetical prediction models (e.g. Refs. [12,16,20,27]) use
aerodynamic models and simulation as the basis for determining the
impact distribution. The hypothetical prediction models can be further
divided into planform, gliding, and vertical descent models. The plan-
form approach takes advantage of the shape and layout of the aircraft
wing. The gliding approach (e.g. Refs. [12,27,54]) assumes that the UA
will continue its descent proﬁle and glide at a certain angle (based on the
lift to drag ratio of the UA) before impacting with the ground. The ver-
tical descent models (e.g. Refs. [12,16,27]) which are based on a steep
geometric assumption, use a circle based on the UA wingspan to deter-
mine the boundaries of the potential impact distribution. Most models
use both the gliding and vertical descent models to evaluate the impact
location. Wu et al. [43] use a dynamic model assessed for various failure
conditions to determine the maximum boundary (and in turn area) of the
impact distribution for ﬁxed wing UA. However, like most models, it
assumes a uniform impact distribution within these boundaries. Such
assumptions fail to account for the existence of higher impact probabil-
ities in the regions immediately surrounding the mission ﬂight path, or
around nominated recovery or hold points. An exception to this are the
models presented by Lum et al. [23] and Cour-Harbo [48]. These models
make use of a probability distribution function to characterise the crash
potential within the given area, thus taking the uncertainty associated
with this factor into consideration.
Empirical prediction models make use of historical data from aircraft
crashes (manned and unmanned) as a basis for determining the impact
location. Melnyk et al. [17] further classiﬁes these models into
weight-based (e.g. Ref. [19]) and size or aircraft category based (e.g.
Ref. [32]) prediction techniques. While historical data from the UAS
industry would be ideal for these models, owing to the relative infancy of
the technology, data from CPA are often used as inputs. Impact location
models based on CPA accident and incident data make the implicit
assumption of similarity in the behaviour of a CPA and an UA under a
particular failure. The validity of this assumption is not adequately
explored in the existing literature and is particularly signiﬁcant for those
cases where CPA data is used to develop impact location models for small
UA or unique UA types for which there is no direct CPA comparison. The
basic mathematical models for some of these models are provided in
Table 9 of Appendix B.
Various models are used to describe the lethal area. The majority use
a simple deterministic model based on the dimensions of the UA, the
radius of a person, and the product of the height of the person impacted
and the cotangent of the glide angle [23]. Second order factors including
skid, roll, explosion, and fragmentation can be taken into consideration
in the characterisation of the lethal area (e.g. Refs. [12,47]). Models (e.g.
Refs. [12,16,27]) characterise the lethal area for steep vertical trajec-
tories using a circle of diameter equal to the wingspan of the UA. Melnyk29et al. [17] compared the lethal areas calculated from some of the hypo-
thetical and empirical prediction models to actual or approximated lethal
areas documented in accident and incident reports. While the data used
in the study were limited, it was observed that the geometric methods
continually under predicted the lethal area when compared to actual
data, with the gliding approach producing the most accurate results,
followed closely by the weight and size/category based approach.
2.2.3. Representation of uncertainty
As can be seen from Table 3, with the exception of [23,46,48] all of
the other models did not characterise the uncertainty at a high level. Each
of the factors described above contribute to the level of uncertainty
associated with the impact models and consequently impact the devel-
opment of regulations for these systems.
2.2.4. Relationship to regulations
The impact model will be signiﬁcant in the development of opera-
tional regulations for UAS. Speciﬁcally, regulations specifying the:
 Minimum clearance distance to be maintained from people, build-
ings, or populous areas for a given height above ground and UA type;
 Minimum height over which an overﬂight of a populous area can
occur;
 Extents of operating areas including mission and ﬂight boundaries.
The impact model can also be used as a basis for determining whether
UAS are required to be equipped with containment assurance devices
(e.g. geo-fences and tethers) or systems for ﬂight termination (e.g. auto-
land and parachutes). The minimum performance requirements for
these systems will be largely determined by their contribution to the
overall safety case. For example, routine operations over populous areas
may require forced landing and ﬂight termination systems to meet high
design assurance levels. The impact model may also be used in opera-
tional planning to determine the size and location of emergency and
failure recovery areas and as an input to determining minimum perfor-
mance standards for UAS navigation systems.
2.3. Recovery model
The recovery model characterises the uncertainty in the ability of the
UAS to recover to a nominal or degraded operational state given the
occurrence of the failure. Some factors critical to the characterisation of
the recovery model include:
1. Type of failure and its failure mode;
2. Equipage of the UAS with failure detection, warning and recovery/
mitigation devices;
3. Situational awareness of the RP;
4. Reliability and performance of automated failure recovery systems.
The probability of recovery depends on the type of failure, its failure
mode, and the operational situation. For example, if the UA experiences a
failure resulting in a LOC failure mode, then the presence of a recovery
mechanism (e.g. parachute) would reduce the descent velocity, thus
reducing the potential harmful characteristics resultant from the failure.
The equipage of the UAS with failure detection, warning, and re-
covery/mitigation devices directly inﬂuence the probability of recovery.
More speciﬁcally, the absence of a mechanism for failure detection and
alerting would result in the inability to deploy a recovery mechanism by
either automated systems or the RP. The probability of recovery will also
have temporal dependencies, e.g. the RP may not detect the failure in
sufﬁcient time to recover the UA.
The situational awareness of the RP and their ability to recover the
UA under a failure mode also has a direct impact on the probability of
recovery. For example, the RP may not be able to take manual control in
those instances where the UA is operating outside of direct visual line of
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Finally, the reliability of the recovery systems needs to be taken into
account as a factor in the recovery risk model.
2.3.1. Review of recovery models
A summary of the recovery models (part of other GRMs or component
models) reviewed is presented in Table 4 of Appendix A. With the
exception of [21,29,30,44,53,55,56] none of the other identiﬁed models
considered recovery measures in the evaluation of the risks posed by UAS
to people and property on the ground. The models provided by McGeer
et al. [21] and Ford and McEntee [29] make assumptions in relation to
the ability of the UAS to follow a glide path with maximum range, while
the model provided by Shelley [44] and Bleier [53] explore the effec-
tiveness (i.e., the risk reduction) of parachutes. Weibel and Hansman [55]
suggest several mitigation measures which can be put in place to reduce
the risk. Some of these measures include 1) reducing the exposure to risk
of the public on the ground, 2) ensuring UAV system reliability, 3)
facilitating safe recovery from failures, 4) reducing the effects of UAV
ground impact. This is incorporated into the model by introducing a
factor “Pmit” which indicated “the proportion of accidents for which
mitigation prevents the occurrence of ground fatality” [55].
2.3.2. Substantiation of models
While few of the models reviewed incorporated a recovery sub-
model, none of them provided a quantitative assessment on it. The best
way to substantiate these models would be to look at historical data on
other systems or conduct case study experiments, to determine the
amount of risk reduction that would be achieved through the incorpo-
ration of recovery measures. Elicitation of expert opinion may also be
used to substantiate these models.
2.3.3. Representation of uncertainty
As was seen from the literature reviewed, only six of the models
reviewed took this component of the GRM into consideration. While
these models clearly highlight what mitigation measures they accounted
for, with the exception of [53], these models fail to provide any details in
relation to the mitigation measures adopted. As such, it can be assumed
that a ‘Level 0’ uncertainty was taken into consideration by each of the
models. Failure of these models to account for this component of the
GRM, limits the impact of not incorporating the uncertainty in this
parameter into the models.
2.3.4. Relationship to regulations
A clear understanding of the recovery models can directly impact
technical design features and operational processes. For example, if a UA
were to experience a technical failure during operation, then auto-
recovery capabilities in software could reduce the probability of a UDS
(e.g. engine restart). As the recovery measures have the ability to reduce
the negative consequences associated with a failure, this model could
also inﬂuence standards in the training of RP and development of oper-
ational procedures for the management of contingency scenarios.
The presence of recovery measures (e.g. automatic recovery para-
chute) could inﬂuence the decision on whether to relax or remove the
requirement to obtain consent to operate outside some of the standard
operating conditions. When looking at the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
(CASA) regulations, this could thus help deﬁne the properties of
“excluded” or “open” categories of UA. Similarly, when looking at the
regulations outlined by EASA, the presence or absence of recovery
measures could help deﬁne the properties of “open”, “speciﬁc” or
“certiﬁed” categories of UA. The Civil Aviation Authority for New Zea-
land in a new Civil Aviation Rule Part 102 proposed in 2015 notes that in
“deciding whether to relax or remove the requirements to obtain con-
sent”, one of the consideration would include “system redundancy (such
as an acceptable automatic recovery parachute)” [57].
In addition to this, the recovery model could also help inﬂuence the
adoption of principles of fail safe and fault tolerant designs (something30characteristic of Part 1309 regulations).
2.4. Stress model
The stress model describes the uncertainty in harmful conditions
(stresses) being realised at a given point and time. The particular harmful
condition modelled depends on the type of EoV and the type of harm
being characterised as part of the risk assessment. For example, if the
consequence to be managed was the physical injury to people, then
stresses could include the kinetic energy (KE), momentum, or energy
density of the UA. The different stresses can be related to the harmful
outcome through one or more harmmechanisms. Example physical harm
mechanisms for people include: blunt force, penetration, crushing, blast,
burns, lacerations, etc. [58]. Factors inﬂuencing the characterisation of
the stress model include:
1. Type and level of harm of interest (e.g., serious physical injury to a
person);
2. Spatial and temporal aspects associated with the UA (e.g., time of
impact);
3. Type and design of the UA (e.g., exposed rotating parts, size, frangi-
bility, etc.);
4. Conditions at the point of impact (e.g., speed, orientation, etc.);
5. Type of EoV (e.g. people, animals, vehicles, etc.)
6. Secondary effects associated with the UA on impact (e.g., blast
waves);
UA can have multiple stress characteristics, which can relate to one or
more mechanisms of harm, and these can differ with the type of UA. For
example, an UA with exposed rotating blades has the ability to cause
injury through penetration. If the same UA has sufﬁcient size and mo-
mentum, then it may also cause blunt force trauma.
The probability and magnitude of stress can also vary with time and
the spatial location of impact. For example, the mass of the UA can reduce
with time as fuel or stores are consumed, reducing the potential magni-
tude of energy on impact. Further, it is more likely to have a higher en-
ergy on impact at locations close to the ballistic point than in locations at
the extremes of its potential impact distribution.
The properties of the UA and its trajectory can be modiﬁed to change
the stress characteristic at the point of impact. For example, an UA can
have air bags or frangible characteristics that reduce the amount of en-
ergy potentially transferred on impact. Similarly, the UA can be placed in
an energy minimal conﬁguration (e.g., deep stall, or gradual spiral) prior
to impact. While the characterisation of the stress distribution is deter-
mined independent of the EoV, the relevant type of stress used in the
GRM will depend on the type of EoV.
Debris scattering, sliding, or secondary effects like explosions and the
release of hazardous materials will have different associated stress
properties that need to be modelled. These stress characteristics can
change the size of the impact area. For example, the probability of lethal
level of KE is likely to reduce with the increasing distance that the UA
slides over the ground. Similarly, the magnitude of pressure associated
with a blast wave tends to dissipate with increasing distance from the
explosive source.
In summary, the stress model is a key component to the characterisa-
tion of consequential outcomes given an impact. Underpinning thismodel
are the various mechanisms for harm. No single mechanism for harm will
be suitable for all types of UA. For some UA, one harm mechanism will
dominate, while for others, multiple harm mechanisms may need to be
considered in order to comprehensively characterise the conditions most
likely to give rise to harm to an impacted individual (or other type of EoV).
Mechanisms for harm are further discussed in Section x2.7.
2.4.1. Review of stress models
A summary of the stress models identiﬁed in the literature are pre-
sented in Table 5 of Appendix A. Only 10 of the 33 models (GRMs and
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All of the identiﬁed models used the KE associated with the UA as the
stress characteristic, with the model presented by Ball et al. [12] dis-
cussing the effects of explosions and thermal radiation as well. The
models used a range of mass and speed values to determine the KE at
impact, which is a source of variation between the outputs of the stress
models. For example, while determining the KE for small UA ﬂying at low
altitudes, Dalamagkidis et al. [49] suggested the use of terminal velocity
(or alternatively maximum operating velocity increased by 40%) even
though it would be an over-conservative estimate. Ancel et al. [30] makes
a similar assumption while evaluating the impact KE. Other models (e.g.
Ref. [18]) simply assume the maximum velocity while determining the
impact energy.
It is noted that the primary mechanism for harm considered in
existing models is trauma caused through blunt force impact. For UA of
small mass, blunt force trauma may not be the primary mechanism for
harm. For example, small multi-rotor UA are more likely to cause phys-
ical trauma through penetration (i.e., cutting due to exposed propellers).
The Micro-UAS ARC [59] recognise the importance of considering
laceration injuries in the stress model. According to Arterburn et al. [60]
while small UAS may cause injuries in the form of deep cuts (from ve-
hicles as small as 1–2 lbs), they are unlikely to represent a lethal threat to
people in terms of laceration injuries. Until recently there have been
limited models that adequately characterise the stress characteristics
speciﬁc to multi-rotors. This gap led to a number of recent studies
characterising the stress (and harm) speciﬁc to multi-rotors (e.g. model
presented in Refs. [18,60]).
Few models account for the stress factors associated with UA with
signiﬁcant on-board stored energy sources (e.g., stored chemical poten-
tial, etc.) or high kinetic energies, which have the potential to cause
secondary hazards such as an explosion. These secondary effects have
additional stress characteristics (e.g., thermal radiation, shock waves,
fragmentation, etc.), which would need to be considered in a compre-
hensive assessment of the risks. A preliminary discussion of such factors
is provided by Ball et al. [12].
2.4.2. Substantiation of models
The models that did explicitly mention the importance of the stress
model, provided limited detail as to how they were substantiated. The
standard KE equations were used to determine the energy the UA had on
impact, with modiﬁcations made for vertical and gliding descent proﬁles.
The properties of the aircraft (e.g. mass, velocity) were UA speciﬁc, with
certain generalised assumptions made with regards to their terminal
velocities. This method of model substantiation could be classiﬁed as a
hypothetical approach. In addition to this, expert opinion and historical
data can also serve as potential sources of input data for these models.
2.4.3. Representation of uncertainty
There are a number of factors that inﬂuence the stress model. Each of
these factors is a source of uncertainty that will directly inﬂuence the
model. For example, if a smallUAcrashes into an individual on theground,
then the amount of energy possessed by the system on impact will vary
signiﬁcantly with the type of UA, the relative velocity at the point of
impact, the frangibility of the system, the orientation of the UA on impact,
the presence of recoverymeasures, etc.. The uncertainty relating to each of
these factors will directly impact the amount of energy possessed by the
system on impact. In addition to this, the type and characteristics of the
EoV on impact and the uncertainty surrounding this, also plays an
important role in determining the level of severity the system can impart.
Finally, there is limited data fromwhich to develop these models. As each
of thesemodels are based onworst case assumptions, they are categorised
as having only provided a “Level 1” treatment of uncertainty.
2.4.4. Relationship to regulations
The output from the stress model can directly inﬂuence the technical
regulations relating to the crashworthiness of the UA. These are the31design characteristics of the UA that minimise the potential magnitude of
stress transferred to an EoV and the probability of secondary hazards
occurring. Examples include requirements for the equipage of protective
shrouds, or standards specifying the degree of frangibility of leading
edges/structure, the protection of fuel stores, and the need for recovery
measures such as parachutes to minimise the amount of energy on
impact. The stress model can also inﬂuence operational guidelines on the
design of failure trajectories and requirements for ﬂight termination
proﬁles that minimise the amount of energy on impact (e.g. deep stall,
gradual spiral).
2.5. Exposure model
The exposure model characterises the uncertainty in the presence of
EoV at a given location and time. In the context of aviation risk man-
agement, we are largely concerned about the risks to people and prop-
erty, and secondarily the aircraft system. These EoV are classiﬁed as [14]:
1. First parties - people and property directly associated with the oper-
ation of the Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) (e.g., the RP,
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) observers, the RPA itself, etc.);
2. Secondary parties - people and property not associated with the
operation of the RPAS but directly derive beneﬁt from its operation
(e.g., a farmer whose crop is being sprayed by a RPA, infrastructure
being inspected by the RPA, etc.);
3. Third parties - people and property not associated with, nor deriving
direct beneﬁt from, the operation of the RPAS.
Aviation regulations prioritise the management of risks to third
parties. As such, we limit our discussion to these EoV. In conjunction with
the incident stress model (Section x2.6), this factor can have a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on the expected number of casualties.
2.5.1. Review of exposure models
Based on the models reviewed (21 exposure models identiﬁed in
Table 6 of Appendix A), the exposure models can be classiﬁed into two
main types:
1. Uniform exposure models
2. Comprehensive exposure models
The most commonly used population exposure model is a uniform
exposure model. The use of this model ignores potential clustering of a
population within a deﬁned geospatial area, and in effect, averages the
potential contribution of the exposure factor to the overall risk assess-
ment. Thus, potential peaks in resulting risk arising due to population
clustering are not adequately captured by a GRM utilising a uniform
exposure model.
A comprehensive exposure model endeavours to account for spatial
variations in population distribution (e.g., clustering) and changes in this
distribution with time. Geospatial clustering, within buildings or areas of
interest, can occur. For example, at sporting stadiums, in schools, or
places of work. The distribution is not static, with daily, weekly, and
seasonal changes. For example, it is more likely for a student to be in-
doors during school hours than it is during the hours immediately
following the end of the school day. This behaviour will however change
during the winter months when the students are on break from school.
Such temporal effects have a major role in determining variations in
exposure and in turn, variations in the level of risk presented by a UA
operation over populous areas.
Models such as those developed by Burke et al. [16] and Melnyk et al.
[17] attempt to incorporate temporal aspects, recognising how people
spend their day (i.e. the kind of job they have, whether or not they go to
school, etc.). Melnyk et al. [17] provides an example of a comprehensive
exposure model, highlighting temporal dependencies in population
exposure. According to [61], people spent 68.7% of their time in
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another 12.8% in other indoor locations. Melnyk uses this information,
along with the information on what a typical area is comprised of (resi-
dence (21%), vehicles (7%), open (63%) and other/commercial (9%)) to
specify their exposure model. These factors were not taken into consid-
eration in a majority of the models reviewed.
2.5.2. Substantiation of models
Data used to quantify exposure models include:
1. Census data;
2. Geographical data from satellite imagery (e.g. Google maps); and
3. Expert opinion.
The source of the census data varied depending on when the indi-
vidual studies were conducted and what areas were being evaluated. For
example, Clothier et al. [27] made use of the Australian Bureau of Sta-
tistics data, Burke et al. [16] made use of the U.S. Census Bureau and
Stevenson et al. [62] made use of data gathered from the Canadian
Census Bureau. The challenge with the use of this data is the low
geo-spatial resolution and the lack of temporal information. The models
presented by Lum and Waggoner [22] and Waggoner [54] use satellite
images to further reﬁne models based on census data. In addition to
census data and map information, Di Donato et al. [63] also made use of
mobile phone data to provide a more dynamic model of the population
distribution. Ancel et al. [30] aims to make use of near real-time popu-
lation distribution and density via census data augmented by cellular
network activity. Other models (e.g. Ref. [44]), utilised expert opinion to
quantify exposure models.
2.5.3. Representation of uncertainty
Looking at the uncertainty levels in Table 6 of Appendix A, it is seen
that the maximum level of uncertainty taken into consideration is ‘Level
1’. The input data for the exposure models come from census data. The
uncertainty associated with this model is determined by the spatial-
temporal resolution and accuracy of the underlying data.
2.5.4. Relationship to regulations
The exposure model is primarily determined by properties of the
environment and the EoV as opposed to the technical design of the UAS.
It is a key input for determining the effectiveness of operational re-
strictions such as limitations on the time of ﬂight, and types of areas
overﬂown (e.g., the deﬁnition of a “congested” or “populated” areas), on
the overall risk posed by a UAS operation.2.6. Incident stress model
The incident stress model describes the uncertainty in the magnitude
of stress the EoV is exposed to. It characterises the variation in the
amount of stress that is transferred to a speciﬁc EoV due to a wide range
of factors that attenuate (or amplify) the magnitude of stress on impact.
Two aspects are incorporated in any incident stress model:
1. The probability that a particular attenuating or amplifying factor is
present; and
2. The probability of it having a particular attenuating or amplifying
effect given its presence.
For the EoV of people, examples of factors incorporated in an incident
stress model include the protection provided by structures or vehicles, or
the use of personal protective equipment such as helmets or glasses. Both
of which serve to absorb or otherwise reduce the magnitude of energy
imparted on a human. An example of an amplifying effect is the32concentration of pressure (blast waves) due to surrounding terrain or
structures.
The probability of people being sheltered within buildings and the
degree of protection provided by a building will depend on the type of
area overﬂown, and the time when the overﬂight occurs. For example, a
residential area will have different structures to that of a light industrial
or central business district. Large variations in the number of people in
these structures can be expected depending on the time of day as well.
For example, people will be expected to be at work under the protection
of a building during the day and at home during the night. Differences in
the amount of protection provided by these shelters can thus be taken
into consideration by accounting for the time of day in which the oper-
ation is being undertaken.
2.6.1. Review of incident stress models
A summary of the incident stress models reviewed can be found in
Table 7 of Appendix A. Many of the identiﬁed GRMs do not account for
variation in the incident stress. As such, the models implicitly assume
that the EoV is exposed to the entire magnitude of the stress at the point
of impact. For example, it is assumed that 100% of the KE of the UA is
transferred to an impacted EoV. Whilst a conservative assumption, it can
lead to the overestimation of the resulting level of harm.
Of the models reviewed, only 13 incorporated an incident stress
model. These models make use of a simple KE model based on worst case
scenarios to determine the amount of energy different shelters can
absorb, thus providing an overly conservative estimate, and reducing its
impact on the GRM. Based on the case study example, the model pre-
sented by Waggoner [54] assumes a fatality rate taking the characteris-
tics of the UAS into consideration (e.g. fatality rate of one for the Reaper).
Similarly, the model presented by Clothier et al. [27] assumes the con-
ditional probability that a strike results in a casualty is one. Both these
models thus fail to take the potential sheltering into consideration. They
however recognise the limitation of such an assumption. Clothier et al.
[27] clearly states that a more accurate model would have to take into
consideration the transfer of KE to the individual and sheltering provided
by structures. According toMelnyk [17], as these risk models also assume
a uniform population distribution, the failure to incorporate the incident
stress model into the overall risk model, has a negligible impact on the
expected number of casualties. Those risk models that do assume a
comprehensive exposure model could however beneﬁt greatly from the
incorporation of an incident stress model into the overall risk model. The
approaches presented by Melnyk et al. [17] and Ball et al. [12] illustrate
different methods of representing the incident stress model using the
sheltering factor.
Taking advantage of the studies conducted by the Columbia Accident
and Investigation Board and the Department of Defence, Melnyk et al.
[17] describes one approach for modelling the incident stress by ac-
counting for population distribution within different kinds of shelters
(residential buildings and commercial buildings). The model also ac-
counts for differences in the degree of protection offered by the different
types of structures. In addition to this, the model also recognises the
importance of taking chemical energy effects due to fuel into
consideration.
The model presented by Ball et al. [12] looks at the inﬂuence of the
incident stress model on the overall risk posed by the system by sub-
tracting the amount of KE that is absorbed by the shelter as it deforms,
breaks, and moves due to an incident KE. The deformation models are
based on existing studies for inert debris impacts [64].
2.6.2. Substantiation of models
The output from the incident stress models were either a point esti-
mate on the sheltering factor or a representation of the amount of energy
various shelters can absorb, and consequently the amount of protection
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expert opinion, or a combination thereof. The majority of models used
expert opinion to quantify the sheltering factor by providing a value
ranging from 0 (100% shelter) to 1 (no shelter) to represent the amount
of shelter provided for the case study scenario. The protective charac-
teristics of different structures, when considered in a model, were based
on historical studies of inert debris impacts [64,65]. These studies as-
sume an inert and infrangible impactor, which may prove to be limiting,
taking the unique characteristics of the UA into consideration.
2.6.3. Representation of uncertainty
The incident stress model encapsulates the uncertainty in the atten-
uating (or potentially amplifying) aspects of the environment on the
impact stress and ultimately, the magnitude of stress the EoV is exposed
to. Data in relation to the distribution of population to shelters are limited
to broad area population models, such as that provided through census
data. Similarly, the type and structural composition of shelters are largely
limited to local government databases. This results in a considerable
amount of epistemic uncertainty. More recent work [30] has utilised
satellite imagery to provide higher resolution models of structure loca-
tions in a smaller deﬁned area. A second source of uncertainty lies in the
modelling of the energy absorbed by certain types of structures. The
reviewed models all utilise existing impactor studies, which were based
on impact data from inert and infrangible debris. Thus, the models
implicitly inherit the assumption that the impacting UA is also inert and
does not undergo deformation. UA will undergo deformation on impact,
consequently, the structures are likely to offer greater protection than
characterised by these models.
2.6.4. Relationship to regulations
The incident stress model will be a key factor in determining opera-
tional restrictions for different types of UA. Speciﬁcally, the incident
stress model will contribute to what deﬁnes a populous area relevant for
different types of UA. For example, it may be acceptable to operate small
UA over populated areas where people are adequately sheltered but not
over exposed groups. Alternatively, for small UA, permissions to operate
at night over populous areas may be enabled due to the higher proportion
of people protected in structures. The incident stress model can also be
used as a basis for determining the minimum level of protective personal
equipment for operational personnel (ﬁrst and second parties) or build-
ing design criteria for airport structures.2.7. Harm model
The harm model characterises the uncertainty in the level of conse-
quence/damage caused to an EoV given their exposure to an incident
level of stress. Put simply, the harm model characterises the response of
the individual to one or more incident stresses. For example, the harm
model can describe the probability that an incident stress of certain
magnitude (i.e. energy, momentum, etc.) will result in an injury of
varying degrees of severity (e.g. minor, major, fatal). A harm model re-
lates the incident stress to the type and severity of the outcome. Char-
acteristics that inﬂuence the development of the harmmodel include the:
1. Type of EoV being considered;
2. Mechanism of harm being evaluated;
3. Degree of independence between mechanisms of harm; and
4. Characteristics of a speciﬁc EoV that inﬂuence its response.
What constitutes harm will depend on the type of EoV at risk. For
example, people, property, animals, the environment, or the UAS itself.
The type of EoV determines the types of harm and harmmechanisms that
need to be evaluated. An incident stress can cause harm to an EoV33through one or more harm mechanisms. In the context of physical harm
to people, these mechanisms can include blunt force, penetration,
crushing, blast, burns, and laceration. The properties of the UA and the
types and magnitudes of the incident stress on impact will determine
which harm mechanisms need to be modelled. For example, the domi-
nant mechanism for harm for very small and small multi-rotor UA are
penetration and laceration, whereas for large UA, it is crushing and blunt
force trauma. While each of these harmmechanisms have the potential of
causing serious injury on their own, when considered together, they may
have even more severe consequences. The harm model needs to account
for each potential mechanism of harm in isolation and in combination.
The speciﬁc characteristics of individual EoV will inﬂuence their
response to an incident stress. For example, an individual's height,
weight, and build, and their position on impact (e.g. sitting, standing, or
lying down), will inﬂuence their physical response to an incident stress.
2.7.1. Review of harm models
A total of 17 harm models were identiﬁed. A summary of identiﬁed
harm models is provided in Table 8 of Appendix A. It was found that
many of the existing GRMs did not incorporate a harm model. In so
doing, it is implicitly assumed that the probability of a human casualty
given an impact (i.e., level of incident stress) is one. Whilst conservative,
this assumption is not valid for all types of UA and can lead to an over-
estimation of the risk for smaller UA. According to the Range Com-
manders Council (RCC) an exception may be made to the use of unit
probability in the case of very light systems [66] such as small UA. In this
case a limit must be deﬁned that divides UAS into two categories, those
that do, and those that do not have the potential to cause fatal injury
[50]. Weibel et al. [55] introduced a penetration factor for calculating
the probability of fatality to take into consideration the fact that a person
might survive a UAS impact.
Of the harmmodels identiﬁed most do not specify the particular harm
mechanism considered. Of those that do, the most commonly modeled
harm mechanism is that of a blunt force trauma. According to Shelley
et al. [44], the most likely impact injuries are injuries to the head,
particularly skull fracture. More recent research (e.g., [67]) has started to
explore the importance of studying the human response to cutting and
penetration (the likely dominant mechanism for harm for small
multi-rotor UA). This study was based on another study conducted by
Ref. [68] that looked at the damage caused by actual remotely controlled
helicopter blades to human cadaver eyes. While the experiments were
not well documented and the blades used were for very light weight
indoor models, with weak motors and light blades, it serves as one of the
only current sources of data for characterising a model of the penetration
harm mechanism [67].
In the context of UAS safety analysis, the identiﬁed models have not
explored the combined effects of multiple harmmechanisms. This will be
particularly important in the characterisation of harm for those UAwhere
no particular harm mechanism dominates (e.g., small to medium sized
multi-rotor RPA). This marks an area requiring further research. In
addition to this, with the exception of the model developed in Ref. [67],
the identiﬁed harm models assume the EoV impacted is an adult male,
which, by virtue of their physiology, are on average more resilient to
harm than other sub-categories of the general population (e.g., children,
the elderly, or females, etc.).
A few of the harm models reviewed (e.g. Refs. [44,50]) model the
conditional probability of harm based on experimental data collected in
historical studies. One such study is that conducted by Feinstein et al.
[69] where the effects of blast, debris and other factors to people were
investigated. Distributions characterising the probability of fatality as a
function of incident KE for various impact locations have been developed
[69]. The model describes the harm response of an average male, aver-
aged over varying impact orientations. A standard logistic curve for the
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PðfatalityjimpactÞ ¼ 1
1þ ekðEimpEoÞ
(1)
Where Eo is the impact energy associated with a 50% probability of a fa-
tality (measured in Joules), Eimp is the impact energy and k is a constant. A
number of advancements over this standard equationhave been presented
by Dalamagkidis et al. [70] and Shelley et al. [44] to name a few.
Magister [56] makes use of a blunt criteria (BC) that relates the ki-
netic energy on impact with the body's ability to tolerate the energy on
impact, which is expressed using the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS).
When compared to impact kinetic energy alone, this has a stronger po-
tential of predicting the level of injury upon impact [71].
Models also vary inhowthey specify the resultingharm.Peoplehit by a
falling unmanned aircraft, but not fatally injured, may have received in-
juries of varying severity, depending on the force of the impact [44]. Ca-
sualty and fatality are two terms often used to describe the resulting harm
andhavedifferent limits for theKE associatedwith them. For example, the
RCC set a limit of 15 J (11 ft lb) for casualty (i.e. reversible injury) and 34 J
(25 ft lb) for fatality (i.e. non-reversible injury or death). The AIS appears
to be emerging as a common scale for describing a level of traumatic injury
(another scale used to relate the impact energy to the severity of skull
fracture is the Head Injury Criterion). The AIS represents the threat to life
associated with the injury, rather than the comprehensive assessment of
the severity of the injury [67]. The scale ranges from zero to six, where
zero represents no injury and six represents a fatal injury. Injuries with an
AIS of greater than three are considered life-threatening.
Finally, on review of the models, it was made evident that only direct
physical harm has been considered. Longer term physical (morbidity)
and psychological effects have not been modelled. Such harmful out-
comes may be more signiﬁcant than the direct physical harm caused by
the UA, particularly for smaller UA. Other forms of harm, such as eco-
nomic loss or environmental damage have also not been considered in
existing models.
2.7.2. Substantiation of models
The three different approaches used to substantiate harm
models include:
1. expert elicitation;
2. historical accident and incident data and;
3. impactor studies.
The models presented in Refs. [22,27,30,54,55] use expert judgement
to assign ﬁxed probabilities of fatality given speciﬁed characteristics of
the UA. Speciﬁcally, the probability of a fatality given an impact for a
larger UA such as a Reaper is assumed as one, while a lighter UA such as
the ScanEagle is assumed to have a probability of fatality of 0.5 [22,54].
Similarly, Clothier et al. [27] and Weibel et al. [55] assume a probability
of casualty and probability of fatality (respectively) of one, for any UA
that strikes an individual.
Historical data for accidents and incidents have been used to inform
the development of harm models (e.g. Refs. [16,17,46,67,72]). While
historical data can be used to evaluate the level of harm a particular UA
can cause in terms of KE imparted, there are a number of factors that
need to be taken into consideration. These include the characteristics of
the UA, type of EoV being considered, mechanism of harm being eval-
uated, degree of independence between mechanisms of harm and
characteristics of a speciﬁc EoV that inﬂuence its response. Using his-
torical data (particularly from manned systems) to determine the level
of harm might bring to question the suitability of the approach, owing
to the rapidly evolving pace of the technology, continually changing34system baselines and the uncertainty associated with the operation of
these systems.
Existing harm models based on experimental impactor studies have
also been adapted and applied (e.g. models presented in Refs.
[12,28,44,49,50,60]). Most commonly used is the blunt force trauma
model developed in Ref. [69], which describes the probability of fatality
as a function of impactor KE. Other physiological models based on
experimental data are presented in Refs. [73–75] and are used to esti-
mate the force causing skull fracture. The model presented in Ref. [67]
looks at both impact to the thorax and head and recognised the impor-
tance of extending the harm model to include cutting injuries from
rotating blades.
2.7.3. Representation of uncertainty
According to Melnyk et al. [17] the actual deaths or severe injury of a
human caused by a falling object or debris is a highly complex problem
that cannot be accurately modelled in a physics-based approach. Melnyk
et al., however, make use of other studies of injuries caused by explosives
and debris to provide the best possible model given the limited data.
These studies often make use of impactors in the form of projectiles that
are assumed to be inert, i.e. no deformation occurs on impact. UA would
however behave differently and are more likely to deform and break
during impact. In addition to this, most of these models make the
assumption that on impact all of the energy from the projectile is
imparted to the object. It is however argued that if the mass of the pro-
jectile is comparable or larger than that of the body part struck, not all of
the KE will be absorbed by the impacted person. After impact the object
will continue to move, in unison with the body, retaining some of the KE.
Failure to take this into consideration may add to the uncertainty in the
model. While this may provide a conservative estimate on the risk, it
needs to be taken into consideration while developing the model. In
addition to this, assuming an adult male in evaluating the amount of
energy an average person can withstand may result in an underestima-
tion of the risk as it ignores potentially more susceptible sub-groups
within an exposed population. The uncertainty associated with the de-
mographic of the person impacted is another factor that needs to be taken
into consideration while developing the harm model. Next, most of the
models assume the reference is standing upright when impacted by the
UA. The orientation of the individual in conjunction with the orientation
of the UA can greatly inﬂuence the level of harm imparted by these
systems and thus marks another area where research effort needs to be
focused. Finally, most of the models only take blunt force trauma into
consideration. Failure to take the effect of cutting or lacerations into
consideration may result in an underestimate of the risk. Each of these
factors may result in a non-conservative estimate of the risk and as such
the uncertainty associated with it should be taken into consideration
while developing the models and consequently setting the regulations
associated with them.
2.7.4. Relationship to regulations
An understanding of different thresholds for harm will be a key factor
in determining operational and airworthiness categorisations of UA and
has been the focus of most research to date. Understanding the impact of
different harm mechanisms (e.g. penetration, lacerations) on the human
body, will allow regulators to determine whether or not certain type of
UA (e.g. small UA) should be allowed to operate. It would also provide a
justiﬁable means of evaluating the need for certain harm mitigation
measures (e.g. need for protective shrouds), and their inclusion in the
airworthiness requirements of the system. Looking at blunt force trauma,
based on the threshold energy the human body can absorb, regulators
will be able to deﬁne weight restrictions and operational restrictions for
certain UA.
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Based on the preceding discussion it is evident that there are a
number of areas where opportunity for future research exists.
Firstly, failure models need to be modiﬁed to take the variable failure
rate associated with UAS into consideration. Adoption of a Bayesian
approach to take the limited data and high uncertainty associated with
UAS into consideration is needed. Future work is looking at adopting a
BBN to model this component of the GRM. BBN are graphical structures
that make use of probabilistic reasoning to ascertain information about
the unknown [85] and are beneﬁcial when expert opinion is ambiguous,
incomplete or uncertain [86]. They explicitly model causal factors; allow
for reasoning from effect to cause and vice versa; reduce the burden of
parameter acquisition; allow for previous beliefs to be overturned in light
of new evidence including both subjective beliefs and objective data and
arrive at decisions based on visible, auditable reasoning [87].
Secondly, a more transparent representation of the factors inﬂuencing
impact sub-models is required. In addition to this, a means to incorporate
the uncertainty associated with the overall impact model and the indi-
vidual factors that go into deﬁning it is also needed. Future work needs to
look at improving the ﬁdelity of the impact location model; going beyond
the uniform impact distribution models currently used. This sub-model is
particularly important to the development of operational regulations for
UAS. Impact sub-models need to be extended to include different failure
modes and the biasing effects emergency procedures and recovery sys-
tems have on the potential distribution of impacts.
Currently there is very limited research into the development of re-
covery sub-models. The presence of recovery mechanisms can signiﬁ-
cantly reduce the risk posed by certain UAS and subsequently, are widely
used as a risk control within UAS safety cases.
Looking at the stress model, it is evident that future work needs to
look at the inﬂuence of some of the additional harm mechanisms (e.g.,
lacerations), the relationship between the types/size of UAS and the
probable mechanisms of harm, and the combined effect multiple mech-
anisms for harm have on an EoV. No research to date has been conducted
on the non-physical effects of an UA impact. Non-physical effects can be
the dominant harm mechanism for very small and small UA. Secondary
hazards, such as vehicle accidents, bush ﬁres, blasts, or release of haz-
ardous materials, should also be characterised.
Future research into GRMs should seek to adopt more comprehensive
population distributions for the areas of operation. The use of novel ap-
proaches such as those that take advantage of mobile phone data to
determine the population distribution may also prove to be beneﬁcial.
Additional census data on employment and dwelling types can be used to
improve the ﬁdelity over uniform exposure models. The models pre-
sented in Refs. [61] and [76], while not directly applied to the risk
modelling of UAS operations, provide examples of more comprehensive
approaches to the broad area of population distribution modelling.
Future research efforts should focus on developing a better repre-
sentation of the distribution of third party people in shelters and of the
protective properties of different types of shelters. This will be an
important factor in determining regulatory requirements, particularly in
relation to the operation of small UAS over populous areas.
Finally, harmmodels need to be expanded to include consideration of
human response to multiple mechanisms of trauma. The combined effect
of multiple harm mechanisms could have severe consequences, and
cannot be considered as independent. An industry standard harm scale
(e.g., AIS) should be used to ensure consistent measurement of conse-
quence and to facilitate intra- industry and inter-industry risk compari-
sons. Furthermore, extending the assumed demographic to include a
more realistic population demographic will ensure peak risks to more
susceptible sub-populations are captured. Whilst not a topic of objective
risk assessment, how the public respond to various harmful outcomes
should also be considered.354. Summary
There are a number of high level ﬁndings that can be made on the
basis of the preceding review. Of these, perhaps the most
signiﬁcant ﬁndings relate to 1) the diversity of models; 2) cascading
assumptions, and 3) the inadequate treatment and representation of
uncertainty.
4.1. Diversity of models
There is signiﬁcant diversity in the developed models. This diversity
arises due to differences in 1) the nature of the risks associated with a
particular UA type and its Concept of Operations (CONOPs), 2) the
treatment of uncertainty (e.g., underlying assumptions), or 3) the spe-
ciﬁc question that needs to be answered by the model (e.g., support for a
particular aspect of the regulation). As international aviation safety
regulators move towards a set of harmonised, outcome based, and risk-
informed regulations for UAS, the need for a consistent approach for
assessing and managing the risks associated with their operation will
increase. Whilst the conditions describing acceptable risk will vary
between regulatory authorities, the method used to assess the risk
should be consistent. For reasons discussed in the previous sub-sections,
a single universal risk model is not practical; risk models will need to be
developed and tailored to the particular UAS type and general CONOPs.
However, it is possible to deﬁne the high level components of a risk
model and identify the inﬂuencing aspects that need to be addressed, in
the development of speciﬁc GRMs for UAS. Such requirements on the
development of GRMs would aid in the systematic and consistent
assessment of the risk UAS operations pose to people and property
overﬂown. The framework of sub-models illustrated in Section x2
and the discussion presented in the preceding sections of this paper
could provide the basis for the development of such a set of
requirements.
4.2. Cascading assumptions
This relates to the inadequate treatment of uncertainty but warrants
discussion in its own right. Numerous assumptions are made in existing
models. The review found that many of these assumptions are implicit
and undocumented, and where explicit, their impact on the resulting
assessments of risk are not explored. Assumptions are an inescapable
necessity in anymodelling task, particularly in situations of low data, low
operational experience, and complex systems. Assumptions relating to
the development of the model itself (e.g., model components and data
used to qualify the model) give rise to epistemic uncertainty in the
assessment of risk. Whilst the risk analyst's default position is to reach for
the conservative “worst case” position when faced with an uncertainty,
these assumptions may not represent the “conservative” position for all
UA types and operations. More speciﬁcally, the justiﬁcation for a
particular assumption may not be valid for a particular UAS type or
CONOPs. The cascading effect of these assumptions within a single model
have not been explored. A series of conservative assumptions can lead to
overly conservative risk estimates, and in turn, impose unnecessary
regulatory cost on the industry. The reviewed models do not adequately
document their assumptions nor provide a rigorous analysis of their
potential impact. Such analysis would be required of a GRM used as the
basis for the development of regulations for UAS.
4.3. Treatment of uncertainty
Under a risk-informed regulatory approach the output of the GRMs
are intended to support decision making in relation to various aspects of
the regulation of UAS. Objective, systematic and justiﬁable decision
making on the basis of the outputs from these models requires a
Fig. 3. Comparison of the levels of treatment of uncertainty in component models.
A. Washington et al. Progress in Aerospace Sciences 95 (2017) 24–44comprehensive and objective presentation of the associated uncertainties
in the estimates. These uncertainties are broadly characterised as
epistemic and aleatory in their nature. The treatment and presentation of
uncertainty varies between risk models. A visual illustration of the
different levels of uncertainty observed across the identiﬁed sub-models
and GRMs is presented in Fig. 3. The levels of treatment of uncertainty
are based on the deﬁnitions provided by Pate-Cornell [26] as summarised
in Table 1. Evident in Fig. 3 is the variation in the treatment of uncer-
tainty between sub-models. Comprehensive methods characterising and
presenting uncertainty in failure and impact sub-models have begun to be
developed. Whereas analysts have provided only a cursory treatment of
uncertainty in the stress and exposure sub-models.
From the review it was also seen that the treatment of uncertainty
varied across the sub-models within a single GRM. The highest level of
uncertainty taken into consideration was Level 4, and this was seen in
Refs. [18,30] (failure models) and [46,48] (impact models). None of the
existing models provided a comprehensive treatment of uncertainty
(Level 5).
The general argument for a more comprehensive treatment of un-
certainty in risk assessments is well established (e.g., see Refs. [13,77])
and for brevity is not repeated here. When considered in the context of
supporting the development of regulations for UAS, a comprehensive
treatment of uncertainty across all component sub-models of the GRM is
needed to ensure objective decision making. This in turn supports more
transparent, systematic, and consistent regulatory decision making;
necessary for the development of justiﬁable regulations that have a clear
and traceable relationship to the safety risks they are intended
to manage.
5. Conclusion
This paper provides an extensive review of the current state of the art
in ground risk modelling for UAS operations. By identifying each of the
sub-models that go into developing a GRM, and relating them to various
aspects of the current aviation regulatory framework, this paper also
provides a means for identifying where future research efforts need to be36focused and how this will potentially inﬂuence the ongoing development
of regulations for the sector.
The review highlighted three major ﬁndings in existingmodels: 1) the
diversity that exists amongst the models; 2) the prevalence of cascading
assumptions and 3) the inadequate treatment and representation of un-
certainty. Each of these ﬁndings will have a signiﬁcant impact on the
development of regulations for UAS. The diversity amongst these models
can lead to a lack of consensus and variability in the risk assessment
outputs that are input into regulatory decision making process. The
inadequate treatment and representation of uncertainty and adoption of
conservative assumptions has the potential to lead to overly conservative
regulations and the imposition of unnecessary restrictions and cost on the
sector. Like the nuclear and space industries, the UAS industry has
limited data and high uncertainty associated with it. In order to bring the
risk assessment process for the UAS industry in line with other more
contemporary models proposed by the nuclear and space industry, it is of
paramount importance to take the uncertainty associated with these
systems into consideration. In addition to this, the review also clearly
highlights certain sub models where future research efforts could be
focused (e.g. recovery model, stress model). Developing these sub models
will directly inﬂuence the overall risk model and the regulations
they impact.
Regulators are increasingly moving towards the development of risk-
based regulations. With it, there is a growing need for risk models that
provide decision makers with a more comprehensive representation of
uncertainty associated with assessments of the risk. Such models are
needed to support more transparent, systematic, and consistent regula-
tory decision making; necessary for the development of justiﬁable reg-
ulations that have a clear and traceable relationship to the safety risks
they are intended to manage.
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Table 2
Summary of failure models.
Reference Failures/Modes Failure Method of Model Substantiation Assumptions and Notes Uncertainty
Addressed Model37LevelAalmoes et al.
[46]Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure modeConstant
Failure RateBased on historical data from current conventional
manned aircraft. Data from National Transport
Safety Board (NTSB) used for cruise phase.Flight divided into three phases, take-off phase,
cruise phase and a landing phase. Risk for each
phase is evaluated and then summed up for the
whole ﬂight.Level 2Ancel et al. [30] Single system
failure mode
(unpowered
descent/
terminated ﬂight)Constant
Failure RateDynamic aircraft health data used. However
development phase was based on historical data
(manned), numerical distributions and military
operational data (manned and unmanned)– Level 4Awad [45] Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure modeConstant
failure rateBased on historical Class A mishap rate data from
National Transport Safety Board (NTSB).Acknowledges that failure rates vary depending on
several factors (e.g. for manned aircraft, failure rate
is higher near airports). Case study example of MQ-
9 Reaper and ScanEagle used.Level 1Barr et al. [18] Multi-dependent
failures
LOC and CFITConstant
failure rate
(Poisson
distribution)Based on arbitrary and preliminary data to
illustrate concept (historical and expert opinion)Includes four major aircraft system failures
(propulsion, power, ﬂight controls and
navigation), two inappropriate ground personnel
actions (operator/pilot and maintenance related
actions), two low-level hazards (inappropriate/
impaired ﬂight control input and aircraft state
conducive to LOC) and three main hazards
(inappropriate guidance, loss of control and loss of
aircraft structural integrity). Makes use of Bayesian
Belief NetworksLevel 4Burke et al. [16] LOC
(Catastrophic)
and UDSConstant
Failure RateCalculated based on geometry and population
density (Expert opinion)Makes use of system/functional level breakdown
of the UAS to relate lower-level failures to a system
level failure modeLevel 2Clothier et al.
[27]Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure mode
(Hazardous
failures)Constant
Failure RateAssumed value of 105 per ﬂight hour (expert
opinion)Hazard of discontinuance of ﬂight due to
Unrecoverable ﬂight critical eventLevel 2Ford et al. [29] Catastrophic
failures and
Hazardous
failuresConstant
Failure RateAssumed to be 105 per ﬂight hour for catastrophic
and 104 per ﬂight hour for hazardous (expert
opinion)Failure was considered to be catastrophic if it
resulted in an uncontrolled ﬂight termination. In
comparison hazardous failures posed a reduced
risk of casualty. These values were chosen to be an
order of magnitude worse than the nominal
deﬁnitions of improbable and remote frequencies.Level 1King et al. [20] Catastrophic LOC Constant
Failure RateBased on manned aircraft limits (from regulations)
and properties of systems (historical data)– Level 1Lum et al. [23] Catastrophic LOC Constant
Failure RateBased on experimental results and hardware in the
loop simulation.Failures were introduced at random times,
uniformly sampled from the reference ﬂight.Level 3Lum et al. [22] LOC Constant
Failure RateBased on historical data of case study UA (different
values for each scenario).As UAS tend to have high mishap rates during take-
off and landing, the failure rate used will only
represent mid-ﬂight failures (to avoid
overestimation of the risk) if take-off and landing
are performed in a restricted area free of
pedestrians.Level 3McGeer et al.
[21]Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure modeConstant
Failure RateUse of general aviation limits and case study
examples (e.g. data from Boeing 747). (historical
data)Model is based on general aviation. Data for
Aerosonde used to evaluate model.Level 2Shelley [44] Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure modeConstant
Failure RateAssumed from data used by FAA UAS task force
(100 h, MTBF).MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures). The
reciprocal of MTBF gives the expected number of
failures per hour.Level 2Stevenson et al.
[62]Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure modeConstant
Failure RateAssumed MTBF 105 for sub-urban and 106 for
urban areas based on expert judgement.– Level 1U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers
[28]Catastrophic Constant
Failure RateHistorical data used from space shuttle, shuttle
orbiter and X-15 descent usedRisk analysis for generic UAS used. No fault tree or
FMEA.Level 3Waggoner [54] Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure modeConstant
Failure RateBased on historical data of case study UA (different
values for each scenario).– Level 1Weibel et al. [55] Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure modeConstant
Failure RateReliability estimated based on, impact area,
population density, probability of penetration,
mitigation factor and target level of safety.Failures are measured as any general type that
leads to an accident, including mechanical and
software failures, human error, and combinations
of events that result in a ground impact.Level 3Wolf [78] Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure modeConstant
Failure RateLogistic regression and artiﬁcial neural network
failure prediction models were used. Based on
historical data from Air Force Research Laboratory
Munitions Directorate that comprises of over two
dozen types of UAS and has ﬁve years' worth of
data.Logistic regression and artiﬁcial neural network
failure prediction models were used for failure
prediction, damage prediction and comparison of
human vs. mechanical errors.Level 1
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Summary of impact models.
Reference Failure Modes UA Type Point or Lethal Method of Model Assumptions and Notes Uncertainty
Area area Substantiation38LevelAalmoes et al.
[46]Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure modeTilt-rotor
and multi-
rotorArea Yes Hypothetical: Geometry
(Gliding)Bivariate normal distribution used based on [27]. Level 4Ancel et al. [30] CFIT, LOC Multirotor
(octocopter)Area Yes Hypothetical: Geometry
(Gliding)Descent rate assumed to be equivalent to terminal
velocity. 2- sigma impact point uncertainty
obtained by Monte Carlo analysisLevel 2Awad [45] Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure modeFixed-wing Point Yes Empirical: size based
(NTSB data for manned
aircraft)Based on Lum and Waggoner [22] Level 1Bleier et al. [53] UDS Fixed-wing Area No Hypothetical: Geometry
(Gliding)Evaluates scenario of an unrecoverable loss of
propulsion (e.g. motor failure). Assumes that the
aircraft is still steerable and the gliding performance
is not degraded.Level 1Bradley et al. and
Ball et al.
[12,47],Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure modeFixed-wing
and rotary-
wingArea Yes Hypothetical: Geometry
(Gliding and Vertical)Also takes skid distance into consideration. LCA is
based on assumption of ﬁxed wing geometry.Level 2Burke et al. [16] UDS and LOC Fixed-wing Point Yes Hypothetical: Geometry Assumes aircraft does not breakup during ﬂight.
Assumes model between Gliding and Vertical.Level 1Clothier et al.
[27]Flight Critical
FailuresFixed-wing Area Yes Hypothetical: Geometry
(Gliding and Vertical)Assumed Bi-variate normal distribution used for
case study.Level 2Cour-Harbo [48] UDS (Complete
loss of lift)Fixed-wing
and
multirotorArea No Hypothetical: Geometry
(Ballistic)Based on a second order drag model with
probabilistic assumptions on the least well-known
parameters of the ﬂight, and includes the effect of
wind. Probability density function used for travelled
distance.Level 4Dalamagkidis
et al. [49]Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure modeFixed-wing
and multi-
rotorPoint Yes Hypothetical: Geometry
(Gliding and Vertical)– Level 1Dalamagkidis
et al. [50]Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure modeFixed-wing
and rotary-
wingPoint Yes Hypothetical: Geometry
(Gliding and Vertical)– Level 1Ford et al. [29] Flight critical
catastrophic
and hazardous
failuresFixed-wing Area No Hypothetical: Geometry
(Gliding and Vertical)Maximum range dictated by the unpowered glide
ratio. Variation in side forces, such as wind, is
neglected, such that the aircraft is equally likely to
impact to the right or left of its position. (based on
[27])Level 2Foster et al. [52] LOC Multirotor Point No Hypothetical: Geometry
(Gliding and Vertical)Based on simulations and wind tunnel tests Level 1Guglieri et al.
[79]Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure modeFixed-wing
and multi-
rotorArea Yes Hypothetical: Geometry
(Gliding and Vertical)Based on studies conducted by the FAA for
commercial space launch and re-entry missions.
Glide angle for MH850 set equal to 45. For QX-
Rotor, vertical impact crash is considered, therefore
glide angle is set equal to 90 .Level 1Haartsen et al.
[51]Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure modeFixed wing
and multi-
rotorArea Yes Hypothetical: Geometry
(Gliding and Vertical)Based on simulations and [43] Level 1King et al. [20] LOC Multi-rotor
(VTOL)
UAVArea Yes Hypothetical: Geometry
(Gliding and Vertical)Based on Columbia accident investigation board
study. Based on ballistic properties.Level 2Lum et al. [22] Catastrophic
(System
Failures)Fixed-wing Point Yes Hypothetical: Geometry
(Gliding and Vertical)For crashes due to system failure it is assumed that
upon failure the UAS glides towards the ground at
maximum L/D (worst case scenario) with glide
angle γ.Level 2Lum et al. [23] Catastrophic Fixed-wing Area Yes Hypothetical: Geometry
(Gliding)Point of impact is used to develop a PDF which can
be used to determine the horizontal distance
travelled before impact likelihood. Based on
simulations.Level 3McGeer et al.
[21]Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure modeFixed-wing Area Yes Hypothetical: Geometry
(Gliding)Based on Aerosonde case study example Level 1Melnyk et al.
[17]Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure modeFixed-wing Point Yes Empirical: Weight based
(linear)Based on model developed by Ref. [19] for manned
aircraft. Different values used for built up and open
areas.Level 2Shelley [44] Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure modeFixed-wing Point Yes Hypothetical: Geometry
(Vertical)– Level 2Stevenson et al.
[62]Catastrophic Fixed-wing Point Yes Hypothetical: Geometry
(Gliding)– Level 1Waggoner [54] Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure modeFixed-wing Point Yes Hypothetical: Geometry
(Gliding and Vertical)– Level 2Weibel et al. [55] Single non-
speciﬁc system
failure modeFixed-wing
(varying
sizes)Point Yes Hypothetical: Geometry
(planform area)– Level 1
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AreaLethal
areaMethod of Model
Substantiation39Assumptions and Notes Uncertainty
LevelWu and Clothier
[43]Unrecoverable
Flight Critical
FailuresFixed-wing Area Yes Hypothetical: Geometry
(Gliding)6 Degree of Freedom impact footprint boundary
model usedLevel 1Table 4
Summary of recovery models.
Reference Recovery Mechanism Assumptions Uncertainty
LevelAncel et al. [30] Return to base command Assumed minimum acceptable navigation capability and lost link
statusLevel 0Bleier et al. [53] Parachutes Location of parachute deployment is based on decision making process
that aims to minimise the risk of endangering humans, minimise the
chance of property damage and maximize the expectation of aircraft
survival.Level 1Ford et al. [29] Ability to put the system into glide to maximize glide range Wind and other transient acceleration effects are ignored Level 0
Magister [56] Engine emergency termination system with propeller braking
supplemented with optional propeller blades folding for more effective
injury minimization. Use of airbags or parachutes also recommended.Assumed that parachute is capable of reducing impact velocity to
below vminLevel 0McGeer et al.
[21]Deadman's switch Loss of ﬂight computer, would cause loss of tracking performance. This
would trigger Deadman's switch and kill the engine, the aircraft would
then crash with equal probability, anywhere within the gliding range.Level 0Shelley [44] Parachutes Target descent speed of 4.6 m/s is assumed for this analysis Level 0
Weibel [55] Mitigation measures which include 1) reduce the exposure to risk of
the public on the ground, 2) ensure UAV system reliability, 3) facilitate
safe recovery from failures, 4) reduce the effects of UAV ground
impact.Type of mitigation is dependent upon vehicle class, type of operation,
and the level of safety required.Level 0Table 5
Summary of stress models.
Reference Stress Mechanism Type Notes Uncertainty
Characteristic LevelArterburn
et al. [60]KE Blunt force,
penetration,
lacerationsMulti-rotor Terminal velocity used in developing estimate stress (KE) Level 1Ball et al. [12] KE, Explosion,
Thermal
RadiationBlunt force Fixed-wing
and rotary-
wingA more likely source of injury and lethality to 3rd persons was the effects of primary and
secondary ﬁres due to unspent aviation fuel. Using algorithms provided by the
Department of Energy, the amount of heat released from a resultant ﬁre in a crash could
be determined. This was then correlated with the time it takes human tissue to burn, as
well as fatality studies that relate burn amount to lethality.Level 1Barr et al.
[18]KE – Fixed-wing
and multi-
rotorTerminal velocity used in developing estimate of stress (KE) Level 1Burke et al.
[16]KE Blunt force Fixed-wing All small UAS are going to reach effectively the same terminal velocity during an
uncontrolled crash. With this assumption, the KE variation between the different aircraft
is reduced to a function of its mass or weight.Level 1CASA [67] KE Blunt force Fixed-wing
and multi-
rotorKE function of mass and velocity Level 1Dalamagkidis
et al. [49]KE – Fixed-wing
and multi-
rotorThe KE imparted at impact is a function of impact speed that may vary depending on the
UAS and the trajectory of descent. Maximum operating velocity increased by 40% is
proposed. Terminal velocity also used for case study.Level 1Guglieri et al.
[79]KE – Fixed-wing
and multi-
rotorKE function of mass and velocity. Different velocities used for different case study
examples. For MH850 the maximum operative speed increased by 40% is used. For QX-
Rotor, the freefall velocity from 70 m is used.Level 1Magister [56] KE Blunt force Fixed-wing KE is a proportional factor to the aircraft hazard potential. Two scenarios evaluated. The
unpremeditated descent scenario with impact at velocity 30% over minimal (i.e. stall
airspeed with UA is under control but unable to maintain altitude) and Loss of control
scenario with UA impacting at velocity 40% higher than maximum airspeed attainable in
level ﬂight.Level 1Melnyk et al.
[17]KE Blunt force Fixed-wing KE based on the mass of the air vehicle and a value of 1.4 times the maximum speed of the
vehicle as proposed by Ref. [49].Level 1Skobir et al.
[72]KE Blunt force Fixed-wing KE based on the maximum take-off mass of the vehicle and UA impact ground speed
which in still weather equals the air speed and depends upon the UA crash scenario.Level 1
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Summary of Exposure models.
Reference Exposure EoV at Risk Method or Data used in Substantiation of Model Assumptions and Notes Uncertainty
Model40LevelAalmoes et al.
[46]Comprehensive Third party
peopleEvaluated based on simulations – Level 1Ancel et al.
[30]Comprehensive Third party
peopleCase study example (occupants of buildings used
with longitude and latitude information to
determine population around each building,
parking lots and walkways)Model allows for percentage of population to be out
in the open. Future work: develop near real-time
population distribution and density via census data
augmented by cellular network activityLevel 1Andrew et al.
[80]Uniform Third party
peopleCensus data from the 2012 U.S. Census Bureau
used.Population density for any given area is a function
of the localised population divided by the area.Level 1Awad [45] Uniform Third Party
peopleCensus data from U.S. Census Bureau Pedestrian density is equal to population density Level 1Barr et al.
[18]Uniform Third Party
peoplePopulation values obtained from demographia [81]
and based on expert opinion.Five individual cases considered, namely, sporting
event, urban environment, suburban environment,
rural setting and remote setting. Variety of
assumptions made for each.Level 1Burke et al.
[16]Uniform Third party
peopleCorrelation of population density data from U.S.
census data with sectional maps for the U.S. using
geographic information systems program.Population density divided into four categories
(unpopulated, sparsely populated, densely
populated and open air assembly).Level 1Clothier et al.
[27]Uniform Third party
people and
propertyPopulation density data from 2001 Census data
collected by Australian Bureau of statistics.Resolution of population distribution is dependent
on the size of the census geographical collection
districtsLevel 1Dalamagkidis
et al. [49]Uniform Third party
people– Assumed population density based on case study
examples.
Case 1 Easy: 50 people/km2
Case 2 Hard: 5000 people/km2
Case 3 Average: 200 people/km2Level 1Dalamagkidis
et al. [50]Uniform Third party
peoplePopulation density of 200 people/km2 (for
suburban regions) based on value provided by
EASA is used.The population density is typically estimated using
the average population density over the area the
UAS will operate.Level 1Di Donato
et al. [63]Comprehensive Third Party
peopleMobile phone data, census data and
OpenStreetMap information– Level 1Ford et al.
[29]Comprehensive Third party
peopleCombines data from 2000 U.S. Census Bureau with
LandSat data from the United States Geological
SurveyA strong correlation between the population density
and structure density was assumed. Thus,
population is more likely to be concentrated in
developed areas.Level 1Guglieri et al.
[79]Uniform and
ComprehensiveThird party
peopleTwo case study scenarios evaluated. First assumes
uniform exposure (25 habitants/square kilometre).
Second uses census data to determine population
density around Torino Aeritalia Airport.For second case study scenario, area and
consequently population density is divided into
nine squares and different densities are assigned to
each based on the type of area and data available.Level 1King et al.
[20]Comprehensive Third party
peoplePopulation density of each city/county as
determined from 2000 U.S. Census BureauFlight path data including time spent over different
population densities was used.
Mission type also taken into consideration.Level 1Lum et al.
[22]Uniform Third party
people and
propertyData from U.S. Census Bureau reﬁned by the
information gathered from Google maps satellite
images.Ignore time of day and work.
Make use of housing unit density as well.
Ignore population and housing densities for three
biggest cities.Level 1Lum et al.
[23]Uniform Third party
peopleCensus data and satellite imagery used to estimate
local bystander distribution.Structural densities also extracted from census data. Level 1McGeer et al.
[21]Uniform Ships, houses,
third party
individualsAssumed values based on case study example Assume distribution of ships is random. Average
dimensions of target assumed.Level 1Melnyk et al.
[17]Comprehensive Third party
peopleData from 2000 U.S. Census bureau was used. Data from Ref. [61] used to determine how people
spent their days. Includes time of day and type of
work.Level 1Shelley [44] Constant Third party
peoplePopulation densities from 0.05 to 4 people/m2 were
evaluatedVarious population densities considered, including
densities representative of crowds at a public event.Level 1Stevenson
et al. [62]Comprehensive Third party
peopleUsed Census data from 2011 Census for Canada. Data calculated for several hypothetical regions
over which the UAS would operate.Level 1Waggoner
[54]Uniform Third party
people and
propertyData from U.S. Census Bureau reﬁned by the
information gathered from Google maps satellite
images.Ignore time of day and work.
Make use of housing unit density as well.
Ignore population and housing densities for three
biggest cities.Level 1Weibel et al.
[55]Uniform Third party
peoplePopulation density data were used from the 2000
U.S. Census BureauThe probabilistic expectation assumes that the
population is evenly distributed over the area.Level 1
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Summary of incident stress models.
Reference Stress How was it calculated Assumptions Sheltering Model Method of Model Substantiation Uncertainty
Property41LevelAalmoes et al.
[46]– – Assumed as percentage of fatality.
Includes shelter effects.Parameter model Estimated value of 17% chance of
fatality (based on [82])Level 1Ancel et al.
[30]KE – – KE model Based on studies conducted by the
range safety group. Different
classes of buildings/roofs can
absorb different amount of energyLevel 1Ball et al. [12] KE – It is assumed that the aircraft
remains intact until impact with
the ground (e.g. no mid-air
breakup)KE Model Difference in structure
performance between roof-top and
sidewall accounted for.
Blast effects also taken into
account.Level 1Burke et al.
[16]KE KE variation between
different aircraft is reduced
to a function of its mass or
weight.It is assumed that the amount of
hard shelter is proportional to the
population density.Parameter model. Based
on type of shelter.Shelter factor is divided into two
different variables. Hard shelter
and soft shelter.Level 1CASA [67] KE Mass and Velocity Assumes perfectly inelastic
collisionKE Model Uses limit set by Ref. [83] Level 1Dalamagkidis
et al. [49]– – Average value of 0.5 assumed for
sheltering, with higher values
meaning better sheltering and a
lower probability of fatality for the
same KE.Parameter model Assumed for different case study
examples: Case 1 Easy: 0.6
Case 2 Hard: 0.4
Case 3 Average: 0.5Level 1Dalamagkidis
et al. [50]KE Terminal velocity used to
calculate KE (different case
studies evaluated)This model implies a type of
“absolute sheltering”, where any
person considered sheltered, is not
affected by the impact.KE Model Sheltering factor takes a value
from 0 to 1.Level 1Guglieri et al.
[79]– – Values assumed based on case
study scenario and terrain under
evaluation.Parameter model Two case study scenarios
evaluated. For the ﬁrst scenario,
no sheltering is considered. For
the second scenario, area around
Torino Aeritalia Airport is divided
into 9 parts, shelter factor
estimated for each of them based
on expert opinion, and then
average value evaluated (average
shelter factor equal to 4.81).Level 1Lum et al.
[22]KE – Percentage of times the UAS
penetrates the building is
assumed, along with the number
of fatalities.– Fatality rates assumed for case
study examples.
Border patrol: 0.42 deaths/strike
estimated.
Environmental monitoring: 0.02
deaths/strike estimated.
Urban patrol: 0.02 fatalities/
building strike.Level 0Melnyk et al.
[17]KE and
Chemical
Energy– Chemical energy only included in
the penetration decision in 13% of
all crashes based on [84]KE and Chemical Energy
ModelData from Refs. [64,84], used as
inputs in the modelLevel 1Stevenson
et al. [62]– – Assumed values based on UAS
evaluated and terrainLocation model
(dependent on terrain)Value based on terrain:
For wilderness: 0.75
For urban areas: 0.25
For sub-urban areas: 0.5
For no shelter: 0Level 1U.S. Army
Corps of
Engineers
[28]KE Each fragment was
characterised by a ballistic
coefﬁcient.Assumes UAS and building is
frangible (impact of fragments
also studied)
All fragments in the break up lists
were assumed to be inert, that is
not capable of sustaining an
explosion on impact.Parameter model, linked
to population density,
shelter type and
occupation.Census data from western United
States and Canada was used.
Probability studies used to
determine impact of fragments on
roof.Level 1Weibel et al.
[55]KE – – Parameter model. Calculated based on class of
vehicle.Level 1
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Summary of harm models.
Reference Stress Mechanism Assumed Demographic Harm Measure/Output Method of Model Substantiation and Uncertainty
Characteristic of Harm42assumptions/notes LevelAalmoes et al.
[46]– – Unspeciﬁed – Historical accident and incident data.
Constant value of 17% lethality was
selected based on other studies.Level 1Ancel et al.
[30]KE – Unspeciﬁed – Expert elicitation. Assumed that if a UAS
strikes an individual, it will result in a
casualty.Level 1Arterburn
et al. [60]KE Blunt
traumaATD Hybrid III 50th
percentile male crash test
dummy usedAIS level 3, Impact KE that will
not result in skull fracture range
from 114 to 141 ft-lbs for
Phantom 3Impactor studies. Upper limit based on
study conducted by Dr Yofanandan's
translated to the case study example of a
Phantom 3.Level 1Ball et al. [12] KE Blunt
trauma95th percentile American
male ages 20-30 (190.1 cm
tall, waist 51.6 cm, weight
98.5 kg)Energy level cut-off:
56 ft lb of KE
(Skull fracture 15 ft. lb)Impactor studies. This value is determined
through empirical analysis of animal and
cadaver testing.Level 3Burke et al.
[16]KE Blunt
traumaUnspeciﬁed Energy level cut-off:
68 ft lb. of KEHistorical accident and incident data.
Energy limit based on different studies
conducted.Level 3CASA [67] KE Blunt
trauma,
lacerations5th percentile of females
(50 kg body mass, thin body
wall)AIS level 3
Blunt Criteria of 1.61 (limit to
head injury severity)Historical accident and incident data.
Based on other studies. The probability of
death for this type of injury is less than
10%.Level 3Clothier et al.
[27]– – Unspeciﬁed – Expert elicitation. Assumed that if a UAS
strikes an individual, it will result in a
casualtyLevel 1Dalamagkidis
et al. [49]KE – Unspeciﬁed – Impactor studies. Probability of fatality
calculated based on the shelter factor,
impact energy required for a fatality
probability of 50% with shelter factor
equal to 0.5 and the impact energy
required to cause a fatality as the sheltering
factor goes to zero.Level 1Dalamagkidis
et al. [50]KE – Unspeciﬁed Energy level cut-off:
34J of KEImpactor studies. Logistic Curves used.
Value used as parameter of model to
calculate probability of fatality given
exposure. Based on limit provided by the
RCCLevel 3Lum et al.
[22]– – Unspeciﬁed – Expert judgement. Value ranging from 0 to
1 representing the fatality rate for
pedestrian strike. Fatality rate (deaths per
strike) based on case study; Reaper: 1; Scan
Eagle: 0.5Level 1Magister [56] KE Blunt
Trauma5th percentile female, 50th
percentile male and 95th
percentile maleAIS level calculated as a factor of
blunt criteria (BC)
AIS ¼ 1328BCE þ 0603The BC correlates the kinetic energy
deforming the body on impact with the
body's ability to tolerate the energy on
impact. Expert elicitation to test various
case study scenarios. BC based on UA mass,
impact velocity, characteristic diameter,
human body mass and chest wall thickness.Level 1Melnyk et al.
[17]KE (and
Chemical
energy)– Unspeciﬁed Energy level cut-off:
58 ft-lbfHistorical accident and incident data.
Based on other studies. In open areas, all
individuals considered as casualties if the
energy imparted by the UA exceeds the
58 ft-lbf limit. Inside shelter 30% casualties
if penetration occurs.Level 3Shelley [44] KE – Unspeciﬁed AIS levels for different levels of
severity of injury speciﬁed.Impactor studies. Makes use of Logistic
Curves.Level 3Skobir et al.
[72]KE – Unspeciﬁed Energy level cut-off: 78 J Historical accident and incident data.
Energy levels assumed based on other
studies.Level 3U.S. Army
Corps of
Engineers
[28]– – Unspeciﬁed AIS Level 3 (or greater) Impactor studies. Two standards for
acceptable risk to ground populations are
applicable: RCC criteria and Range Safety
Requirements for the Eastern and Western
Range. This study makes use of maximum
casualty expectation (30  106)Level 1Waggoner
[54]– – Unspeciﬁed – Expert elicitation. Fatality rate (deaths per
strike) based on case study; Reaper: 1; Scan
Eagle: 0.5Level 1Weibel et al.
[55]– – Unspeciﬁed – Expert elicitation. Assumed that, if debris
penetrate shelter, then fatality has
occurred.Level 1
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Table 9
Comparison of Models used to determine the Impact Area of UAS based on [17].
S. No Equation Citation43Geometry Based1
LAGliding ¼ ðWAircraft þ 2 RPersonÞ  ðLAircraft þ LGlideGround þ 2 RPersonÞ LAVert ¼ π 

1
2WAircraft þ RPerson
2 [27]
2 AL ¼ π  b2 [16]
3 Vertical Descent
IAvert FW ¼ π 

1
2 baircraft þ Rperson
2
Gliding Descent
WHaz ¼ baircraft þ ð2 RPersonÞLGlide ¼ H95thtanðγÞ ¼ H95th 

L
D

Max
LSkid Length ¼ ðVGlidetsafeÞ  ðμglide  g  t2safe Þtsafe ¼ VGlideVMin Kill2μslideg
VMin Kill ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2 Wlbsg  KELethal
q
IA ¼ WHaz  ðLglide þ LSkid LengthÞ
Similar equations presented for Rotary Wing Aircrafts[12]4 AC ¼ f ðβUAV Þβ ¼ GWdragdrag ¼ 0:9 length width [20]
aWeight Based
5 Debris Area in Built up Area ¼ 1.0764 ft2/lb MTOW
Debris Area in Open Area ¼ 1.3455 ft2/lb MTOW
[19]Size/Category Based
6 Small Aircraft Steep Impact: 1.3 Hectares
Large Aircraft Steep Impact: 3.89–5.18 Hectares
Small Aircraft Shallow Impact: 2.59–3.89 Hectares
Large Aircraft Shallow Impact: 5.48–6.48 Hectares[32]a Uses weight component as well.
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4. A Bayesian Approach to System Safety 
Assessment and Compliance Assessment for 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
 
Figure 10: Concept image of an unmanned aircraft operation over Dandenong Ranges, Australia 
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“True genius resides in the capacity for evaluation of uncertain, hazardous and conflicting 
information.” 
Winston Churchill (1874-1965) 
This paper titled, “A Bayesian Approach to System Safety Assessment and Compliance Assessment for 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems” aims to present a new approach to showing compliance to system safety 
requirements for aviation systems. While the primary focus is on Research Question 2, it also delves 
into elements of Research Question 1. It explores how the uncertainty which was identified in the 
previous chapter can be taken into consideration in the SRMP (Research Question 1.2, Research 
Question 1.3 and Research Question 2.1). Looking at the case study of the SSR and reframing it as a 
problem of decision-making under uncertainty, it demonstrates how the concept of risk-based regulation 
can be extended to include a risk-based approach to the regulatory processes of compliance assessment 
and compliance finding (Research Question 2.2). This allows for compliance decisions to be made on 
the basis of compliance risk. The model developed in this paper makes certain simplifying assumptions 
which are addressed in subsequent chapters. 
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This paper presents a new approach to showing compliance to system safety requirements for aviation
systems. The aim is to improve the objectivity, transparency, and rationality of compliance ﬁndings in
those cases where there is uncertainty in the assessments of the system. A Bayesian approach is adopted
that facilitates a more comprehensive treatment of the uncertainties inherent to all system safety as-
sessments. The assessment and compliance framework is reformulated as a problem of decision making
under uncertainty, and a normative decision approach is used to illustrate the approach. A case study
system safety assessment of a civil unmanned aircraft system is used to exemplify the proposed
approach. The proposed approach could be readily applied to any regulatory compliance process and
would represent a signiﬁcant change to, and advancement over, current aviation safety regulatory
practice. This paper is the ﬁrst to describe the application of Bayesian techniques to the ﬁeld of aviation
system safety analysis. The adoption of the proposed compliance approach would bring aviation system
safety practitioners in line with more contemporary (and well established) approaches adopted in the
nuclear power and space launch industries.
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are one of the fastest growing
sectors in the aviation industry. However, like all technologies there
are risks associated with their use. To date, aviation safety regula-
tors have largelymanaged these risks through imposing substantial
restrictions on their operation (CAA, 2015; Clothier et al., 2011; JAA/
EUROCONTROL, 2004; US DoD, 2007), including limiting their
operation to non-populated areas. Key to the relaxation of these
restrictions is the provision of greater assurance in the airworthi-
ness of the UAS. Numerous challenges to the development of a
regulatory framework for UAS are described by Clothier et al. (2015)
and it is widely accepted that the existing airworthiness regulatory
framework used for conventionally piloted aircraft (CPA) is not
suitable for all UAS types and missions (Clothier andWalker, 2006).
A central component of airworthiness regulations are system
safety regulations; commonly referred to as “Part 1309” regulations(A. Washington), reece.a.
ndan.p.williams@boeing.comas they are contained in subpart 1309 of the respective civil codes of
aviation safety regulations (e.g. CS/FAR 23.1309 (FAA, 2011) and CS/
FAR 25.1309 (FAA, 1988)). System safety regulations supplement
prescriptive design requirements and are put in place to ensure that
an aircraft or system is capable of continued safe ﬂight and landing
following a failure or multiple failures of systems (JARUS Working
Group 6-Safety and Risk Assessment, 2015). Disparate speciﬁca-
tions of Part 1309 regulations for UAS have been proposed (EASA,
2005; JARUS Working Group 6-Safety and Risk Assessment, 2015;
NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), 2009). As stated by the
Australian Department of Defence, Part 1309 regulations will be
“fundamental to the safety of UAS” but are also “an area of evolu-
tion and disagreement” (ADF, 2016). Some of the various issues and
points of contention surrounding the speciﬁcation of Part 1309
regulations for UAS are discussed by Clothier and Wu (2012) and
EUROCAE (2013).
System safety regulations will be particularly critical to the
airworthiness of UAS during their early years of certiﬁed opera-
tions. This is due to a lack of data and knowledge to inform the
speciﬁcation of prescriptive design requirements; knowledge that
is only typically gained through extensive in-service experience.
This uncertainty, in turn, places greater emphasis on the need for
assurance in the system safety of the UAS.
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challenges. Namely, the lowdata needed to inform estimates of UAS
reliability, which arises due to:
1. changing system design baselines;
2. the use of components that are not designed to standards and
subject to quality assurance;
3. the non-homogeneity of the UAS ﬂeet (i.e., the diversity of de-
signs and their concepts of operation, which limits the conclu-
sions which can be drawn from aggregating data across types).
As a consequence, there is signiﬁcant uncertainty in the system
safety assessment of UAS. The current method for assessing the sys-
tem safety of civilian aviation systems (SAE ARP 4761, 1996; SAE ARP
5150, 2013) does not comprehensively address uncertainty in the
input data, models, and assessment process. Instead it is suggested
that uncertainty be ‘handled’ through the setting of conservative
assumptions and the use of sensitivity analysis to determine “upper
bounds” on quantitative estimates (SAE ARP 5150, 2013). Nor is un-
certainty in the assessments objectively represented and accounted
for in regulatory decision making; potentially leading to subjective
regulatory compliance ﬁndings. A more comprehensive treatment of
uncertainty is required for more rational, objective, and consistent
compliance decision making (Apostolakis, 1990; Pate-Cornell, 1996).
This paper explores a newapproach to the certiﬁcation of UAS to
Part 1309 regulations. In this paper the system safety compliance
process is modelled as a decision-making process under uncer-
tainty. This approach to aviation regulations was inspired by the
work of Perez et al. (Perez, 2013; Perez et al., 2013, 2012a, 2012b),
who explore new methods for the assessment of autonomous
systems. The approach presented herein is in line with contem-
porary safety assessment and decision making approaches ﬁrst
proposed by the nuclear power industry (United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commision, 1975).
It is important to note that the use of Bayesian analysis to eval-
uate and represent uncertainty is not a new concept and has readily
been employed in a number of industries. The space launch industry
(Guarro, 2012; Guikema and Pate-Cornell, 2004; Kelly and Smith,
2008; Lindsey et al., 2013; Maranzano and Krzysztofowicz, 2008;
Morris and Beling, 2001), nuclear power industry (Apostolakis,
1981; Huang et al., 2006; Ozbay and Noyan, 2006; United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commision, 1975; Wieland and Lustosa, 2009),
ﬁshery industry (Punt and Hilborn, 1997), ecological management
industry (Ellison,1996;Marcot et al., 2001;McCann et al., 2006) and
bio management industry (Mallick et al., 2009; Wade, 2000), to
name a few, have already recognised the importance of using
Bayesian analysis to take the uncertainty associated with the sys-
tems into consideration. Bayesian analysis techniques have also
been applied in the ﬁeld of aviation safety in the past. Speciﬁcally,
through the use of Bayesian Belief Networks to model accident
causation, human-system interaction, and safety risks (Ancel et al.,
2014; Ancel and Shih, 2015; Luxhøj and Matthew, 2015). In this
paper, we explore how a Bayesian approach can be applied to the
system safety analysis and compliance ﬁnding process.
A brief introduction to system safety regulations is presented in
Section x2. Uncertainty, its types, sources, representation, and
incorporation into decision-making are presented in Section x3.
The revised model of the Part 1309 regulatory compliance process
is presented in Section x4, and a case-study assessment presented
in Section x5.
2. System safety regulations
Part 1309 regulations are intended to supplement prescriptive
standards on the design, manufacture, and installation of aircraftcomponents. At a high-level, system safety regulations specify the
requirement for (Clothier and Wu, 2012):
1. A documented analysis showing that equipment and systems
perform as intended under foreseeable operating and environ-
mental conditions;
2. The adoption of principles from fail-safe and fault-tolerant
design (FAA, 1988); and
3. The demonstration (through a documented qualitative or
quantitative analysis) that the expected frequency of failure of
equipment and systems, when considered separately and in
relation to other systems, is inversely-related to the severity of
its effect on the safe operation of the system. This is commonly
referred to as the system safety performance requirement
(SSPR).
A complete description of the Part 1309 regulations can be
found in (EASA, 2005; Hayhurst et al., 2007; JARUS Working Group
6-Safety and Risk Assessment, 2015; NATO Standardization Agency,
2014; NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), 2009; RTCA DO-344,
2013) and associated guidance material (FAA, 2011, 1988). Guide-
lines on the system safety assessment process and accepted
assessment tools and techniques can be found in (NATO
Standardization Agency, 2014; NATO Standardization Agency
(NSA), 2009; SAE ARP 4754A, 2010; SAE ARP 4761, 1996). The
focus of this paper is on the speciﬁcation of, and process for
demonstrating compliance to, the SSPR.
2.1. System safety performance requirements
The SSPR deﬁnes the minimum acceptable level of reliability of
aviation equipment and components (Clothier and Wu, 2012).
Compliance to the SSPR is essential to the airworthiness certiﬁca-
tion of the system. The current SSPR compliance process is illus-
trated in Fig. 1. It comprises three main sub processes, namely, the
system safety assessment, compliance assessment, and compliance
ﬁnding processes.
2.1.1. System safety assessment process
The system safety assessment process determines the various
ways in which the component, sub-system, or system, can fail; the
magnitude of the potential negative impacts of these failures on the
overall safety of ﬂight; and an estimate of the Average Probability
per Flight Hour (APFH) of these failures.Where, the APFH is deﬁned
as “the probability of occurrence, normalised by the ﬂight time of a
failure condition during a single ﬂight” (FAA, 2011).
The system safety assessment process starts with an analysis of
each component to determine its various modes of failure (referred
to as failure conditions) and their potential impact on the safety of
the aircraft system. The analysis is ﬁrst undertaken for the com-
ponents in isolation, and then as an integrated part of the aircraft
system. To represent this mathematically we must ﬁrst deﬁne the
ﬁnite integer set Q, which is used to index the various outputs from
the system safety assessment process, as given in Equation (1).
Q ¼
n
njn2 ℤþ; n  N
o
(1)
where N corresponds to the total number of unique failure condi-
tions identiﬁed. We can then deﬁne the outcome of the ﬁrst step in
the system safety assessment process as the set F containing N
failure condition descriptions, as given in Equation (2).
F ¼ ffn : n2 Qg (2)
The next step in the system safety assessment process is to
Fig. 1. Overview of the SSPR compliance process.
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conditions in F. Each failure condition fn is assigned a failure
severity category, cn, based on the potential severity of the impact
of the failure condition on the safety of the aircraft. System safety
regulations and guidance materials describe a range of possible
failure condition severity scales and these are summarised in
Appendix A. The output of this assignment process is the set C,
which comprises the failure condition severity assigned to each
respective failure condition in F, as given in Equation (3).
C ¼ fcn : n2 Qg (3)
Analysis is then undertaken to estimate the APFH for each fail-
ure condition. The APFH is assessed on qualitative or quantitative
“failure probability scales” deﬁned in Part 1309 regulations.
Example failure probability scales are summarised in Fig. 2.
Assessment of the APFH is undertaken for each failure condition
in F. The APFH can be determined through a combination of dataFig. 2. Comparison of quantitatifrom testing, modelling and simulation, expert judgement, and
structured analysis techniques as detailed in SAE ARP 4761 (1996).
The output of the assessment is the speciﬁcation of the set L as
given in Equation (4). L comprises N assessed APFHs; one associ-
ated with each of the failure conditions deﬁned in F.
L ¼ fln : n2 Qg (4)
The failure condition severity, cn, for a particular failuremode, fn,
is then used to determine the applicable failure probability objec-
tive. Failure probability objectives specify the maximum APFH
permissible for a failure condition of a given failure severity cate-
gory. The failure probability objectives are deﬁned within the Part
1309 regulations and are the criteria that the assessments of the
APFH must be evaluated against. An example qualitative descrip-
tion of failure probability objectives is provided in CS-25 25.1309
(b) (EASA, 2015b) as follows:ve failure probability scales.
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separately and in relation to other systems, must be designed so
that-
(1) Any catastrophic failure condition(i) Is extremely improbable; and
(ii) does not result from a single failure; and(2) Any hazardous failure condition is extremely remote; and
(3) Any major failure condition is remote.”
Quantitative speciﬁcations of the objectives are also provided in
the Part 1309 regulations, as illustrated in Fig. 3.
The output is the deﬁnition of the set O, which contains the
failure probability objective associated with each failure condition
deﬁned in F, as given in Equation (5).
O ¼ fon : n2 Qg (5)
The outcomes of the system safety process are the four related
sets: F, C, L and O. The index variable n can be used to reference the
assessment for each identiﬁed failure mode; describing the tuple:
hfn; cn; ln; oni where n2 Q ; (6)
Further details on the system safety process and the tools used
in performing an assessment are provided in SAE ARP 4754A (2010)
and SAE ARP 4761 (1996).2.1.2. Compliance assessment process
Following the system safety assessment process is the compli-
ance assessment process (Fig. 1). Each tuple, as given in Equation
(6), represents an independent compliance assessment point.
Compliance assessment is a simple deterministic binary “pass or
fail” process, where the state of compliance for the nth identiﬁed
failure mode, Hn, is TRUE when the assessed APFH (ln) is shown to
be less than its applicable failure probability objective (on), as given
in Equation (7).
Hn ¼
8<
:
True if jlnj  on
False otherwise:
(7)
This compliance assessment process must be undertaken for all
N failure conditions, with the overall state of compliance of the
system, Hs, being determined as True if it can be shown that all of
the assessed APFH satisfy their applicable failure probabilityFig. 3. Comparative illustration of the Part 1309 sobjective, as shown in Equation (8).
Hs ¼
8<
:
True if Hn ¼ True cn2Q
False otherwise:
(8)2.1.3. Compliance ﬁnding process
As shown in Fig. 1, the ﬁnal step is the compliance ﬁnding
process. Compliance ﬁnding is a simple deterministic decision
making process, where a system is deemed compliant to the Part
1309 SSPR if:
1. Hs is assessed as True; and
2. All necessary documentation on the assessment outcomes,
people, tools, and data used as part of the system safety
assessment and compliance processes is provided.
If the system is determined to be non-compliant (i.e., Hs ¼ False)
then an iterative engineering process is undertaken to reduce the
APFH and/or the failure condition severity, as shown by the dotted
line in Fig. 1. It is possible for regulators to declare a system as non-
compliant on the basis of insufﬁcient evidence of compliance. In
such cases, further information or a reassessment is required
(shown as a feedback path in Fig. 1). However, reaching this deci-
sion outcome is entirely subjective as the current assessment and
compliance process does not explicitly handle uncertainty. Uncer-
tainty in the outcomes from the system safety assessment process
and subsequently, uncertainty in the compliance assessments are
not input to the compliance ﬁnding process.3. Incorporating uncertainty in the SSPR compliance process
There are a number of perspectives on the meaning of uncer-
tainty. In its general sense, uncertainty is a “state of knowledge”
(Dezfuli et al., 2009). Ayyub (2001) deﬁnes uncertainty as
“knowledge incompleteness due to inherent deﬁciencies with ac-
quired knowledge”, while Aven (2003) describes it as a “lack of
knowledge about the performance of a system (the ‘world’), and
observable quantities”. Central to these deﬁnitions is the concept of
knowledge, where knowledge is deﬁned as something that is
“known from gathered information” (Dezfuli et al., 2009).afety objectives/failure probability objectives.
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Uncertainty is traditionally divided into two types: aleatory and
epistemic (Ayyub, 2014; Dezfuli et al., 2009). The basis of this
classiﬁcation lies in the origin of the uncertainty; uncertainty
arising through variation in measurable phenomena (aleatory un-
certainty) and uncertainty due to a lack of our understanding of the
physical phenomena being studied (epistemic uncertainty) (Ayyub,
2014; Riesch, 2013).
The term aleatory stems from the Latin word “alea” (game of
chance, die) and pertains to “stochastic (non-deterministic) events,
the outcome of which is described by probability” (Dezfuli et al.,
2009). According to Ayyub (2014), aleatory uncertainty relates to
“the inherent, random, or non-reducible uncertainty” and may be
described through the use of objective or classical frequency-based
probability measures (Ayyub, 2014; Pate-Cornell, 1996). It repre-
sents the “randomness” or “variability in samples” inherent in the
system that cannot be reduced by further observations but is
acknowledged and integrated into mathematical models (Pate-
Cornell, 1996).
Epistemic has Greek origins, stemming from the word “epis-
teme” meaning “knowledge” and pertains to “the degree of
knowledge of models and their parameters” (Dezfuli et al., 2009).
According to Ayyub (2014) epistemic uncertainty is “the
knowledge-based, subjective uncertainty that can be reduced with
the collection of data or attainment of additional knowledge” and
can be described by subjective probability measures. Epistemic
uncertainties represent fundamental uncertainties and are often
“ignored and tend to be under-reported” (Pate-Cornell, 1996). They
are particularly signiﬁcant in those situations where the evidence
base is small (Pate-Cornell, 1996). They are more difﬁcult to treat
than aleatory uncertainties as they stem from incomplete knowl-
edge about fundamental phenomena (Pate-Cornell, 1996) but can
be reduced with further information (e.g., via observation) of the
system.
3.2. Sources of uncertainty
Epistemic and aleatory uncertainties are an inherent and ines-
capable part of the modelling and assessment of any real world
system. Aven (2010) describes uncertainty in relation to the inputs,
model, outputs (including parameters of interest) and the decision
criteria. For example, uncertainty can be associated with the inac-
curacy, incompleteness, and imprecision of the data, models, and
information used in an assessment process. Uncertainty can also be
introduced through subjectivity and errors made in the assessment
process itself. Extending Aven's model, uncertainty can also be
introduced through the communication of the model and its out-
puts to other stakeholders. For example, uncertainty arising due to
homophony, linguistic or lexical ambiguity, channel distortion,
trust, etc. A detailed literature review identiﬁed additional sources
of uncertainty relating to the modelling process (Riesch, 2013;
Spiegelhalter and Riesch, 2011), engineering systems (Ayyub,
2001), and the use of expert opinion (Ayyub, 2001).
3.3. Measuring uncertainty
There are numerous approaches for measuring uncertainty
(Aven, 2010; Aven and Zio, 2011; Zio and Pedroni, 2013), with the
simplest and most common of which being probability theory
(Aven and Zio, 2011). Under this approach, uncertainties are char-
acterised by the probabilities associated with events (Zio and
Pedroni, 2013), where an event is deﬁned as an “occurrence or
outcome or change of a particular set of circumstances” (Ayyub,
2014) and “corresponds to any of the possible states a physicalsystem can assume, or any of the possible predictions of a model
describing the system” (Zio and Pedroni, 2013). As discussed by
Ayyub (2014), the term probability has a precise mathematical
deﬁnition but its meaning, when applied to the representation of
uncertainties, is subject to differing interpretations: that of the
Frequentist (objective or classical interpretation), and that of the
Bayesian (subjective interpretation) (Ayyub, 2014; Bolstad, 2007).
3.3.1. Frequentist interpretation
The Frequentist school, which includes classical statistical
thinking, views probability as a “true property of nature” (Nilsen
and Aven, 2003) or “a property of the external world” (Moller,
2012) that can be measured objectively. According to this view
the probability of an event is the frequency with which it would
occur in a long series of similar trials (Ayyub, 2014). “More pre-
cisely, it is the value to which the long-run frequency would
converge as the number of experiments increases toward inﬁnity”
(Covello and Merkhofer, 1993). This approach is based on the “Law
of Large Numbers” (Covello and Merkhofer, 1993), which states if
independent trials with the same probability of outcomes are
repeated, the average value of the trials converges to the expected
value. In other words, in the long run, given the above assumptions,
actual value converges to the expected value (Moller, 2012). One of
themain advantages of the Frequentist interpretation of probability
is that “it involves only objective treatment of statistical samples”
(Pate-Cornell, 1996). It is based on well-known principles of sta-
tistical inference that makes use of empirical data and empirically
validated models that can provide added conﬁdence in the
approach (Aven and Zio, 2011; Covello and Merkhofer, 1993). The
limitations to the Frequentist approach is that it only takes aleatory
uncertainties into account and cannot be applied when the data is
insufﬁcient (Covello andMerkhofer, 1993; Pate-Cornell, 1996). Thus
the use of a Frequentist interpretation of probability can be prob-
lematic for complex systems where epistemic uncertainty is high
and any situation where data are scarce.
3.3.2. Bayesian interpretation
A Bayesian interpretation deﬁnes probability as “the rational
degree of belief that one holds in the occurrence of an event”
(Ayyub, 2014). It is based on the concept of subjective probabilities;
where probability is interpreted as “a number, expressing a state of
knowledge or degree of belief that depends on the information,
experience, and theories of the individual who assigns it” (Covello
and Merkhofer, 1993). According to this view, “probability is a
function not only of the event, but of the state of information.
Different people may assign different probabilities and the proba-
bility assigned by any one person may change over time as new
information is acquired” (Covello and Merkhofer, 1993). Probability
under a Bayesian perspective quantiﬁes the state of knowledge and
represents the plausibility of an event or hypothesis (Dezfuli et al.,
2009). Although subjective probabilities are judgmental in nature
they are by no means arbitrary. They need to satisfy the same basic
axioms as those in classical probability theory (Covello and
Merkhofer, 1993).
One of the main advantages of the Bayesian interpretation of
probability is that it is capable of taking both objective and sub-
jective measures of uncertainty into consideration (Nilsen and
Aven, 2003). In contrast to the Frequentist approach, the Bayesian
approach can be used when data is scarce (Aven and Zio, 2011) and
can take both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties into consider-
ation (Pate-Cornell, 1996). Furthermore, its use also allows the
analyst to make use of all the available information to allow for
better parameter estimation and improved decision making
(Dezfuli et al., 2009; Pate-Cornell, 1996). Bayesian methods provide
an accepted, structured, and consistent way (logically and
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where one has experience and data, however limited this may be.
According to Jaynes (2003), Bayesian methods provide the
comprehensive representation of the state of knowledge needed by
decision makers to make rational and consistent decisions in the
presence of uncertainty.
3.4. Decision making under uncertainty
Jaynes (2003) describes the desiderata of rationality and con-
sistency for plausible reasoning in the presence of uncertainty (see
p.17, (Jaynes, 2003)). The general preface is that decision makers
can only make inferences (or propositions) about the state of the
world based on the uncertain knowledge and information on hand.
Bayesian inference provides a means for measuring uncertainty in
relation to these hypotheses by producing information based on
models, data, and other information (Dezfuli et al., 2009). Bayesian
inference can also be used to progressively update the state of
knowledge (degree of belief in the hypothesis) as new data or
experience in the operation of the system is gained. These tech-
niques are already accepted as the standard in a number of in-
dustries and used in the probabilistic assessment of the risks
associated with space launch activities (Guarro, 2012; Guikema and
Pate-Cornell, 2004), and in the nuclear power industry (United
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975). Both of these appli-
cations are analogues to the system safety assessment of UAS;
complex systems with relatively low data.
3.5. Uncertainty in the SSPR compliance process
Uncertainty is inherent to all stages of the SSPR compliance
process illustrated in Fig. 1. This uncertainty is compounding and
can ultimately lead to errors in compliance ﬁndings.
3.5.1. Uncertainty in the system safety assessment process
There is signiﬁcant uncertainty associated with the input data
and modelling undertaken as part of the system safety assessment
process, irrespective of whether it is undertaken for a manned or
unmanned aircraft. However, the uncertainty in a system safety
assessment for a UAS is likely to be higher due to:
 Limited operational data and experiencee Operational data and
experience is a principal input to the assessment process, being
used in the identiﬁcation of failure modes, the characterisation
of their effects, and the assessment of the probability of their
occurrence. There is a signiﬁcant amount of data and experience
on CPA, their operation, component systems, and various means
of failure. Conversely, for UAS, there is less data and experience
due to the relative infancy of the systems, the restrictions
imposed on their operations, and the rapid pace of technology
development. In addition, the diversity of the UAS ﬂeet and the
nature of their operations makes it difﬁcult to draw conclusions
from other operational systems.
 Use of commercial off the shelf (COTS) components eMost CPA
types make use of certiﬁed quality-assured components. Such
components have been designed, manufactured, and tested to
deﬁned standard(s), which can be used as a basis for estimating
component reliability. The standards are common to the in-
dustry; hence a wealth of data and information on the failure
modes and reliability of components can be obtained through
studying the population of components in service. Conversely,
the majority of civil UAS employ COTS hardware and software,
which are not designed, manufactured, nor tested to deﬁned
standards. The rapid pace of technology development further
compounds the situation, with COTS components constantlybeing updated to remain commercially competitive. As a
consequence, it is difﬁcult to develop heritage in a particular
component and in turn, system baseline conﬁguration.
 Dynamic system baselines e The system certiﬁcation baseline is
a description of the conﬁguration of the entire system at a
particular point in time. The description includes a speciﬁcation
of the system architecture and its constituent components, and
is a key input to a system safety assessment for any aircraft. For
CPA the system baseline is relatively static, allowing safety data
to be quickly compiled for a single aircraft type or across the
entire ﬂeet of a particular aircraft type. For civil UAS the system
baseline is dynamic, largely due to the rapid pace of technology
development and the need for a ﬂexible and commercially
competitive UAS that remain at the forefront of current capa-
bility. In addition, many UAS are designed to be “plug-and-play”
systems to meet the demand for ﬂexible mission capability. It is
difﬁcult to develop safety heritage in the systemwithout a static
baseline. This also challenges the use of existing reliability
models typically used in the system safety assessment process,
which assume mature systems exhibiting constant failure rates.
Uncertainty in the inputs and models used will lead to uncer-
tainty in relation to all of the outputs from the system safety
assessment process. With reference to Equation (2) through to (4),
these uncertainties can include:
 FeWhether all failure conditions have been correctly identiﬁed,
and whether each identiﬁed failure condition (fn), is correctly
speciﬁed in terms of its modes of failure and its effects;
 C e Uncertainty in relation to the estimate of the magnitude of
consequential effects and in turn, the severity condition cate-
gory (cn) assigned to each failure condition fn;
 L e Uncertainty in relation to the estimate of ln for each failure
condition fn;
 FPO e Whether the correct on is selected for each identiﬁed
failure condition fn.
It is important to note that these uncertainties are not inde-
pendent. For example, uncertainty in the choice of on will incor-
porate the uncertainty associated with the assignment of cn.
Typically, a number of people and organisations are involved in the
system safety compliance process. As such, the outcomes of the
system safety assessment process are also subject to communica-
tion uncertainty (e.g., trust, certitude, etc.).
System safety guidance material (FAA, 2011, 1988; SAE ARP
4754A, 2010; SAE ARP 4761, 1996; SAE ARP 5150, 2013) make no
explicit mention of uncertainty, its measurement or treatment as
part of the system safety assessment process. However, it is
acknowledged that a failure mode can potentially have a range of
negative impacts on the safety of ﬂight. In such cases, the recom-
mended practice is to assign cn to the highest potential severity
category. Guidance material (SAE ARP 5150, 2013) also suggests the
use of sensitivity analysis to determine the “upper bounds” on
quantitative estimates of ln. Such conservative approaches, whilst
arguably defensible, do not comprehensively address the un-
certainties present in the system safety assessment process,
particularly knowledge/model uncertainty. Such conservative as-
sumptions can compound and result in the impost of unnecessary
cost.
3.5.2. Uncertainty in the compliance assessment and ﬁnding
processes
As described in Section x2.1.3, the current compliance assess-
ment process is a deterministic binary process. No account of the
uncertainty in the input sets F, C,L andO is taken into consideration
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means for expressing the resulting uncertainty in the output state
of compliance, HS. The output assessment can be either TRUE or
FALSE. As such, decision makers are unable to objectively account
for uncertainty in decision-making.
Uncertainty is inherent to the entire process illustrated in Fig. 1;
its inescapable existence gives rise to six possible outcomes from
compliance decision-making, namely:
1. Certifying a UAS as compliant when it is in fact compliant; a
desirable outcome;
2. Certifying the system as compliant when it is in fact non-
compliant. This is the least desirable outcome, which can lead
to the operation of a UAS that does not meet the minimum
safety standards;
3. Not certifying a UAS as compliant when it is in fact compliant.
This is a less than desirable outcome where an unnecessary cost
is borne by the system manufacturer;
4. Not certifying a UAS as compliant when it is in fact non-
compliant; a desirable outcome;
5. Requiring further data and analysis to be undertaken when the
UAS is in fact compliant. This is a less than desirable outcome
where an unnecessary cost is borne by the system
manufacturer;
6. Requiring further data and analysis when the UAS is in fact non-
compliant; this is a less than desirable outcome where an un-
necessary cost is borne by the system manufacturer in under-
taking additional assessment on a non-compliant system.
As described above, the consequences of various decision ac-
tions vary, and there is currently no objective means for decision
makers to take these into consideration. A decision maker uses a
subjective and somewhat “black box” process for making compli-
ance ﬁndings.
3.6. Summary
The uncertainty inherent to the SSPR compliance process can
lead to inconsistent, subjective, and potentially erroneous regula-
tory outcomes. This situation arises due the absence of a systematic
and objective means for representing uncertainty to decision
makers, and a framework that enables decision makers to make
rational, logical, transparent, and consistent decisions when faced
with uncertainty.
4. A new system safety performance requirement compliance
process
A revised system safety performance requirement compliance
process is illustrated in Fig. 4 and further described in the followingFig. 4. New SSPR comsub-sections. Inspiration for the revised approach comes from
(Perez, 2015, 2013, Perez et al., 2013, 2012a, 2012b). At its foun-
dation, is the premise that the compliance ﬁnding process can be
viewed as a problem of decision-making under uncertainty.
Improved decision-making in the presence of uncertainty requires
comprehensive assessments of the uncertainty. As discussed by
Aven and Zio (2011) “the bottom line concern with respect to un-
certainty in decision making is to provide the decision makers with
a clearly informed picture of the problem upon which they can
conﬁdently reason and deliberate”.
In this paper we address only the uncertainty associated with
the assessment of ln. Discussion on how the framework can be
readily extended to represent other uncertainties in the system
safety performance requirement process is presented in x5.4.4.1. The system safety assessment process
The system safety assessment process remains a systematic
process of determining F, C, L and O. However, the set L is now
denotedL* and no longer comprises point-value assessments of the
average probability of failure, ln, but N conditional probability
distributions describing the uncertainty (or degree of belief) in ln,
denoted p(lnjD,I), Equation (9).
L* ¼ fpðlnjD; IÞ : n2Qg (9)
In contrast to the traditional system safety assessment process,
the outputs are measures of the uncertainty associated with the
assessment of the APFH for the particular failure condition, given all
of the available failure data, D, and knowledge and information, I.
The conditional probability distribution, p(lnjD,I)n, representing our
uncertainty in ln is determined using Equation (10).
pðlnjD; IÞ ¼ pðDjln; IÞ  pðlnjIÞPðDjIÞ (10)
Equation (10) can be readily recognised as Bayes' Theorem, with
p(lnjD,I) corresponding to the posterior distribution, p(Djln,I) cor-
responding to the likelihood (or sampling) distribution, p(lnjI) the
prior distribution, and P(DjI) the marginal or unconditional prob-
ability of observing failure condition data, D. p(lnjD,I) is the distri-
bution describing the uncertainty in the parameter of interest (ln)
based on our prior state of knowledge and any new evidence pro-
vided by D. p(lnjI) describes the uncertainty in our current
knowledge; the model parameter ln (epistemic uncertainty), based
on all previous available information, I. This is the analysts’ state of
knowledge about the hypothesis (Dezfuli et al., 2009) before taking
into account D. p(Djln,I) is a distribution representing the likelihood
of observing D and represents the aleatory uncertainty in the
modelled system. P(DjI) is a constant and serves as a normalisation
factor.pliance process.
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The likelihood distribution, p(Djln,I), represents the aleatory
uncertainty in the observed/measured ln for the nth identiﬁed
failure condition, fn. It is a statistical model describing the occur-
rence of the failure condition. There are a number of different
models that are readily used in system safety assessment failure
modelling. These include the Poisson, Exponential, Gamma, Wei-
bull, Bernoulli and Binomial (Covello and Merkhofer, 1993). The
particular likelihood distribution chosen will depend on the data
and the fundamental physical phenomenon being observed; hence
the distribution is conditioned on implicit information, I. The
reader is directed to Covello and Merkhofer (1993) for further
discussion on the selection of reliability distributions. A common
choice used within the system safety assessment of most aviation
systems is the Poisson, which assumes the failure condition, fn,
occurs at a constant rate. Discussion on the suitability of this model
for describing the probability of UAS failures is presented in Section
x5.1.2.
4.1.2. The prior distribution
There is uncertainty associated with the choice of p(Djln,I). This
epistemic uncertainty is encoded through the choice of the prior
distribution, p(lnj,I). The prior distribution represents our current
degree of belief in the model parameter, in this case ln. It describes
an initial state of knowledge (Covello and Merkhofer, 1993) and
reﬂects either what one believes or a summary of all one allows
oneself to believe initially (Bolstad, 2007). Priors can be broadly
classiﬁed as either informative or non-informative. Informative
priors contain substantive information about the possible values of
the unknown parameter (i.e., ln), while non-informative priors are
intended to let the data dominate the posterior distribution
(Dezfuli et al., 2009). The prior could be any distribution that best
represents the state of knowledge and will depend on the assessor.
Expert judgement and historical failure data could be used to
inform the choice of prior. A conjugate prior can also be used to
simplify the evaluation of Equation (10). A conjugate prior permits
solved analytical solution to Equation (10), removing the need to
determine the posterior distribution through numerical integration
(Bolstad, 2007; Dezfuli et al., 2009).
4.1.3. The posterior distribution
The marginal probability, P(DjI), is obtained by integrating the
numerator of Equation (10) over all the possible values of ln (for
continuous distributions). Depending on the choice of distribu-
tions, Equation (10) can then be solved analytically or numerically,
through Markov Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) simulation. The
resulting posterior distribution, p(lnjD,I), represents our updated
state of knowledge in ln. This distribution can be used to make
probabilistic inferences as to the value of ln.
To summarise, the output from the revised system safety
assessment processes are the sets F, C, L* and O. However, L* con-
tains a set of N distributions describing the uncertainty on the N
estimates of APFH as opposed to point estimates of the APFH, as
given in Equation (9).
4.2. The compliance assessment process
Input to the compliance assessment process is the set of pos-
terior distributions, L*, and the associated set of failure probability
objectives, O. A moment (e.g., mean) or the maximum likelihood
estimator (MLE) of p(lnjD,I) could be used to obtain representative
point values of ln needed to evaluate Equation (7). However, this
approach would discard the information captured in the uncer-
tainty distribution (Perez, 2015).
Following (Perez, 2013; Perez et al., 2013, 2012a, 2012b), weredeﬁne compliance assessment as the process of determining the
degree of belief as to whether the candidate system satisﬁes all of
its relevant failure probability objectives. Equation (7) is recast as a
proposition (or hypothesis), for which we assign a probability
representing the degree of belief in its state (i.e., Hn being TRUE or
FALSE). We begin by deﬁning the set of N sub-propositions, S, as
given in Equation (11).
S ¼ fHn : n2Qg (11)
Each sub-proposition, Hn, is TRUE if and only if ln is less than its
relevant failure probability objective, On. We do not know the value
of ln with certainty and hence can only determine a probability
representing our uncertainty in each sub-proposition being TRUE
(or not). This probability is denoted as P(HnjD,I). Each conditional
probability P(HnjD,I) can be thought of as our degree of belief in the
compliance of each failure condition, fn, in meeting its required
failure probability objective, On. There are a number of ways we can
infer P(HnjD,I) from the posterior distributions p(lnjD,I). One means
for determining P(HnjD,I) is through the one-sided integration of
p(lnjD,I), Equation (12).
PðHnjD; IÞ ¼
ZOn
0
pðlnjD; IÞ:dl (12)
Alternatively, Bayesian Prediction can be used to determine the
predicted probability of compliance taking full account of the un-
certainty in ln. The predicted probability is calculated using Equa-
tion (13) (Bolstad, 2007) through marginalisation of the parameter
ln (Hamada et al., 2008; Perez, 2015).
PðOnjD; IÞ ¼
Z
L
pðOn; lnj D; IÞ :dl
¼
ZOn
0
pðOnj lnÞpðlnjD; IÞ :dl
(13)
The predicted uncertainty in compliance can be found by
combining Equations (10) and (13), as given in Equation (14).
PðHnjD; IÞ ¼
ZOn
0
pðOnjlnÞ pðDjln; IÞpðlnjIÞPðDjIÞ :dl (14)
In effect, Equation (14) averages the model uncertainty through
integration of the sampling distribution p(Onjln) over the posterior
distribution p(lnjD,I) (Hamada et al., 2008). The outcome is a pre-
dictive probability representing the uncertainty in compliance for
the particular failure condition. Once P(HnjD,I) has been determined
for all Hn in S and assuming the assessments are independent,
Equation (8) can be recast to express our overall degree of belief in
the compliance of the system P(HsjD,I) as follows:
PðHsjD; IÞ ¼ ∩
N
n¼1
PðHnj D; IÞ
¼ PðH1jD; IÞ∩PðH2jD; IÞ∩:::∩PðHNjD; IÞ
(15)
Unlike the original SSPR compliance assessment process, which
provided a TRUE or FALSE statement to decision makers, the
revised framework provides a conditional probability P(H0jD,I)
representing the uncertainty in the system being compliant with
the system safety performance requirement. This enables system-
atic consideration of uncertainty in the proceeding compliance
process.
Table 1
Compliance decision matrix.
X1 Compliant X2 Non-compliant
A1 e Compliant L11 L12
A2 e Non-Compliant L21 L22
A3 e More information required L31 L32
W 11 : The UAS is deemed to be compliant when it is actually compliant;
W 12 : The UAS is deemed to be compliant but it is actually non-compliant;
W 21 : The UAS is deemed to be non-compliant but it is actually compliant;
W 22 : The UAS is deemed to be non-compliant when it is actually non-compliant;
W 31 : There is insufﬁcient information in the state of compliance when the UAS is
actually compliant;
W 32 : There is insufﬁcient information in the state of compliance when the UAS is
actually non-compliant.
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Following Perez et al. (2013), the compliance ﬁnding process can
be considered as a problem of decision making under uncertainty.
In so doing, it is explicitly acknowledged that the state of system
compliance with the SSPR, Hs, cannot be known with absolute
certainty. Instead, regulators can only pose a hypothesis as to the
state of compliance of the system, and then look to reason, in some
rational way, on the basis of its plausibility.
Input to the compliance ﬁnding process is the measure P(HsjD,I)
describing the degree of belief in the state of compliance of the
systemwith the system safety performance requirement. Based on
this information, and as described in Section x3.5.2, decision
makers can make one of three decision actions:
1. Deem the system to be compliant;
2. Deem the system to be non-compliant; or
3. Regulators request further data, testing, and analysis before they
can have conﬁdence to make a compliance ﬁnding.
A range of decision-making approaches can then be applied to
assist decisionmakers in choosing between the above three options.
A normative decision making approach is advocated by Perez et al.
(2013). A normative decision making approach (refer to (Peterson,
2009) and Chapter 13 (Jaynes, 2003)) provides a means for rational
and objective decision making. An individual's behaviour is likely to
vary over time and across cultures, however the use of a normative
theory can be expected to withstand the test of time and cultural
differences (Peterson, 2009). In addition to this, the normative deci-
sion theory is a simple, transparent and pragmatic approach that is
capable of accounting for the consequences that follow from a deci-
sion. It is a theory onhowdecisions should bemade, rather than how
they are actually made, thus serving as a prerequisite for rational
decision making (Hansson, 2005). This latter point is important.
Whilst simple and objective, normative decision-making is not
intended to replace human decision-making. Rather, the authors
consider it to be a useful input to human decision-making to
encourage more rational, consistent and objective outcomes from
what is an inherently subjective process. An area of future work
would be in exploring a formulation of the decision space that better
meets the information needs of human decision-making.
The compliance ﬁnding process can be formulated using a
normative decision making approach as follows. Following Perez
et al. (2013), the compliance ﬁnding decision problem can be
considered to comprise of three components:
P ¼ 〈A ;X ;W 〉 (16)
A ¼ fA1;A2; :::Aig (17)
X ¼ X1;X2; :::Xy (18)
W ¼ fWuvg for u ¼ 1;2; :::i and y ¼ 1;2; :::y (19)
where, A describes the set of decision options or actions, X de-
scribes the set of states of nature about which there is uncertainty,
and W describes the set of decision outcomes. The uncertainty in
the state of nature is denoted Pk ¼ P(Xk).
Specifying a loss with each decision action facilitates consider-
ation of risk in decision-making. A loss function describing the
consequences associated with pursuing each of the decision out-
comes in W needs to be deﬁned. The loss function L maps the
states of nature X and the decision options A to measures of the
consequences of outcomes (Perez et al., 2013):L : Au;Xy1LuyðWuyÞ (20)
where Luv measures the consequence of taking the decision A u;
where Xv is the true state of nature. A decision criterion can then be
applied, which selects the preferred decision option based on the
consequences of the outcomes and the uncertainty in the state of
nature [54]:
Z : fLuy; Pkg1A (21)
Applying the above to the compliance ﬁnding process, A has
three elements representing the three possible decision options
described above:
A1≡Compliant
A2≡ Non Compliant
A3≡More information required
The states of nature of interest corresponds to the state of sys-
tem compliance, Hs, and its complement:
X1 ¼ Hs X2 ¼ Hs (22)
The uncertainty in the states of nature Pk are provided by the
compliance assessment process (Equation (12)):
P1 ¼ PðX1Þ ¼ PðHsjD; IÞ
P2 ¼ PðX2Þ ¼ 1 P1
(23)
The six potential outcome states contained in W are described
in Section x3.5.2 and are indexed as follows:The decision/loss matrix providing the mapping between the
loss function Luv, decision options Au and states of nature Xv is given
in Table 1.
A negative loss value corresponds to a gain or reward, and a
positive value represents a loss or cost. A qualitative description of
the losses associated with the six outcome states in W was pro-
vided in Section x3.5.2. The loss values L11 and L22 would be
assigned negative values reﬂecting desirable decision-making
behaviour. Similarly, the loss values L12, L21, L31 and L32 would be
assigned positive values reﬂecting less than desirable decision-
making behaviour. It is important to note that the measurement
of loss and the assigned values are subjective; reﬂecting the pref-
erences and risk appetite of the regulator. With that said, same
rational relationships between the assigned loss values can be
hypothesised, with some examples summarised in Table 2.
Table 2
Relationship between various loss functions.
Relationship Description
L12 ¼ max
cu;y
fLu;yg It would be expected that the highest loss value would be assigned toW 12 as it describes the outcome where a potentially unsafe UAS is certiﬁed as safe
for operation.
L22 ¼ min
cu;y
fLu;yg It would be expected that the lowest assigned loss (or highest reward) would be assigned toW 22 as it describes the outcome where a potentially unsafe
UAS is deemed non-compliant.
L22  L11 From a safety perspective, deeming a system as non-compliant when it is in fact non-compliant (W 22), is as desirable, if not more desirable, than
deeming the UAS as compliant when it is actually compliant (W 11).
L31 < L21 It would bemore preferable to seek further information beforemaking a decision onwhether or not a compliant system is actually compliant (W 31) than
deeming the compliant system to be not compliant (W 21).
L22 < L31 From a safety perspective, deeming a system as non-compliant when it is actually non-compliant (W 22), would be more desirable than seeking further
information before making a decision on whether or not a compliant system is compliant (W 31)
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with the decision outcomes. Decision risk is the composite of un-
certainty and consequence for each decision outcome/action. The
measure of uncertainty is given by the probabilities P1 and P2
(Equation (23)) and the values of loss as assigned inTable 1.
There are numerous ways in which a measure of risk can be
found from its component measures of uncertainty and conse-
quence. In aviation risk management frameworks, a risk matrix is
used to provide a measure of risk. The matrix provides a Cartesian
mapping between the component measures of consequence and
uncertainty and risk. More simplistic approaches use multiplicative
or additive operations.
For the purposes of providing a simple illustration of the
approach, it is assumed that a measure of risk can be found through
the multiplication of the measures of loss and probability. On this
basis, a measure of the decision risk can be described as the ex-
pected loss over the posterior distribution of the uncertain states of
nature at the time of making the decision (Perez et al., 2013;
Singpurwalla, 2006). The risk for each of the three decision ac-
tions in A can be found using Equation (24).
RðA1Þ ¼ L11P1 þ L12P2
RðA2Þ ¼ L21P1 þ L22P2
RðA3Þ ¼ L31P1 þ L32P2
(24)
Following Perez et al. (2013) the decision criterion that satisﬁes
Jaynes (2003) desiderata of consistency and rationality is the de-
cision action A* that minimises the Bayesian risk, as given in
Equation (25).
A* ¼ argminfRðAÞg
A2A
(25)
The decision option A* determined through the use of Equation
(25) represents the “objective” compliance decision option, given
all available data and information. As mentioned, this does not
reﬂect the subjective process of human decision-making. Rather, A*
would input to such a subjective decision making process, helping
to foster more objective, consistent and rational compliance
ﬁnding.4.4. Summary
The proposed framework provides onemeans for fosteringmore
robust, systematic, rational, objective, and transparent compliance
decision making in the presence of uncertainty. Uncertainty in theestimates of the APFH is represented through the use of Bayesian
probabilities. The normative decision making approach reduces the
subjectivity of compliance ﬁndings in the presence of uncertainty
and allows decision makers to take into account the risk associated
with pursuing various decision actions. The revised system safety
performance requirement compliance process is suited to UAS,
which lack the data and knowledge needed to provide estimates of
the APFH with certainty.
5. Case study
A hypothetical case study is presented to exemplify the features
of the reﬁned compliance process. The case study is for a manu-
facturer undertaking type certiﬁcation of a new UAS. The certiﬁ-
cation activity includes the requirement to demonstrate
compliance to the system safety performance requirement con-
tained within sub-part 1309 of the respective civil aviation safety
regulations. For the purposes of this case-study, the draft Part 1309
regulations presented in EASA (2015a) are used. The simple case
study presented herein illustrates the general process for a single
failure condition. It is important to note that a safety analysis and
compliance assessment would need to consider numerous failure
conditions and the potential dependencies between them (as dis-
cussed in Section x4.2).
5.1. System safety assessment process
Following standard failure identiﬁcation and effects analysis
processes (as described in Hayhurst et al. (2007)), one component
of the UAS was identiﬁed as having a failure condition (f1) and
assigned the severity category (c1) ofMinor. The appropriate FPO for
a failure condition of Minor severity as deﬁned in EASA (2015a) is:
O1 ¼ 103:hr1 (26)
5.1.1. Available data
The manufacturer has a ﬂeet of six identical prototype UAS. The
ﬂeet has undergone extensive hardware in the loop (HIL) simula-
tion and ﬂight testing; collectively accummulating a total of
7500 hours of operation. f1was observed only ﬁve times during HIL
and ﬂight testing of the prototypes. This represents available data,
D.
5.1.2. Choice of likelihood distribution
As stated previously, there are numerous mathematical models
that can be used to describe discrete events such as the failure of a
Fig. 5. Comparison of the prior distributions input by Analyst A and Analyst B.
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considered appropriate choices for the likelihood distribution for
this case study. One of the major limitations of the Poisson distri-
bution is that it assumes a constant failure rate (Covello and
Merkhofer, 1993), an assumption not made in the Weibull model.
Given the characteristics of UAS described in Section x3.5.1, the
Weibull distribution is potentially a more appropriate failure dis-
tribution, however, in keeping with Part 1309 Guidance Material, a
Poisson likelihood distribution is assumed for this case study,
Equation (27).
pðDjl1; IÞ ¼
ðl1tÞDel1t
D!
(27)
where, p(Djl1,I) is the likelihood distribution, D is the observed
number of failures (a positive integer), l1 is the APFH, I is the in-
formation known prior to D, t is the time period over which the
failures were observed.5.1.3. Choice of prior distribution
Two analysts were tasked with determining l1. Analyst A had no
prior knowledge or information as to the value of l1, and thus
adopted a non-informative prior. While there are a number of non-
informative priors that can be used, a conjugate Jeffrey's Prior was
selected for this case. The selection of this prior, not only lets the
data speak for itself, but being a conjugate prior, the posterior
distribution can be solved analytically.
There are different Jeffrey's priors for different distributions; for
the Poisson distribution, it is a gamma distribution with shape
parameter (aÞ equal to 0.5 and rate parameter ðbÞ equal to zero
(Equation (28)). It is important to note that this distribution is not a
proper distribution as the integral over all possible values of l1 is
not ﬁnite. The posterior distribution that it yields is a proper dis-
tribution with updated parameters (Dezfuli et al., 2009) as given in
Equation (28), where G is the gamma function.pAðl1jIÞf
ba
GðaÞl
a1
1 e
bl1 (28)
Analyst B undertakes a fault tree analysis (FTA) incorporating
component reliability data and expert judgement. Analyst B is able
to provide an estimate of the mean and standard deviation of l1.
Thus, the prior distribution of l1 determined by Analyst B is taken to
follow a lognormal distribution with parameters m ¼ 8.275 and
s ¼ 1.151 substituted into Equation (29). The corresponding mean
and standardard deviation of the lognormal distribution is equal to
4.94  104 and 8.21  104 respectively. The two candidate prior
distributions are illustrated in Fig. 5.
pBðl1jIÞ ¼
1
l1s
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
p eðlnðl1Þm Þ2 (29)5.1.4. Calculation of the posterior distribution
Due to the choice of a conjugate prior distribution, Analyst A can
determine the posterior distribution, pA(l1jD,I), analytically. In this
case, pA(l1jD,I) follows the same form as the prior distribution but
with updated shape and rate parameters a and b as given in
Equation (30).
pAðl1jD; IÞf
ba þ D
Gðaþ DÞl
ðaþD1Þ
1 e
ðbþDÞl1 (30)
where D is the number of observed failures in the time period t (the
data) and G is a gamma function. As per Equation (10), the resulting
distribution must be normalised by the marginal probability
(summation of the gamma distributions for all values of l1) to
obtain a proper posterior distribution. For Analyst B, numerical
integration is needed to determine the posterior distribution
pB(l1jD,I). The likelihood distribution p(Djl1,I) (Equation (27)) and
the prior distribution pB(l1jI) (Equation (29)) were substituted into
Equation (10) and then solved using MCMC simulation. The
Fig. 6. Posterior distribution for Analyst A and Analyst B.
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The effect of the additional prior information can be observed in
the outcome posterior distributions illustrated in Fig. 6. The pos-
terior distribution provided by Analyst B is slightly narrower
compared to that of Analyst A, with Analyst A's posterior distribu-
tion more strongly representing the available data, D. The non-
informative prior has the effect of spreading the likelihood func-
tion. Taking this into consideration, if information is limited, as
would currently be the case in the UAS industry, choosing a non-
informative prior is not likely to adversely impact the posterior
distribution. However, as more information becomes available, the
Bayesian approach allows for it to be taken into consideration thus
providing the regulator with additional information to aid in theFig. 7. Comparison of failure distributions for the MLE and uppedecision making process. The tuples describing the output from the
system safety assessment process are given in Equations (31) and
(32), for Analyst A and B, respectively.
< f1;Minor;pAðl1jD; IÞ;1003 > (31)
< f1;Minor;pBðl1jD; IÞ;1003 > (32)
5.1.5. What if point estimates were required?
The output assessments are distributions describing the uncer-
tainty in ln. However, estimates of the value of ln may also be
required to support the quantitative analysis of other failure con-
ditions. Direct statistical estimates on the value of the parameterr and lower limits for the 90% Bayesian credibility interval.
Table 3
Proposition probabilities for Analyst A and Analyst B.
Analyst A Analyst B
P(H1jD, I) 0.8190 0.9296
Table 4
Compliance decision matrix for case study.
X1 e Compliant X2 e Non-Compliant
A1 e Compliant 3 3
A2 e Non-Compliant 2 3
A3 e Uncertain 1 1
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computing the MLE. Bayesian credibility intervals (CI) (Covello and
Merkhofer, 1993) can also be deﬁned, which describe an interval on
the domain of lnwith probability a that it contains the true value ln,
given all data and information available. These estimates of ln can
be incorporated into the likelihood distribution to provide a “family
of models” of the reliability of the system. For example, illustrated
in Fig. 7 are three Poisson failuremodels for ln equal to theMLE and
the lower and upper limits of the 90% CI for ln, taken from the
posterior distribution pA(l1jD, I). Analysts could use the three cases
as representative worst, likely, and best case failure distributions
given all available data and information at hand. As described by
Pate-Cornell (1996), the presentation of alternate models to deci-
sion makers represents the highest treatment of uncertainty. An
advantage of this approach is that there is no need to aggregate
expert opinions or to deal with the fundamental assumptions made
by each expert. Information can be represented exactly as it was
coded (Pate-Cornell, 1996).
5.2. Compliance assessment
From EASA (2015a), a failure condition classiﬁed as havingMinor
severity must have an APFH of Probable or less, which corresponds
to the quantitative failure probability objective of 103 failures per
ﬂight hour. The compliance sub-proposition for the particular
failure condition, H1, can be deﬁned as:
H1 : l1  103 (33)Fig. 8. Posterior distribution showing the uncertaiAs described in Section x4.2, the conditional probability
describing our uncertainty in the proposition H1 can be determined
through integrating the posterior distribution for the appropriate
bounds (Equation (12)) or through calculation of the predictive
probability (Equation (14)). For the purposes of this case study,
Equation (12) is used to determine the uncertainty in H1 with the
results for the two analysts summarised in Table 3. The probability
of the hypothesis of compliance is the area under the curve to the
left of the proposition as given in Fig. 8.
As we are only analysing a single failure condition (i.e., N ¼ 1),
our uncertainty in the overall state of system compliance (as given
by Equation (15)) simpliﬁes to:
PðHsjD; IÞ ¼ PðH1jD; IÞ (34)
Thus the proposition probabilities given in Table 3 can be
directly interpreted as the output compliance probabilities
PA(HsjD,I) and PB(HsjD,I) input to the compliance ﬁnding process.5.3. Compliance ﬁnding
The normative decision making approach as described in Sec-
tion x4.3 is adopted for this case study. A loss matrix is deﬁned in
Table 4 following the qualitative relationships described in Section
x4.3. The assigned loss values are subjective; with a loss scale
ranging from 3 to þ3 used in this case study. The loss value of 3
represents the most desirable outcome and þ3 represents the leastnty relating to H1 for Analyst A and Analyst B.
Table 6
Risk for each decision action.
Analyst A Analyst B
R(A1) 1.914 2.578
R(A2) 1.095 1.648
R(A3) 1.000 1.000
Table 5
Probabilities characterising the uncertainty in the state of compliance.
Analyst A Analyst B
P1 0.819 0.930
P2 0.181 0.070
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PB(H1jD,I) correspond to PA,1 and PB,1 and their complements, as
given in Table 5. Finally, the risk associated with each decision
option can be obtained using Equation (24), with the results pre-
sented in Table 6. Applying Equation (25), the decision action with
the minimum decision risk (A*) for both analysts can be
determined.
The recommended decision action is A1, which corresponds to
the decision to certify the failure condition as being compliant with
the system safety performance requirement. The recommended
decision action is the same for both analysts despite the differences
in the prior knowledge held by each analyst. However, the value of
having additional prior knowledge (i.e., the use of an informed
prior) is evident in the posterior probabilities and decision risks
presented in Tables 5 and 6, respectively, where the additional in-
formation available to Analyst B leads to a much more distinct de-
cision action.
The system safety assessment process typically involves a
diverse range of data and expert judgement. As illustrated in the
case study, the new framework provides an objective and mathe-
matically defensible means for combining the various sources of
data and information in the assessment process.5.4. Discussion
With reference to Pate-Cornell's “levels of treatment of uncer-
tainty” (Pate-Cornell,1996); the revised framework provides for the
highest treatment of the uncertainty associated with estimates of
the average probability of failure, l. Such an approach is necessary
where there are situations of high uncertainty, such as the system
safety assessment of civil UAS, which lack the data and knowledge
that comes with extensive operational experience. Such knowledge
and experience is gained incrementally. The posterior models can
be progressively updated as data becomes available, allowing the
regulator andmanufacturer to objectively reﬁne estimates of safety
performance with time.
The revised approach does not take into consideration the un-
certainty associated with the input data, D. Such uncertainty may
arise through, for example, a lack of ﬁdelity in the HIL simulation
environment, or inaccurate, censored, or missing ﬂight test records.
A number of approaches can be used to account for data uncer-
tainty and are presented in Chapter 10 of Kelly and Smith (2011).
Extensions to this framework will look to account for the uncer-
tainty associated with the assignment of the failure condition se-
verities (cn), and in turn selection of failure probability objectives(on).
In accordance with system safety assessment guidelines, this
paper adopted a simple Poisson failure rate model, which assumes
a constant failure rate. Currently, most commercial UAS do not
exhibit the constant failure rates typical of mature aviation systems.
For small UAS, their changing conﬁguration may mean that they
never achieve a stable failure rate. This brings into question the
validity of the assumption of a constant failure rate model. A more
appropriate model is likely to be the Weibull model, which can be
used to characterise the reliability of immature, mature, and aging
systems.
Existing system safety modelling techniques such as FTA can be
readily incorporated into the proposed framework (see, for
example, (Guarro, 2012)). An area requiring further research is in
the extension of the current framework to include consideration of
the uncertainty in the assignment of failure severities and input
data. Further, advancements could be made through exploring
likelihood distributions that more accurately characterise the fail-
ure characteristics of different types of sub-systems, including
those associated with the remote pilot.
The risk measures are not immediately usable within existing
aviation risk management frameworks. Future work would look
to represent the decision risk within a standard risk matrix and
incorporate existing risk evaluation and treatment decision-
making frameworks (i.e., the As Low As Reasonably Practicable
(ALARP) framework) commonly used in aviation risk
management.6. Conclusion
The general lack of data and experience in the operation of civil
UAS gives rise to uncertainty in relation to all aspects of their
performance. This poses a particular problem when it comes to
certifying such systems against airworthiness regulations. The
existing system safety compliance process does not take uncer-
tainty into consideration, and accounting for uncertainty in
compliance decision-making is a subjective process. This paper
proposes a fundamentally new approach to the aviation system
safety performance requirement compliance process that could
account for the uncertainty inherent in the system safety assess-
ment of any aircraft system, manned or unmanned. The overall aim
is to facilitate more transparent, rational, and systematic compli-
ance decision-making.
Whilst applied to UAS and compliance to the Part 1309 regula-
tions, the same fundamental approach could be readily adopted for
any regulatory compliance process or aircraft system. The approach
proposes a signiﬁcant change to how aviation safety practitioners
currently undertake regulatory compliance activities. Whilst the
theoretical principles of the approach are not new, their application
to aviation represents a signiﬁcant advancement over current
aviation regulatory practice. The proposed approach brings aviation
system safety practices in line with the more contemporary (and
well established) approaches adopted by other safety critical
industries.Acknowledgements
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(JARUS Working Group 6-Safety
and Risk Assessment, 2015)
EASA
(EASA, 2015a)
Hayhurst
(Hayhurst et al., 2007)
NATO
(NATO Standardization Agency,
2014)
RTCA
(RTCA DO-344,
2013)*
No Safety
Effect
Failure conditions that would
have no effect on safety.
For example, failure conditions
that would not affect the
operational capability of the
RPAS or increase remote crew
workload.
Failure conditions that would
have no effect on safety. For
example, failure conditions that
would not affect the operational
capability of the RPAS or increase
the remote crew workload.
Failure Conditions that would
have no effect on safety (that is,
Failure Conditions that would
not affect the operational
capability of the airplane or
increase ﬂight crew workload).
None deﬁned. UAS failure
condition(s) that
have negligible
effects to people on
the ground.
(Referred to as
Minimal)
Minor Failure conditions that would not
signiﬁcantly reduce RPAS safety
and that involve remote crew
actions that are within their
capabilities. Minor failure
conditions may include a slight
reduction in safety margins or
functional capabilities, a slight
increase in remote crew
workload, such as ﬂight plan
changes.
Failure conditions that would not
signiﬁcantly reduce RPAS safety
and that involve remote crew
actions that are well within their
capabilities. Minor failure
conditions may include a slight
reduction in safety margins or
functional capabilities, a slight
increase in remote crew
workload, such as ﬂight plan
changes.
Failure Conditions that would
not signiﬁcantly reduce UAS
safety and involve ﬂight crew
actions that are well within their
capabilities. Minor Failure
Conditions may include a slight
reduction in safety margins or
functional capabilities or a slight
increase in ﬂight crew workload
(such as routine ﬂight plan
changes).
Failure conditions that do not
signiﬁcantly reduce UA safety
and involve UA crew actions that
are well within their capabilities.
These conditions may include a
slight reduction in safety
margins or functional
capabilities, and a slight increase
in UA crew workload.
UAS failure
condition(s) that
could result in
minor injuries to
one or more people
on the ground.
Major Failure conditions that would
reduce the capability of the RPAS
or the ability of the remote crew
to cope with adverse operating
conditions to the extent that
there would be a signiﬁcant
reduction in safety margins,
functional capabilities or
separation assurance. In
addition, the failure condition
has a signiﬁcant increase in
remote crew workload or
impairs remote crew efﬁciency.
Failure conditions that would
reduce the capability of the RPAS
or the ability of the remote crew
to cope with adverse operating
conditions to the extent that
there would be a signiﬁcant
reduction in safety margins,
functional capabilities or
separation assurance. In
addition, the failure condition
has a signiﬁcant increase in
remote crew workload or
impairs remote crew efﬁciency.
Failure conditions that would
reduce the capability of the UAS
or the ability of the ﬂight crew to
cope with adverse operating
conditions to the extent that
there would be:
a signiﬁcant reduction in safety
margins or functional
capabilities;
a signiﬁcant increase in ﬂight
crew workload or in conditions
impairing ﬂight crew efﬁciency;
a discomfort to the ﬂight crew;
or a potential for physical
discomfort to persons
Failure conditions that either by
themselves or in conjunction
with increased crew workload,
are expected to result in an
emergency landing of the UA on
a predeﬁned site where it can be
reasonably expected that a
serious injury will not occur.
Or
Failure conditions which could
potentially result in injury to UA
crew or ground staff.
UAS failure
condition(s) that
could result in
moderate injuries
to one or more
people on the
ground.
Hazardous Failure conditions that would
reduce the capability of the RPAS
or the ability of the remote crew
to cope with adverse operating
conditions to the extent that
there would be the following;
i. Loss of the RPA where it can be
reasonably expected that a
fatality will not occur, or
ii. A large reduction in safety
margins or functional
capabilities, or
iii. High workload such that the
remote crew cannot be relied
upon to perform their tasks
accurately or completely.
Failure conditions that would
reduce the capability of the RPAS
or the ability of the remote crew
to cope with adverse operating
conditions to the extent that
there would be the following:
i. Loss of the RPA where it can be
reasonably expected that one or
more fatalities will not occur, or
ii. A large reduction in safety
margins or functional
capabilities or separation
assurance, or
iii. Excessive workload such that
the remote crew cannot be relied
upon to perform their tasks
accurately or completely.
Failure Conditions that would
reduce the capability of the UAS
or the ability of the ﬂight crew to
cope with adverse operating
conditions to the extent that
there would be the following:
i. A large reduction in safety
margins or functional
capabilities;
ii. Physical distress or higher
workload such that the UAS
ﬂight crew cannot be relied upon
to perform their tasks accurately
or completely; or
iii. Physical distress to persons,
possibly including injuries.
Failure conditions that either by
themselves or in conjunction
with increased crew workload,
are expected to result in a
controlled trajectory termination
or forced landing potentially
leading to the loss of the UA
where it can be reasonably
expected that a fatality will not
occur.
Or
Failure conditions for which it
can be reasonably expected that
a fatality to UA crew or ground
staff will not occur.
UAS failure
condition(s) that
could result in
serious injuries to
one or more people
on the ground.
Catastrophic Failure conditions that could
result in one or more fatalities
Failure conditions that are
expected to result in one or more
fatalities.
Failure conditions that are
expected to result in one or more
fatalities or serious injury to
persons, or the persistent loss of
the ability to control the ﬂight
path of the aircraft normally with
the loss of the aircraft.
Failure conditions that are
expected to result in at least
uncontrolled ﬂight (including
ﬂight outside of pre-planned or
contingency ﬂight proﬁles/areas)
and/or uncontrolled crash.
Or
Failure conditions which may
result in a fatality to UA crew or
ground staff.
UAS failure
condition(s) that
could result in a
fatality to one or
more people on the
ground
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Figure 11: Concept image of an unmanned aircraft operation over Melbourne City, Australia 
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“If you are looking for perfect safety, you will do well to sit on the fence and watch the birds” 
Wilbur Wright (1867-1912) 
This chapter titled, “Managing Uncertainty in the System Safety Assessment of Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems” extends the framework developed in Chapter 4 to address certain additional uncertainties in 
the system safety process (Research Question 2.1 and Research Question 2.2). It demonstrates how 
certain types of model uncertainty, such as those arising from the assumption of a constant failure rate, 
can be accounted for in the assessment and compliance processes. This paper only focuses on the SSA 
process and how the variable failure rate can be incorporated into this model. It does not explore the 
impact of this modification on the remaining components of the SSPR compliance framework. 
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Abstract 
There is much debate over the development of suitable system safety requirements for 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). A particular point of contention is the approach for 
determining the allowable average probability per flight hour of failure conditions. For UAS, 
there is limited knowledge and data to inform the assessment of the average probability of 
failure conditions. This leads to uncertainty in the system safety assessment (SSA) process. 
Current literature provides no discussion as to how this uncertainty can be managed in the 
system safety certification (SSC) of a UAS. In addition to this, uncertainty in the average 
probability of failure conditions is not accounted for in compliance findings, which can result 
in subjective certification decision-making. This research proposes a new framework for 
system safety certification under conditions of uncertainty. The new framework is briefly 
introduced, with the focus of this paper being on the characterisation of uncertainty within the 
SSA process. A Bayesian approach to the modelling of the average probability of failure 
conditions is adopted. The traditional assumption of a constant failure rate model is 
challenged; with a Weibull distribution proposed as a more appropriate representation of UAS 
failure occurrence.  
 
Keywords: Unmanned Aircraft Systems, System Safety Assessment, Airworthiness 
Introduction 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are the fastest growing sector of the aviation industry. 
However, as with any new technology, there is a considerable amount of risk and uncertainty 
associated with the operation of these systems. At present, the default stance taken by 
regulatory authorities the world over is to manage these risks through the imposition of a 
significant amount of restrictions on the operation of these systems [1]–[4]. Uncertainty, 
while mentioned is not taken into consideration by any of the regulatory bodies. And while 
this is implicitly recognised when dealing with manned aircraft operations, the same cannot 
be said for UAS operations. In order to ease these restrictions, it is of paramount importance 
to provide a greater degree of assurance in the airworthiness of these systems taking both the 
risks and uncertainties associated with them into consideration.  
A central component of airworthiness regulations are system safety regulations. System safety 
regulations supplement prescriptive design requirements and are put in place to ensure that an 
aircraft or system is capable of continued safe flight and landing following a failure or 
multiple failures of systems [5]. The current method for assessing the system safety of civilian 
aviation systems [6], [7] does not comprehensively address uncertainty in the input data, 
models, and assessment processes. The model developed in [8] addresses some of these 
shortcomings by providing a means of incorporating uncertainty in the system safety  
assessment and compliance finding process. The approach, however, assumes systems fail at 
a constant rate; a poor assumption for new and complex systems such as UAS. This paper 
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builds on the approach presented in [8] through relaxing this assumption. The failure rate of 
the system is considered an uncertain parameter. Subsequently, the output of the system 
safety assessment process is no longer a point estimate of the failure rate of the system but a 
probability distribution representing the uncertainty inherent in the system. 
System Safety Regulations 
Part 1309 regulations are intended to supplement prescriptive standards on the design, 
manufacture, and installation of aircraft components. A complete description of the Part 1309 
regulations can be found in [5], [9]–[13] and associated guidance material [14], [15]. 
Guidelines on the system safety assessment (SSA) process and accepted assessment tools and 
techniques can be found in [6], [10], [12], [16]. The primary focus of this paper is showing 
compliance to the system safety performance requirements (SSPR). The main objective for 
which is to demonstrate (through a documented qualitative or quantitative analysis) that the 
expected frequency of failure of equipment and systems, when considered separately and in 
relation to other systems, is inversely-related to the severity of its effect on the safe operation 
of the system.  
System Safety Assessment Process 
The current SSA process can be carried out at the component, sub system and system level 
and requires the component reliability data, concept of operations and system baseline 
description as input. Output from this process is a set F, which contains a description of the 
various ways the component, system or sub system can fail; the associated set C describing 
the assigned failure severity categories for each failure condition identified in F; and the set Λ, 
which contains the estimate of the Average Probability of failure per Flight Hour (APFH) of 
these failure conditions being realised. The APFH estimates are then compared to a set of 
failure probability objectives (O) to determine if the system is compliant or not with the 
SSPR. The net output from the SSA process are thus the four related sets: F, C, Λ and O. The 
index variable n can be used to reference the assessment for each identified failure mode; 
describing the tuple given in Eqn 1. Further details on the system SSA process and the tools 
used in performing an assessment are provided in [6], [16]. 
The focus of this paper is on the uncertainty associated with the estimates of the failure rate 
(APFH). The APFH is assessed on qualitative or quantitative “failure probability scales” 
defined in Part 1309 regulations for each category of failure condition in F. The qualitative 
description can include extremely improbable, extremely remote, remote (or improbable), 
probable or frequent and the quantitative description ranges from an APFH of 10
-9
 per hour to 
10
-0
 per hour. Example failure probability scales are summarised in [8]. Estimates of the 
APFH can be determined through a combination of data from testing, modelling and 
simulation, expert judgement, and structured analysis techniques as detailed in [6]. The output 
of the assessment is the specification of the set Λ as given in Eqn 2. Λ comprises N assessed 
point estimates of the APFHs; one associated with each of the failure conditions defined in F.  
 1 
 2 
Incorporating Variable Failure Rates into System Safety Assessment 
The current SSPR assessment process does not comprehensively account for uncertainty 
associated in the assessments of the APFH. The approach proposed in [8] recognises this 
shortcoming and provides an objective, transparent and rational means to show compliance 
with the SSPR in those cases where there is uncertainty in the SSA process. A Bayesian 
approach is adopted that facilitates a more comprehensive treatment of the uncertainties 
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inherent to all SSA. Following SSA guidance material, the approach described in [8] assumes 
that the failure rate of the system is constant. This paper explores the impact of substituting 
the constant failure rate assumption with variable failure rates. 
Failure Rate Modelling 
A “bathtub curve” is typically used to model the failure rate of a system (or population of 
systems). It is divided into three main phases, the “Infant Mortality” phase, the “Useful Life” 
phase and the “Wear-out” phase, each of which are associated with a different failure rate 
[17]. A typical distribution used in the industry to model this is a Weibull distribution. A 
Weibull distribution is a general two-parameter distribution. By adjusting the scale parameter 
α and the shape parameter υ a variety of shapes can be obtained to fit experimental data [18]. 
The Weibull distribution can be used to represent each of the phases of the “bathtub” curve by 
varying υ. The “Infant Mortality” phase represents the initial phase of the lifecycle of the 
family of systems and has υ < 1. The failure rate of the family of systems is reducing during 
this period. It encompasses the latent design faults and errors inherent in the design, 
production, and operation of any new system. These “failures” tend to be identified and 
addressed with increasing operational experience of the system, leading to a reduction in the 
failure rate with accumulated operational time. The second phase, the “Useful Life” phase, 
represents the plateau in these safety improvement measures. The family of systems in the 
Useful Life phase is generally said to exhibit a constant failure rate corresponding to the 
random failures that occur during the life of a system. This phase can be modelled using the 
Weibull function with υ = 1. The final phase, the “Wear-out” phase, is associated with the 
increasing failure rate of the family of systems, which can come with, for example, aging 
systems. The Wear-out phase can be modelled using the Weibull distribution with values of υ 
> 1.  
UAS Failure Rates 
Existing SSA guidance material assume mature aircraft systems exhibiting stable failure rates 
(i.e., in its Useful Life phase). This may not be an appropriate assumption for UAS, 
particularly small commercial UAS, due to the rapid pace of technology development and the 
use of Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components, which create a constantly changing 
system baseline. This in turn means it is difficult to build heritage in a particular configuration 
of a system. Components are not designed or manufactured to accepted standards. Further, 
many small UAS are not subject to routine maintenance. The rapid evolution of technology 
may mean that many UAS types may never achieve a constant failure rate. On this basis, this 
paper assumes the failure rate of UAS follows a Weibull distribution. 
Accounting for Uncertainty in UAS Failure Rates 
In [8], uncertainty (or the degree of belief) in the estimates of the APFH is captured through 
the use of conditional probability distributions, denoted p(λn|D,I). Where, λn is an estimate of 
the APFH for a particular failure condition fn. p(λn|D,I) is determined through the use of 
Bayes’ equation (as given in Eqn 3) taking into consideratoin all of the available data, D, and 
knowledge and information, I. The posterior distribution, p(λn|D,I) is the distribution 
describing the uncertainty in the parameter of interest (λn) based on our prior state of 
knowledge and any new evidence provided by D. p(λn|I) describes the uncertainty in our 
current knowledge; the model parameter λn (epistemic uncertainty), based on all previous 
available information, I. p(D|λn,I) is a distribution representing the likelihood of observing D 
and represents the aleatory uncertainty in the modelled system. P(D|I) is a constant and serves 
as a normalisation factor. For more details on each of these components, the reader is directed 
to [8]. It is important to note that the output from the SSA is no longer a point estimate of λn 
but distributions representing our uncertainty in λn. 
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Accounting for Uncertainty in Non-constant UAS Failure Rates 
As discussed, it is assumed the likelihood distribution can be modelled using the Weibull 
distribution given in Eqn 4. 
 ( |     )              [    ] 4 
Where, p(D|τ,υ,I) is the likelihood distribution, D is the observed time period or time to 
failure (positive rational number), τ is the scale parameter1 (positive rational number) and υ is 
the shape parameter (positive rational number), and I is the information known prior to D.  
The Weibull distribution represents the mean time to failure (MTTF) of the system. The 
failure rate of the system for varying time periods can be calculated from the parameters τ and 
ν using the hazard function provided in Eqn 5. 
 ( )         5 
Where λ(t) represents the varying failure rate of the system and τ and υ are the scale and 
shape parameters of the posterior distribution respectively. The choice of priors can be 
broadly classified into two distinct categories, informative priors and non-informative priors. 
Informative priors contain substantive information about the possible values of the unknown 
parameter (i.e., τ, ν), while non-informative priors are intended to let the data dominate the 
posterior distribution [19]. While data on the failure rate is known from historical data, a 
distribution of the scale and shape parameters for the systems operations is not readily 
available for the case study example. Taking this into consideration a non-informative prior, 
in the form of a gamma distribution was selected as the prior distributions for both the shape 
and scale parameter. A gamma distribution is ideal for those events that occur in a purely 
random fashion [20], and being non-informative, it allows the data dominate the posterior 
distribution [19]. The general form of the equation is presented in Eqn 6. Where A can be 
substituted with τ and υ to represent the scale and shape parameters for the Weibull 
distribution that are to be evaluated and a and b are respectively the scale and rate parameters 
of the gamma distribution (both set to 0.0001, to serve as a non-informative prior).  
 ( | )   
  
 ( ) 
            6 
The marginal probability, P(D|I), is obtained by integrating the numerator of Eqn 3 over all 
the possible values of τ and υ. The posterior distribution is then calculated using Eqn 3. This 
can be done numerically for simpler models (through MATLAB) or through Markov Chain 
Monte-Carlo (MCMC) simulation (through OpenBUGS) for more complex examples such as 
that presented in this paper. The resulting posterior distributions, p(τ|D,I) and p(υ|D,I), 
represent our updated state of knowledge in the Weibull parameters τ and υ. This distribution 
can be used to make probabilistic inferences as to the value of τ and υ and, from that, 
inferences as to the APFH (through the use of the hazard function given in Eqn 5). 
 
Case Study Application 
In order to exemplify the features of the model a simple case study example based on the RQ-
2 (Pioneer) UAS is presented. The Class A mishap data for the RQ-2 from 1986 to 2002 were 
taken from [21]. A Class A mishap is defined as those aircraft accidents resulting in loss of 
                                                 
1
 It is important to note here that the scale parameter is often defined using α and is equal to τ-1/υ. The equations 
used here have been modified to take this into consideration. 
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the aircraft (in naval parlance "strike"), human life, or causing over $1,000,000 in damage 
[21]. A mishap can result from a range of technical, operational factors. For the purposes of 
this example, it is assumed that all of the recorded mishaps were the result of technical 
failures. The MTTF were calculated from the data using the equations given in [21]. It is 
assumed that all the mishaps presented were for non-repairable systems or components, thus 
making the MTTF equivalent to the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF). Taking this into 
consideration the following MTTF (in hours) based on the failure rates for the 17 years of 
operation were observed: 11, 86, 124, 259, 122, 361, NA, NA, 174, 1752, 222,692, NA, 187, 
423, 1091, NA. These represent the input data, D, in Eqn. 3 and 4.   
As described in the previous section, p(τ|I) and p(υ|I) were modelled using uniformed Gamma 
priors. MCMC software was then used to determine the posterior distributions p(τ|D,I) and 
p(υ|D,I). 
Results 
The posterior distributions p(τ|D,I) and p(υ|D,I) output from the MCMC simulations are 
presented in Fig 1 and Fig 2. The mean and lower and upper limits of the 90% Credible 
Interval (CI) for both parameters were then calculated and presented in Table 1. The posterior 
distribution showing the MTTF for the RQ-2 UAS unconditional upon τ and υ is presented in 
Fig 3. This has a mean value of 488.5 hours with the lower and upper limit of the 90% CI 
being 13.2 hours and 1574 hours respectively. The failure rate of the system for varying time 
periods determined using Eqn 5 is presented in Fig 4. It is important to note that only the 
mean τ value of 0.0074 (corresponding to mean α of 192.4) has been used in Fig 4, Fig 5 and 
consequently the results presented in Table 2.  
 
Fig 1: Posterior distribution for τ 
 
Fig 2: Posterior distribution for υ 
 
Fig 3: Posterior distribution for MTTF 
unconditional on τ and υ 
 
Fig 4: Failure rate distribution of the system 
for varying time periods 
Table 1: Scale and Shape parameter for mean and 90% Credible Interval (CI) 
 Scale (τ) Shape (υ) 
Lower limit of 90% CI 0.0003 0.6234 
Mean 0.0074 0.9328 
Upper limit of 90% CI 0.0266 1.2770 
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Using the mean τ value and the mean, lower, and upper limits of the 90% CI for υ, the 
reliability function can be plotted (Fig 5) using Eqn 7. The MTTF can be determined by 
integrating the reliability function. The failure rate can then be calculated by taking the 
inverse of the MTTF with the results presented in Table 2. 
 ( )      [    ] 7 
 
Fig 5: Reliability distribution for mean τ and 
varying υ values from 90% CI 
 
Fig 6: Probability that the mean time to 
failure is at least 1000 hours 
Table 2: Outputs from System Safety Assessment Process 
 MTTF (hours) 
Failure Rate 
(Failures/hour) 
Lower limit of 90% CI 278.29 0.0036 
Mean 202.02 0.0050 
Upper limit of 90% CI 180.99 0.0055 
Uncertainty in the RQ-2 meeting System Safety Objectives 
For the three MTTF obtained in Table 2 the probability of each MTTF for varying shape and 
scale parameters can be calculated from the reliability function presented in Eqn 7. This 
provides not only the probability that the MTTF is greater than or equal to a prescribed 
system safety objective (for illustrative purposes, a system safety objective of 1x10
-3
 flight 
hours is used) but also the uncertainty surrounding this information. One such example of this 
is provided in Fig 6. Here the probability that the MTTF is at least 1000 hours is provided. 
This corresponds to an APFH of no more than 10
-3
 failures/hour. The mean probability 
obtained from this is estimated to be 0.1251 with a 90% CI of (0.0319, 0.2692), indicating 
that we are 12.51% certain that the APFH of the system will satisfy the failure probability 
objective (FPO) of 10
-3
 failures per flight hour.  
Discussion 
There are a number of advantages to the incorporation of uncertainty into the SSA process. 
The approach provided allows for uncertainty to be taken into consideration into the 
compliance finding process rather than the traditional “point” assessments of APFH. Decision 
makers can also draw additional inferences on the predicted failure performance of the system 
that reflect the risk appetite of the regulator (e.g., choosing to use the upper 90% CI values on 
the APFH as opposed to the mean value of the APFH). 
The most significant advantage of the approach is that it provides decision makers with a 
measure of the uncertainty in the system meeting a given system safety failure probability 
objective as opposed to binary “pass / fail” comparison. In the case study, there was 0.1251 
probability that the RQ-2 met the 10
-3
 per flight hour FPO. Confidence in this finding is 
reflected in the 90% CI defined about this value. 
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Additional information can be provided to the decision maker in relation to the uncertainty in 
the model. For example, in the case study provided, the posterior distribution of the shape 
parameter υ can be used to provide insight into the particular phase of the bathtub curb the 
RQ-2 fleet is in. A value of υ greater than one indicates an increasing failure rate (infant 
mortality phase), equal to one indicates a constant failure rate (useful life phase), and less than 
one indicates a reducing failure rate (wear-out phase). From Fig 2, the mean of the shape 
parameter is 0.9328
2
, indicating that the RQ-2 fleet is still in the “infant mortality” phase but 
approaching the “useful life” phase. The area under the curve to the left of one in Fig 2, 
provides a measure of the degree of confidence that the failure rate is in fact reducing. From 
this we can see that, given the available data and prior knowledge, there is a probability of 
0.657 that the RQ-2 failure rate is reducing or constant (υ ≤ 1). This means there is also 34.3% 
chance that the RQ-2 is in the wear-out phase (υ > 1).  
Forward inferences (predictions) on the future failure performance of the fleet can also be 
made as described in [22]. Further, if new mishap data becomes available, the existing 
analysis can be readily updated using Bayes’ formula (Eqn. 3). 
Conclusion 
The general lack of data and experience in the operation of civil UAS gives rise to uncertainty 
in relation to their safety performance. This poses a particular problem when it comes to 
certifying UAS against airworthiness regulations, and in particular, system safety 
requirements. The existing system safety assessment process does not take uncertainty into 
consideration. The work presented in [8] provided a mathematical framework for 
incorporating uncertainty into this process. This work extends this framework through 
relaxing the modelling assumption that UAS exhibit constant failure rates. The case study 
highlights the power of the approach, with system safety decision makers measures of the 
probability of compliance. Additional inferences in relation to the model and the future 
performance of the system can also be made. Further work still needs to be undertaken to take 
other sources and types of uncertainty into consideration. In particular, how to represent 
uncertainty in the input mishap data and in the assignment of failure severity conditions.  
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6. Adoption of a Bayesian Belief Network for the 
System Safety Assessment of Remotely Piloted 
Aircraft Systems 
 
Figure 12: Concept image of an unmanned aircraft operation over New York City Skyline 
Image Copyright © Achim Washington 
“Take calculated risks. This is quite different from being rash” 
George S. Patton (1885 – 1945) 
This chapter titled “Adoption of a Bayesian Belief Network for the System Safety Assessment of 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems” extends the framework developed in Chapter 4 to address certain 
additional uncertainties in the system safety process, thus helping address Research Question 2.1 and 
Research Question 2.2. It develops a general template for high level classification of functions and 
failures which can be applied to any aircraft system. It also allows for the application of BBN as a valid 
approach for capturing uncertainty in the assessed compliance scenario. Instead of assessing single 
credible (often worst-case) scenarios, this allows for multiple assessments of compliance scenarios. It 
is the first to apply a BBN within an aviation regulatory System Safety “Part 1309” context. By showing 
how the risk and uncertainty measures obtained from the regulatory safety risk assessment process can 
be represented to the decision makers, the research also addresses elements of Research Question 1.3.  
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A B S T R A C T
There can be significant uncertainty as to the safety of novel or complex aviation systems, such as Remotely
Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS). Current aviation safety assessment and compliance processes do not adequately
account for uncertainty. The aim of this research is to support more objective, transparent, systematic and
consistent regulatory outcomes in relation to the safety assessment of such systems. The objective of this work is
to provide a systematic means of accounting for the various uncertainties inherent to any System Safety
Assessment (SSA) process. The paper first defines the system safety compliance process and its modification to
account for uncertainty. The SSA process, its various outputs, and associated uncertainties are defined and then
applied to a generic RPAS. A Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) is adopted that facilitates a more comprehensive
treatment of the uncertainty in each of the outputs of a typical SSA process. A case study of a generic RPAS is
used to illustrate the features of the new approach. The adoption of the Proposed SSA approach would allow for
the high uncertainty associated with the safety assessment of novel or complex aviation systems, such as RPAS,
to be taken into consideration. Such an approach would enable the risk-based regulation of the sector.
1. Introduction
A new set of airworthiness regulations for RPAS is emerging. It is
now broadly recognised that this set of regulations should be tailored to
different RPAS types and their Concepts of Operations (CONOPs), and
that this tailoring should be governed by the associated safety risk. The
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has proposed a risk-based
regulatory framework that divides RPAS into the three regulatory ca-
tegories of Open, Specific, and Certified (EASA, 2016). RPAS in the
Specific or Certified categories must demonstrate a minimum level of
assurance in their airworthiness. For RPAS in the Certified category, this
assurance is provided through compliance to a comprehensive code of
airworthiness requirements.
A key component of airworthiness regulations are System Safety
Regulations (SSR), also referred to as Part 1309 regulations (FAA, 1988,
2011). SSR supplement prescriptive standards on specific equipment or
sub-systems, with the intent of ensuring the integrated system, across
its spectrum of intended missions and operational environments, sa-
tisfies minimum safety objectives. The SSR describe a number of re-
quirements; the most important to this work being the System Safety
Performance Requirements (SSPR). They are considered to be “funda-
mental to the safety of UAS” but are also “an area of evolution and
disagreement” (ADF, 2017). Discussion on the challenges to defining
SSR for RPAS are presented in Clothier and Wu (2012), EUROCAE
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(2013), Washington et al. (2018). There are also challenges in how to
ensure compliance with the SSR. In particular, managing the un-
certainty in the SSA of RPAS is a challenge, which, in part, arises due to
(Washington et al., 2017):
• limited operational data and experience;• use of commercial off the shelf (COTS) components; and• dynamic system configurations.
A more comprehensive means for treating and managing un-
certainty in the SSA of RPAS is needed to ensure objective, transparent,
systematic and consistent compliance findings against the SSR
(Apostolakis, 1990; Paté-Cornell, 1996). A new system safety com-
pliance process, based on the adoption of Bayesian methods, was pro-
posed by Washington et al. (2017a, 2017b). Taking inspiration from
Perez et al. (2012a, 2012b, 2013), Perez (2013), the new approach
reframed the system safety compliance process as a problem of decision
making under uncertainty, and showed how Bayesian analysis techni-
ques and simple normative decision theory could be used to more
comprehensively address uncertainty in the assessed failure rate of a
system. The result was a risk-based process, which represented a
paradigm shift in standard aviation processes.
The new process presented in Washington et al. (2017a, 2017b)
addressed only the uncertainty in the assessed failure rate. Uncertainty
in relation to the identification of the failure conditions was not taken
into consideration. In addition to this, uncertainty in relation to the
specification of the assessed failure scenario, in particular, the possible
failure condition severity categories assigned to a failure condition, and
in turn, compliance with multiple associated safety objectives, were not
addressed. In Traditional SSAs this uncertainty is accounted for by as-
suming the “worst case” consequential outcome from a failure scenario
(NSA, 2009), which can lead to the imposition of overly conservative
safety objectives. This, in turn, results in additional costs in the design,
production, testing, and certification of the system. Identified failure
conditions are assessed and treated independently, with compliance
only shown against the assigned “worst case” safety objective (NSA,
2009). As a result, overall compliance of the RPAS (as a whole) with its
system-level safety objective is never shown. This assumption was also
made in the models developed in Washington et al. (2017a, 2017b).
Building on the framework developed in Washington et al. (2017a,
2017b), this paper proposes the use of a BBN as a means for more
comprehensively capturing the uncertainty in the SSA process. BBNs
have been used in the past for a number of applications including en-
vironmental (e.g. Marcot et al., 2001; Cain, 2001; Uusitalo, 2007;
Borsuk et al., 2004; Bromley et al., 2005), nuclear (e.g. Kang and Golay,
1999; Beaumont et al., 2015; Lee and Lee, 2006), space (e.g. Morris and
Beling, 2001; Mengshoel et al., 2008; Guikema and Paté-Cornell, 2004),
aviation (e.g. Ale et al., 2009; Luxhøj et al., 2003; Kardes and Luxhøj,
2005; Ancel and Shih, 2015; Ancel et al., 2015; Ministry of Transport
and Water Management, 2009; Luxhøj and Coit, 2006; Luxhøj and
Harrell, 2015) and even UAS (e.g. Luxhoj, 2016; Luxhøj et al., 2017;
Luxhøj, 2015) applications. BBNs have also been previously applied to
aviation safety assessments (e.g., Ale et al., 2009, 2013; Ancel et al.,
2017; Barr et al., 2017; Kevorkian, 2016; Kumar et al., 2014) but have
not been previously integrated within the formal structure of the SSPR
compliance process. The Proposed BBN SSA approach takes into con-
sideration the uncertainty in the consequential outcomes assigned to a
set of identified failure conditions, removing the need for “worst case”
assumptions. System safety compliance assessments can also be made at
different levels of abstraction of the system (i.e., from an individual
failure condition through to a set of all identified failure conditions,
representative of the overall system), providing a means of assessing the
compliance of the overall system with its top-level safety objectives.
The body of this paper is structured as follows. A brief introduction
to SSR and the modelling of the SSPR compliance process is provided in
Section 2, with the various sources of uncertainty and their
representation within the SSPR compliance process presented in Section
2.2. The general approach is applied to a generic RPAS in Section 3. The
SSA of a generic RPAS using a BBN is described in Section 4. Following
this, a case-study is used to illustrate various aspects of the new ap-
proach in Section 5, with discussion and areas for future research
presented in Section 6.
2. System Safety Regulations
SSR supplement prescriptive standards on specific equipment or
sub-systems, with the intent of ensuring the integrated system, across
its spectrum of intended missions and operational environments, sa-
tisfies minimum safety objectives. System safety “Part 1309” regula-
tions can be found in NSA (2009), JARUS (2015), EASA (2005),
Hayhurst et al. (2007), NATO (2014), RTCA Special Committee (2013),
and further information is contained in associated guidance material
(FAA, 1988, 2011). Guidelines on the SSA process and accepted as-
sessment tools and techniques can be found in NSA (2009), NATO
(2014), SAE (1996, 2010). At a high level, SSR include requirements for
(Clothier and Wu, 2012):
1. A documented analysis showing that equipment and systems per-
form as intended under foreseeable operating and environmental
conditions;
2. The adoption of principles from fail-safe and fault-tolerant design
(FAA, 1988); and
3. The demonstration (through a documented qualitative or quantita-
tive analysis) that the expected frequency of failure of equipment
and systems, when considered separately and in relation to other
systems, is inversely-related to the severity of its effect on the safe
operation of the system. This is commonly referred to as the System
Safety Performance Requirement (SSPR).
The focus of this paper is on the assessments and compliance find-
ings against the SSPR.
2.1. SSPR Compliance Process
The SSPR defines the minimum acceptable level of reliability of
aviation equipment and components (Clothier and Wu, 2012). It com-
prises the three sub-processes of: (1) System Safety Assessment (SSA),
(2) Compliance Assessment (CA), and (3) Compliance Finding (CF), as
illustrated in Fig. 1. The scope of this paper is restricted to the SSA and
CA sub-processes. The CF sub-process is not further discussed (refer to
Washington et al. (2017)).
2.1.1. System Safety Assessment Process
The SSA process involves the use of a variety of tools (e.g.,
Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), Failure Mode, Effects and
Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Fault
Trees Analysis (FTA), etc.), data, and expert judgment to determine: (1)
the various ways in which a system or sub-system can fail (referred to as
failure conditions); (2) the potential consequential impacts of these
failure conditions on the safety of the aircraft (referred to as failure
condition severity categories); (3) the Average Probability per Flight
Hour (APFH) of these failure conditions occurring, and (4) the max-
imum permissible APFH (referred to as Failure Probability Objectives
(FPOs)). These outputs are illustrated in Fig. 2. The set notations de-
scribed in Eq. (1) through to Eq. (10) are based on Washington et al.
(2017) but reiterated here for the sake of completeness.
The first output is the set F containing descriptions fn of the N
identified failure conditions, as given in Eq. (1), where Q is an integer
set used to index the various outputs from the SSA process, as shown in
Eq. (2).=F f n Q{ : }n (1)
A. Washington, et al. Safety Science 118 (2019) 654–673
655
= +Q n n n N{ | , } (2)
Associated with the set F are the sets C, Λ, and O as given in Eqs.
(3)–(5). The set C contains the failure condition severities assigned to
each failure condition identified in F. Typically a FMECA is used to
determine the failure condition severity cn assigned to a given failure
condition fn. Various scales that are used in the assessment of the failure
condition severity are summarised in Table 3 in the Appendix.=C c n Q{ : }n (3)
A qualitative or quantitative estimate of the APFH for each failure
condition is then determined through a combination of data from
testing, modelling and simulation, expert judgement, and structured
analysis techniques (as detailed in SAE (1996)). The APFH is defined as
“the probability of occurrence, normalised by the flight time of a failure
condition during a single flight1” (FAA, 2011). Fig. 15 in the Appendix,
summarises different scales used in the assessment of the APFH. The
output is the set Λ, comprising N assessed APFHs; one associated with
each of the failure conditions in F, as given in Eq. (4).= n Q{ : }n (4)
The final output from the SSA process is the set O, which contains N
FPOs, one for each identified failure condition in F. The FPO specifies
the maximum APFH permissible for a given failure condition. The
specific FPO to be assigned to the failure conditions of different failure
condition severity levels is defined in the SSR. Example descriptions of
FPOs can be found in EASA (2015a). An illustration of the assignment
of FPOs can be found in Fig. 16 in the Appendix. Traditionally, a single
FPO, on, is assigned to each failure condition, fn, in accordance with the
SSR, with the resulting set of N FPOs contained in O, as given in Eq. (5).=O o n Q{ : }n (5)
The index variable n can be used to reference the output of the SSA
for each identified failure condition; describing the tuple:< >f c o where n Q, , ,n n n n (6)
For further details on the SSA process and tools used in performing
the assessment refer to SAE (1996, 2010).
2.1.2. Compliance Assessment Process
As illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2 the outputs of the SSA process are
input to a CA process, with each tuple (Eq. (6)) representing an in-
dependent compliance assessment. In a Traditional SSPR compliance
process the CA process follows a simple deterministic binary “pass or
fail” process. The state of the compliance for the nth identified failure
condition, Hn, is determined to be True when the assessed APFH, λn, is
shown to be less than the applicable FPO, on, as shown in Eq. (7).
=H True if o
False
| |
otherwisen
n n
(7)
This CA process is undertaken for all N failure conditions in F with
the output state of compliance for each of the N failure conditions, fn,
summarised in the set S, given in Eq. (8).
Fig. 1. Overview of Traditional SSPR compliance process (adapted from Washington et al. (2017)).
Fig. 2. Principal outputs of a Traditional SSA process.
1 By definition, the APFH is not a probability but the expected frequency of
occurrence per hour.
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=S H n Q{ : }n (8)
The overall state of compliance of the system, Hs, is determined to
be True, if it can be shown that all the assessed APFH satisfy their ap-
plicable FPO, as shown in Eq. (9).
= =H True if H True n Q
False otherwiseS
n
(9)
2.2. Accounting for Uncertainty in the SSA Process
Washington et al. (2017a) explore how the Traditional SSPR com-
pliance process (as described in the previous sub-section) can be
modified to better account for uncertainties inherent to the SSA process.
They identify how uncertainty arising from a lack of knowledge and
data on a system can manifest in relation to each of the outputs from the
SSA process, specifically:
1. F – Whether all failure conditions have been correctly identified,
and whether each identified failure condition, fn, is correctly spe-
cified in terms of its operational failure modes and its effects;
2. C – Uncertainty in relation to the estimate of the magnitude of
consequential effects and in turn, whether the correct failure con-
dition severity category, cn, is assigned to a particular failure con-
dition fn;
3. Λ – Uncertainty in relation to the estimate of λn for each failure
condition fn;
4. O – Whether the correct on is selected for each identified failure
condition fn.
2.2.1. Accounting for Uncertainty in the SSA Process (Extended
Framework)
Washington et al. (2017a, 2017b) then went on to show how the
uncertainty in relation to the quantitative assessments contained in the
set Λ can be represented, proposing the Extended SSPR compliance
process shown in Fig. 3.
A Bayesian approach was used to represent uncertainty in the as-
sessments of λn. The resulting output being a set, Λ*, of N conditional
probability distributions describing the uncertainty (or degree of belief)
in λn; one associated with each failure condition in F. The modified SSA
output Λ* is given in Eq. (10), where D represents the available failure
data, and I represents the available knowledge and information. The
remaining outputs from the SSA process, namely, F, C and O remained
the same.= p D I n Q{ ( | , ) : }n (10)
Washington et al. (2017) then went on to show how the updated
output from the SSA process can be used within the CA and CF pro-
cesses to support more objective, transparent, systematic and consistent
SSPR compliance findings under uncertainty. This Extended framework
was later modified to take into consideration variable failure rates
(Washington et al., 2017).
2.2.2. Accounting for Uncertainty in the SSA Process (Proposed
Framework)
A given failure can have multiple operational failure modes, and in
turn, potential consequential impacts in relation to the safety of an
RPAS operation (i.e., there can be more than one applicable failure
condition severity assigned to an identified failure condition). There
can be considerable uncertainty in the specification of the scenarios for
which an APFH needs to be assessed. The Traditional SSA approach does
not account for this uncertainty, with guidance stating that “worst case”
assumptions should be used to identify the single failure scenario for
assessment (NSA, 2009). This can lead to the imposition of overly
conservative safety objectives. This, in turn, results in additional costs
in the design, production, testing, and certification of the system.
Identified failure conditions are assessed independently. The potential
for multiple consequential outcomes, and the dependencies between
assessments for such outcomes, are not addressed. A new structure is
needed, one which facilitates consideration for uncertainty in the
modelling of the specification of the assessment scenario; and one
which provides a means of assessing the compliance of the overall
system with its top-level safety objectives.
The Extended SSA structure presented in Washington et al. (2017a,
2017b) can be further modified to facilitate consideration of the un-
certainty in the specification of the scenario for assessment (i.e., un-
certainty in the specification of the remaining sets F, C, and O). The
proposed structure showing the primary outputs from the SSA process is
illustrated in Fig. 4. This framework provides a means of assessing the
compliance of the overall system with its top-level safety objectives.
As can be seen in Fig. 4, the output of the Proposed SSA process is
still a tuple of related sets as given in Eq. (11). The description of each
of the elements in the tuple are however updated.< >F C O, , , (11)
The Traditional SSA had a failure condition severity (cn), APFH (λn)
and FPO (on) associated with each identified failure condition (fn), as
shown in Eq. (6). The Extended framework had a similar relationship,
with the APFH (λn) being replaced with a probability distribution de-
scribing the uncertainty in the APFH (p(λ|D,I)n). In the Proposed fra-
mework, the SSA process is being conducted at the system level, taking
the dependencies between different failure conditions into considera-
tion. Under the Proposed framework, the updated sets C**, Λ** and O**
Fig. 3. Extended SSPR compliance process (adapted from Washington et al. (2017)).
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are now related to the set of failure conditions, F**, and not a single
failure condition. The relationship between the sets described in the
tuple is depicted graphically in Fig. 5.
The set of failure conditions F** is described using Eq. (12). The
uncertainty in the failure conditions is taken into consideration by ac-
counting for the potential for multiple outcomes (multiple operational
failure modes) from a failure in a given system function and the de-
pendencies between assessments for such outcomes.=F f n Q{ : }n (12)
While this is equivalent to Eq. (1), each of the elements (fn) are now
more clearly described by the relationship between a given system
function (ux) and operational failure mode (vy), Eq. (13).
u vx
f
y
n (13)
The original output set C given in Eq. (3) is modified to be a set, C**,
given in Eq. (14). Where m is the index to one of the M unique failure
condition severity categories associated with the given set of failure
conditions, F**, as defined in Eq. (15).=C c m R{ : }m (14)= =+R m m for m M{ | , 1, 2, , } (15)
Following this, assessments of the uncertainty in the APFH for each
of theM potential failure condition severities associated with the set F**
is needed. The process used to estimate the APFH and the uncertainty
associated with it is detailed in Section 4. The set described in Eq. (10)
was updated to take this into consideration. The set Λ**, Eq. (16) is a set
ofM conditional probability distributions describing the uncertainty (or
degree of belief) in each λm.= p D I m R{ ( | , ) : }m (16)
Associated with each assessed failure condition severity, cm, is the
relevant FPO assigned in accordance with the relevant Part 1309 reg-
ulation. The output set O is now modified to be a set, O**, as given in Eq.
(17), representing the set of FPOs relevant to a specific set of failure
conditions F**.=O o m R{ : }m (17)
In summary, the proposed mathematical specifications of the out-
puts of the SSA allow each identified set of failure conditions F** to be
assessed against all of its potential relevant FPOs and no longer just the
FPO corresponding to the “worst case” (and potentially least likely)
failure condition severity category. The practical application of the
Proposed framework to a generic RPAS is described in the next section.
The Proposed framework enables consideration of the uncertainty in
the specification of F, C, and O. Specifically, for a given set failure
conditions, F** containing N failure conditions, there can now be a set of
M possible failure condition severity categories, C**, reflecting the un-
certainty in the exact consequential outcome. Associated with each
potential failure condition severity category, cm is a corresponding FPO,
om and assessments of the uncertainty in the APFH, p(λ|D,I)m. The
overall Proposed SSPR compliance framework can be seen in Fig. 6.
It is important to note that, the set descriptions provided in this sub-
section for F**, C**, Λ** and O** and the relationship between them
(Fig. 5) is for a system level assessment (e.g. for an RPAS). This allows
the overall compliance of the system (e.g. RPAS) as a whole to be shown
with respect to its system-level safety objectives, something lacking
from the Traditional and Extended frameworks. If an assessment is to be
undertaken for each system function or each failure condition in-
dependently, then an updated description for the sets can be provided.
3. Application of Framework to Generic Remotely Piloted Aircraft
Systems
3.1. Specification of the Set of Failure Conditions (F**)
A Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) and high-level FMECA are
common techniques used in an SSA process to determine a system level
set of failure conditions. Input to these techniques are a system-level
Fig. 4. Proposed SSA framework showing primary outputs from the model.
Fig. 5. Relationship between defined sets F**, C**, Λ** and O**
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functional decomposition of a generic RPAS and the identification of a
set of operational failure modes.
3.1.1. Specification of System-Level Functions for a Generic RPAS
A set of top-level operational system functions need to be defined
for a generic RPAS. Arriving at a set of generic system functions re-
quires a proper understanding of the workings of an RPAS and all the
systems necessary to achieve the four core functions of any aviation
system, namely, to aviate, navigate, communicate and mitigate
(Hayhurst et al., 2007). The functional decomposition proposed herein
is based on a review and consolidation of existing system functional
breakdowns proposed in the literature (Hayhurst et al., 2007; Burke,
2010; RTCA, 2007). The resulting eight top-level system functions
identified were:
1. Structure – The provision, at a minimum, of a level of structural
integrity necessary to maintain controlled flight and continued
functionality of the system across a defined envelope of operational
conditions;
2. Propulsion – The provision, at a minimum, of a sufficient amount of
thrust to maintain controlled flight;
3. Power – The provision, at a minimum, of a sufficient amount of
electrical energy to support systems necessary for continued flight.
This includes the provision of power to off-board components of the
RPAS (e.g., Remote Pilot Station (RPS), communication repeaters,
etc.);
4. Control – The ability to determine and execute changes necessary to
achieve or maintain a desired Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) state
(e.g., position, attitude, and airspeed) within minimum require-
ments;
5. Guidance – The generation of a trajectory, plan, or sequence of
changes to the current system state necessary to meet mission ob-
jectives under constraints (e.g., system performance limitations,
airspace requirements, terrain clearance, etc.);
6. Navigation – The determination of the current state (e.g., position,
speed) of the RPA in relation to the desired state;
7. Communication – The provision of a means to exchange flight
critical command and control data and information critical for flight
between the RPA, the RPS, other elements of the RPAS, and external
elements (e.g., Air Traffic Control, other aircraft, etc.);
8. Mitigation – The ability to detect and predict hazardous states
(internal and external), generate warnings and alerts, and take the
necessary actions to mitigate the risk.
It is important to note that the substantiation of functions is in-
tentionally not prescribed (e.g., whether functions are performed by
human or machine components of the RPAS). It should also be made
clear that these functions are not independent, that is, a failure in one
function can impact multiple other functions.
A review of RPAS incident and accident data (provided by Belcastro
et al. (2017) along with other incident and accident reports relating to
RPAS from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB)) was un-
dertaken to validate the completeness of the proposed set of functions.
The objective of this review was to determine if previously observed
RPAS incidents and accidents could be described in relation to losses or
degradations of at least one of the system functions identified above. A
number of incident and accident data points provided in the existing
databases lacked the information necessary to assign a loss or de-
gradation of a particular system function. However, the ones that had
sufficient information (37 data points out of the 110 data points) could
have loss or degradation events clearly described using the set of eight
identified system functions.
To put this component of the model into context, consider the fol-
lowing scenario. A pre-flight check failed to identify contamination of
fuel. This failure can be related to the potential loss of the high level
system function of Propulsion. Therefore, the top-level system function
of interest in this case is the Propulsion system. This scenario will be
further elaborated in each of the following sub-sections.
3.1.2. Specification of Operational Failure Mode Classifications for a
Generic RPAS
Clothier et al. (2015) identify three high level operational failure
modes referred to as operational ‘threats’ based on a review of existing
classifications proposed in the literature (ADF, 2017; Williams et al.,
2014; EASA, 2009). In a later paper, Clothier et al. (2018) go on to
define a fourth threat, that of “Dropped or Jettisoned Components”
(DOJC). These four operational threats can be used to describe the
possible impact of a failure at the operational level of a system and are
described below. Each of these operational threats relate to the po-
tential to cause harm to third party individuals on the ground. In ad-
dition to these states, are operational states that have the potential to
result in consequences to people on-board other aircraft. Hence, we
define a fifth operational failure mode as a Loss of Safe Separation
(LOSS) between aircraft. Combined with the ‘threat’ definitions out-
lined in Clothier et al. (2015, 2018), the set of possible operational
failure modes for a generic RPAS are defined as:
1. Unpremeditated descent scenario (UDS) – a failure (or combi-
nation of failures), which results in the inability of the RPA to
maintain a safe altitude above the surface or distance from objects
and structures;
2. Loss of control (LOC) – a failure (or combination of failures), which
Fig. 6. Proposed SSPR compliance process.
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results in loss of control of the RPA and may lead to impact at high
velocity;
3. Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) – when an airworthy RPA is
flown, under the control of a qualified Remote Pilot (RP) or certified
autopilot system, unintentionally into terrain (water, structures, or
obstacles);
4. Dropped or jettisoned components (DOJC) – failures that result in
a component of the RPA (including its payload or stores) being
dropped or jettisoned from the RPA; and
5. Loss of Safe Separation (LOSS) – failures that result in the RPA
failing to remain safely separated from, or colliding with, aircraft in
the air or on the ground.
Loss or degradation of each of the eight top-level system functions
should be traceable to one or more of the five operational failure modes
described above. The association of a loss or degradation of a high-level
system function with a particular operational failure mode defines one
unique failure condition, fn, to be further assessed (as seen in Eq. (13)).
Continuing our example, the loss of Propulsion as a result of con-
taminated fuel is likely to result in UDS and potentially a LOC (e.g., due
to aerodynamic stall). Thus, F** contains the two failure conditions as
given in Eq. (18).=F Propulsion resulting in UDS Propulsion resulting in LOC{" ", " "}
(18)
The incident and accident data provided by Belcastro et al. (2017)
and the ATSB were also used as a form of partial validation of the de-
fined set of operational failure modes. With the exception of the DOJC
operational failure mode, it was found that all previously documented
incidents and accidents (where sufficient information was available)
could be classified using the set of identified operational failure modes.
The absence of the DOJC operational failure mode could be attributed
to the lack of recorded data in these data sets. Numerous cases of
payloads (e.g., cameras) falling from RPA have been reported in public
media sources, providing a partial validation for the DOJC operational
failure mode as well.
3.2. Specification of the Set of Failure Condition Severity Categories (C**)
SSR and associated guidance materials describe the range of pos-
sible failure condition severity scales that can be used to assess the
failure condition severity categories contained in C**. These existing
scales are summarised in Table 3 of the Appendix. In this paper, we
adopt the more recent failure condition severity scale developed by
JARUS (2015), specifically:
1. No Safety Effect – Failure conditions that would have no effect on
safety. For example, failure conditions that would not affect the
operational capability of the RPAS or increase remote crew
workload can be classified as no safety effect;
2. Minor – Failure conditions that would not significantly reduce RPAS
safety and that involve remote crew actions that are within their
capabilities. Minor failure conditions may include a slight reduction
in safety margins or functional capabilities, and/or a slight increase
in remote crew workload, such as flight plan changes;
3. Major – Failure conditions that would reduce the capability of the
RPAS or the ability of the remote crew to cope with adverse oper-
ating conditions, to the extent that there would be a significant re-
duction in safety margins, functional capabilities or separation as-
surance. In addition, the failure condition has a significant increase
in remote crew workload or impairs remote crew efficiency;
4. Hazardous – Failure conditions that would reduce the capability of
the RPAS or the ability of the remote crew to cope with adverse
operating conditions to the extent that there would be the following:
o Loss of the RPA, where it can be reasonably expected that a
fatality will not occur, or
o A large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, or
o High workload such that the remote crew cannot be relied upon to
perform their tasks accurately or completely;
5. Catastrophic – Failure conditions that could result in one or more
fatalities.
In the context of the example scenario involving the loss of
Propulsion, if the RPAS operation is taking place near a populous area,
then the set of potential failure condition severities for the set of failure
conditions, F** can include “Hazardous” and “Catastrophic”. We could
consequently specify C** as given in Eq. (19).=C Hazardous Catastrophic{" ", " "} (19)
3.3. Specification of the Set of Failure Probability Objectives (O**)
The potential values of the set O** can be determined directly from
the applicable Part 1309 Regulation. Maintaining consistency with the
JARUS framework, these are described in Fig. 7.
Applying this to our example scenario, we can identify the applic-
able FPOs (qualitative and quantitative) for each of the failure condi-
tion severities contained in C**, Eq. (19). These are assigned to the set
O** as shown in Eq. (20).=O Extremely Remote Extremely Improbable{" (10 ) ", " (10 )"}-5 6
(20)
3.4. Summary
This section has described how the existing outcomes from the SSA
can be extended. The Proposed framework facilitates the representation,
and in turn assessment of, the uncertainty associated with (1) the
Failure Probability Objective (om) 
Failure Condition Severity (cm) 
No Safety Effect Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic 
Probable < 10-3 
Remote < 10-4
Extremely Remote < 10-5
Extremely Improbable < 10-6
Key: 
No probability requirement described Acceptable  Not Acceptable 
Fig. 7. Failure Probability Objectives for JARUS (2015).
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identification of failure conditions, (2) the assignment of failure seve-
rities, and (3) the assignment of the FPO. Under the Proposed frame-
work it is now possible to associate multiple possible failure condition
severities with a given set of failure conditions, and in turn, explore the
compliance of the system as a whole in relation to all of its potential
consequential outcomes.
A generic system level framework which can be applied to any RPAS
was presented. Assessments using the Proposed framework can be per-
formed using existing techniques, namely FHA, FMEA, FTA, etc. and the
applicable SSR, to specify the sets F**, C**, and O** for a given RPAS and
concept of operation. The modified sets presented in Eqs. (14) and (17)
can be used to update the general framework outlined by Washington
et al. (2017a, 2017b) to take the uncertainty in each of these outputs
into consideration.
What has yet to be addressed is how to quantitatively assess Λ**
within the Proposed framework. The modified set to take the un-
certainty in the APFH for each of the M potential failure condition se-
verities associated with a given set of failure conditions, F**, is provided
in Eq. (16). An appropriate model would need to be able to account for
the various dependencies between identified failure conditions and
propagate the uncertainty throughout the model. This would require
the ability to combine the uncertainty in the APFH for each of the M
potential failure condition severities associated with a given failure
condition, fn. One such method, which has not previously been applied
in the SSA process, is a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN). The following
section explores the application of BBNs as a new modelling method for
assessing the set Λ** as part of the SSA process.
4. Bayesian Belief Networks – Assessing Λ**
BBNs are graphical structures that make use of probabilistic rea-
soning to ascertain information about the unknown (Kevorkian, 2016)
and are beneficial when expert judgement is ambiguous, incomplete or
uncertain (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007). In contrast to other approaches
(e.g. ETA, FTA, FMEA, etc.) that are either deductive or inductive, BBNs
are abductive (Kevorkian, 2016), that is they seek to find the simplest
and most likely explanation to an observation. Given evidence of failure
at the top or intermediate events, we can diagnose which of the pri-
mary, or other, events are the most likely cause of this failure. BBNs can
thus also be used for fault finding and accident investigation (Fenton
and Neil, 2013). Furthermore, unlike classic FTA, a BBN does not as-
sume independence between primary events, and as such is more re-
presentative of real systems.
BBNs have a number of advantages compared to other standard
modelling techniques. They explicitly model causal factors; allow for
reasoning from effect to cause and vice versa; reduce the burden of
parameter acquisition; allow for previous beliefs to be overturned in
light of new evidence; make predictions with incomplete data; and can
combine diverse types of evidence including both subjective beliefs and
objective data to arrive at decisions based on visible, auditable rea-
soning (Fenton and Neil, 2013).
In the context of the SSA process, BBNs are particularly useful in the
modelling of complex relationships with multiple dependencies. They
are capable of being used in the presence of scarce data and can easily
combine objective data available for a system with subjective judgment
provided by the assessors.
BBNs have been extensively used in risk modelling in a number of
industries as outlined previously. In the context of aviation safety, BBNs
have been used in studies such as those that relate to the estimation of
the failure rates of the system and the evaluation of the potential impact
locations (e.g., Ale et al., 2009, 2013; Ancel et al., 2017; Barr et al.,
2017; Kevorkian, 2016; Kumar et al., 2014). They have however not
been integrated within the formal structure of a system safety com-
pliance process.
4.1. Structure of a Bayesian Belief Network
A detailed description of the theoretical mathematical principles of
a BBN and methods for their construction can be found in Fenton and
Neil (2013), Charniak (1991), Jensen (1996), Press (1989), Pearl
(1997) and Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter (1988). Only a brief introduc-
tion based on Fenton and Neil (2013) is provided here. A BBN is a
directed acyclic graph comprising of nodes and arcs. Nodes represent
stochastic variables of interest, and the arcs represent the direct de-
pendencies between the nodes (Fenton and Neil, 2013).
Associated with each node in a BBN is a Node Probability Table
(NPT) describing the probability distribution given the set of parents of
the node. For a node without parents, also called a root node, the NPT is
simply the probability distribution of that node. In most real-world risk
applications, the variables of interest are not likely to be labelled,
Boolean or ranked, but rather numeric (discrete or continuous) vari-
ables that require an infinite number of states (Fenton and Neil, 2013).
A major advantage of numeric nodes (as opposed to a labelled or ranked
node) is that we are able to use a wide range of pre-defined mathe-
matical and statistical functions instead of having to manually define
NPTs (Fenton and Neil, 2013), which can prove to be a complex task as
the number of nodes increases.
The arcs between nodes represent the causal or influential de-
pendencies. The direction of the arcs is of utmost importance. The arc
should always be in the direction of cause to effect rather than in the
direction implied by the deductions one might wish to make (Fenton
and Neil, 2013). However, it is important to note that taking the latter
approach does not necessarily lead to an invalid BBN. The process of
determining what evidence will update which node is determined by
the conditional dependency structure (Fenton and Neil, 2013). For
more details refer to Fenton and Neil (2013). The varying impact of a
given node on one or more of the other nodes, can also be taken into
consideration through the introduction of different weighting factors.
For a BBN consisting of n variables A1, A2, …, An, the simplified full
joint probability distribution of the BBN is shown in Eq. (21), where the
parents for a node Ai are given as Parents(Ai) (Fenton and Neil, 2013).
= =P A A A A P A Parents A( , , , , ) ( | ( ))n i
n
i i1 2 3
1 (21)
4.2. Application of BBNs within the SSA Process
A high-level BBN can be developed using the SSA framework pro-
posed in Section 3. The various outputs from the SSA can be used to
form the basis of the nodes of a BBN, as illustrated in Fig. 8. The set of
failure conditions (F**) are defined by the set of generic system func-
tions and the set of potential operational failure modes (see Eq. (13)).
The set of failure condition severities (C**) are defined by the failure
severity scales outlined by the regulatory bodies.
4.2.1. Substantiation of the Arcs
The connections between the nodes are specific to a particular RPAS
and its CONOPs and therefore, Fig. 8 shows all potential connections
and arcs that could exist for any generic RPAS. Traditional SSA tools
such as FHA, FMECA, FTA, ETA, etc., accident and incident data, and
expert judgment can all be used to substantiate the network for a spe-
cific RPAS CONOPs. Arcs (relationships) that are not feasible or deemed
extremely unlikely, can be removed. Alternatively, such arcs could be
preserved and assigned a low weighting factor reflecting its low relative
probability. By doing so, we preserve the possibility of the arc’s oc-
currence. The arcs relating system functions to operational failure
modes are primarily determined by the characteristics of the RPAS,
whereas the arcs relating operational failure modes to failure condition
severities are heavily influenced by the characteristics of the operation
and environment (e.g., whether the RPA is operating over a populous
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area). Also shown in Fig. 8 is the illustrative example of a Propulsion
failure, used throughout Section 3, with the two scenarios for quanti-
tative assessment highlighted.
4.2.2. Quantifying the NPTs
The first level of nodes (the system function nodes) can be described
using a wide variety of probability distribution functions that are
characteristic of the failure rate associated with each respective system
function. The use of point value estimates of the failure rate to de-
termine these inputs, would not account for the uncertainty in the input
estimate (e.g., due to limited failure data). In order to account for this
input uncertainty, an additional Bayesian analysis process can be un-
dertaken for each of the identified system function nodes. This requires
the specification of a likelihood distribution and a prior distribution for
the APFH. A standard Bayesian update process can then be used to
determine the posterior distribution of the APFH for each of the iden-
tified system function nodes, which forms the input to the BBN. For
further details on the Bayesian analysis process, the reader is directed to
Washington et al. (2017). The Bayesian input is illustrated as Step 1 in
Fig. 9, which shows the Proposed SSA process using a BBN.
The nodes in level two of the model (seen in Fig. 8) have arcs joining
the system functions to the operational failure modes, while those
nodes in level three have arcs joining the operational failure modes to
the failure condition severity categories. This makes the NPT associated
with each of these nodes significantly more complicated as they are
dependent on the nodes from the previous level. As these nodes are
numeric, mathematical expressions or probability distributions can be
used to describe them as well, negating the need to describe complex
NPTs (Fenton and Neil, 2013) (Step 2 in Fig. 9). For more details on the
different mathematical expressions or probability distributions that can
be used the reader is directed to Fenton and Neil (2013).
4.2.3. Output Assessments of APFH
Once the Bayesian analysis process for each of the relevant root
Fig. 8. General structure of BBN showing outputs from SSA process.
Fig. 9. Overall framework for model showing Bayesian analysis process (Step 1), BBN (Step 2) and Bayesian hypothesis test (Step 3) for generic RPAS.
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nodes is undertaken, and a posterior distribution for them is obtained,
the BBN can be used to combine these distributions to determine the
APFH (and the uncertainty surrounding the APFH) associated with each
of the remaining nodes in the network. The weighting factors associated
with the arcs, along with the mathematical expressions used for each of
the nodes, determine how these distributions combine. The end result is
an APFH (and the uncertainty surrounding the APFH) associated with
each of the relevant operational failure modes and failure condition
severity categories defined in the network. The assessments of the APFH
can be updated as more data and information is gained through op-
erational experience or analysis.
4.3. Using the Output from the BBN within Compliance Assessment
For completeness, we briefly explain how the updated output dis-
tributions from the BBN are used within the CA process (Step 3 in
Fig. 9). The CA process described in this sub-section is based on that
developed in Washington et al. (2017) for the Extended SSPR frame-
work.
Instead of assessing whether a particular system is compliant against
the identified “worst case” failure condition severity category, a
strength of the Proposed framework is that a failure in the system can
now be assessed for compliance against all of its possible consequential
outcomes and corresponding FPOs. This allows for the relaxation of
some of the overly conservative safety objectives imposed on these
systems, thereby reducing the costs in the design, production, testing,
and certification of the system.
Input to the CA process is a set of failure conditions, F** and the
associated set of failure condition severity categories, C**, uncertainties
(or degree of beliefs) in each λm, Λ**, and FPOs, O**. Following (Perez
et al., 2012a, 2012b, 2013; Perez, 2013), the CA process is redefined as
the process of determining the degree of belief as to whether the can-
didate system satisfies all of its relevant FPOs. The CA process for the
identified set of failure conditions (F**) is undertaken for each of the M
identified failure condition severity categories (for which a relevant
FPO exists) contained in the set C**. Instead of being a simple de-
terministic binary process, the state of compliance for each of the M
identified failure condition severity categories is recast as a proposition
(or hypothesis), against which a probability representing the degree of
belief in its state (i.e., Hm being True or False) is assigned. Each of the
sub-propositions, Hm, can be defined using Eq. (22). These M sub-pro-
positions are then collected in the set, S**, described in Eq. (23).
H o where m R:m m m (22)=S H m R{ }m (23)
Each sub-proposition, Hm is True if λm is less than its relevant FPO,
om. We do not know the value of λm with certainty and hence can only
determine a probability representing our uncertainty in the state of
compliance, i.e. the probability of each sub-proposition being True (or
not). This probability is denoted as P(H|D,I)m, which can be thought of
as a measure of our degree of belief in the compliance of the system,
against the FPO, om, associated with the relevant failure condition se-
verity category, cm. Each of the M probabilities, P(H |D,I)m, associated
with the M sub-propositions can be contained in the set T**, described
in Eq. (24).=T P H D I m R{ ( | , ) : }m (24)
There are a number of ways we can infer P(H|D,I)m from the pos-
terior distributions p(λ|D,I)m. One means for determining P(H|D,I)m is
through the one-sided integration of p(λ|D,I)m, as seen in Eq. (25).=P H D I p D I d( | , ) ( | , ) ·m o m0 m (25)
Another approach that can be used to this accord is that of Bayesian
Prediction. For more details on this, the reader is directed to
Washington et al. (2017a). Once P(H|D,I)m has been determined for all
Hm in S** and assuming the assessments are independent, Eq. (9) can be
recast to express our overall degree of belief in the compliance of the
system P(H|D,I)S. For more details on this, the reader is once again
directed to Washington et al. (2017a).
In summary, the Traditional CA process did not account for un-
certainty, providing True or False statements to decision makers. The
Proposed CA process acknowledges the uncertainty inherent in the as-
sessment and presents decision makers with measures of uncertainty in
the state of compliance (i.e., system, function or failure condition
meeting all of its relevant FPOs). This enables a more objective,
transparent, systematic and consistent certification decision making
process on the basis of risk.
4.4. Validation of the Structure of the BBN Model
Existing RPAS incident and accident databases such as that provided
by Belcastro et al. (2017) and ATSB were reviewed to help validate the
structure of the BBN model developed in this paper. These databases
provided limited (but useful) information on the system functions,
operational failure modes and failure condition severity categories as-
sociated with each failure. Each data point was compared to the set of
system functions, operational failure modes and failure condition se-
verity categories arrived at in this study. Any data points that did not
fall under this set were then re-evaluated for inclusion. Standard
CONOPs, FMEA and FMECA were further used to help validate the
model.
4.5. Summary
This section has shown how a BBN could be used within the SSA
process to provide assessments of the APFH under situations of un-
certainty. The resulting framework is illustrated in Figs. 8 and 9. The
generic framework enables the assessment of multiple outcomes for a
given system (e.g. RPAS), system function (e.g. Propulsion), or failure
condition (e.g. Propulsion leading to UDS).
Fig. 9 provides the overall framework of the developed model,
showing how each of the steps described above, relate to the SSA and
CA process. In the following section, the new approach is applied to a
simple case study to highlight various aspects of the framework that
provide improved insights to the assessors compared to existing fra-
meworks.
5. Case Study
A hypothetical case study example is presented to illustrate the
practical features of the Proposed BBN approach and modified SSA and
CA processes described in this paper. The case study chosen is for an
RPAS manufacturer who is developing the compliance case for a new
RPAS type design. For the purposes of this case study, the draft Part
1309 regulations presented in JARUS (EASA, 2015b) are used as the
certification basis. The analysis and results are purely illustrative, based
on available data and expert judgement and are not necessarily re-
presentative of a real system. The output from this analysis is used only
to highlight the practical aspects of the Proposed approach and is not an
accurate representation of an analysis for RPAS of a similar type. The
characteristics of the RPAS, environmental conditions and operational
environment all play an important role in determining the relationships
that exist in the model, and consequently, have been described below.
5.1. System, Mission and Environment
The manufacturer intends to mass produce a small quadrotor RPA
with a maximum take-off mass of less than 2.0 kg for commercial ap-
plications in Europe. It is fitted with failure detection, warning, and
recovery/mitigation devices, automatic recovery parachutes and has
engine restart capabilities. The RPA falls under the open
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category2 of RPA, and as such adheres to the corresponding regulations
associated with open category RPA as detailed by EASA (2017).3 The
flight tests involve the RP conducting routine operations over a pre-
determined area to gather flight test data. Operations are conducted in
clear weather conditions during the day, in keeping with the restric-
tions and regulations imposed on these systems. The chosen case study
RPAS and application is representative of commonly used COTS RPAS.
5.2. Available Data
Data from 500 hours of flight testing were collected over a six-
month period. Seven incidents relating to a failure in the Propulsion
function were observed during this period. This represents the available
data, D. A summary of the APFH data for the Propulsion function are
provided in Table 4 in the Appendix. Two of the incidents resulted in
the RPA being unable to maintain a safe altitude (i.e., UDS operational
failure mode) and the remaining five resulted in the RP completely
losing control of the RPA (i.e., LOC operational failure mode). In each
instance the RPA impacted the ground, and while no one was injured,
the RPA sustained irreparable damage.
The manufacturer was also able to draw upon existing datasets to
supplement the limited data from flight testing. The dataset compiled by
Belcastro et al. (2017) and ATSB were available. This data, along with
expert judgement, can be used to determine the weighting factors within
the BBN model. The datasets contain information on 110 distinct in-
cidents and accidents involving RPAS, of which only 37 were related to
multi-rotor RPAS. Of these 37, only 22 data records contained sufficient
information and were used to assign the weighting factors in the model.
The limited data were supplemented by a simple high level FMECA, to
help tune the appropriate weighting factors within the BBN model. The
FMECA process involved exploring the different ways a failure in the
Propulsion system could eventuate and what operational failure modes
and failure condition severity could materialise from this. In addition to
this, the RPA CONOPS played an important role in determining the likely
consequence severities (and hence weighting factors) assigned to each
operational failure mode. Tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix provide a
summary of the weighting factors used to substantiate the model.
It is important here to note that historically reported incident and
accident data are inherently skewed to Catastrophic and Hazardous
events owing to the mandatory reporting nature of these safety occur-
rences. Such data needs to be supplemented with predictive analysis
and the results of a preliminary SSA. The uncertainty associated with
these various information and data sources is not taken into con-
sideration and marks an area of future research extension.
5.3. Defining the Structure of the BBN
The BBN for the case study is illustrated in Fig. 10. The BBN approach
allows for multiple concurrent failures in different system functions to be
evaluated simultaneously. However, in order to keep the case study as
simple as possible, only failures in the single system function, Propulsion,
are evaluated. The remaining system function nodes have consequently
been removed from the BBN shown in Fig. 10. The set notation provided
in Section 2.2.2, can be updated to take this into consideration.
Through the existing data and FMECA, a complete, partial or in-
termittent loss of the Propulsion function was determined as having two
primary operational failure modes: UDS and LOC. Other operational
failure modes may be possible. However, taking the characteristics of
the case study and the limitations of the software for evaluating the
BBN into consideration, the remaining operational failure mode nodes
have also been removed from the BBN depicted in Fig. 10.
The five failure condition severity categories of interest span “No
Safety Effect”, “Minor”, “Major”, “Hazardous” and “Catastrophic”. Taking
the operational environment into consideration, it is evident that fatal
injuries are unlikely, and consequently the “Catastrophic” failure con-
dition severity category can potentially be removed. However, to en-
sure completeness in the assessment process, all five categories have
been included in this case study.
In any real-world application, these additional nodes (faded nodes
in Fig. 10) would not be removed. Instead, they would be assigned a
low weighting factor. While this would increase the complexity of the
model, it would ensure that no credible scenario (despite never being
observed in data) was inadvertently ignored. An example of this can be
seen in the inclusion of the “Catastrophic” failure condition severity
category. This link was preserved as, even though the operations would
be limited to non-populous areas, there is always the chance that third
party individuals might inadvertently enter the flight test area. In ad-
dition to this, based on the stress model, it was clear that the RPA had
sufficient Kinetic Energy (KE) to cause a fatality on impact (refer to Ball
et al. (2012), Burke (2011), Dalamagkidis et al. (2012)) for examples of
energy cut-off limits), in the event any recovery mechanisms failed.
5.3.1. Quantification of the NPTs
Based on the fundamental theory of BBNs outlined previously, each
of the nodes representing the system functions, operational failure
modes and failure condition severity categories, are numeric and hence
require continuous variables to represent them.
The first step (Step 1 in Fig. 9) is to determine the posterior dis-
tribution of the Propulsion failure. This is achieved through a Bayesian
analysis process. Following Washington et al. (2017) and Barr et al.
(2017), the failure rate was assumed constant, and a standard Poisson
distribution was selected for the likelihood distribution (refer to
Washington et al. (2017) for the limitations of this assumption). From the
choice of a Poisson distribution, it is clear that the time between suc-
cessive failures is an independent and identically distributed random
variable. An uninformed prior in the form of a Gamma distribution was
also selected for the prior distribution based on Washington et al.
(2017a). Being uninformed, it lets the data dominate the posterior dis-
tribution (Dezfuli et al., 2009). For more information on the rationale for
the choice of the prior and likelihood functions, refer to Washington et al.
(2017a). These probability distributions, along with the incident and
accident data available on the system (seven incidents in 500 hours) were
input into the AgenaRisk™ software to obtain the posterior distribution,
representing the uncertainty in the estimate of the APFH of the Propulsion
system function. For further details on the Bayesian analysis process, the
reader is directed to Washington et al. (2017a).
The distributions associated with the nodes for each operational failure
mode were obtained by multiplying the posterior distribution for the
Propulsion function with the appropriate weighting factors. If two or more
system functions were being evaluated, then an appropriate mathematical
function would have been used to estimate the distributions associated
with the operational failure mode nodes. As can be seen in Fig. 10 each of
the failure condition severity category nodes have two associated arcs, one
from each of the operational failure mode nodes. Thus, a mathematical
function was required to combine the distributions (and the relevant
weighting factors) from each of the operational failure mode nodes. In this
case study, a dynamic OR gate was used to obtain the distributions for
each of the failure condition severity nodes (Step 2 in Fig. 9). For more
details on this and other mathematical functions that could be used, the
reader is directed to Fenton and Neil (2013).
Once the model is developed, it needs to be executed. The
AgenaRisk™ software conducts the necessary analysis associated with a
BBN to empirically determine the output probability distributions
2 The open category defined by EASA is similar to the excluded category
defined by CASA.
3 RPA in the open or excluded categories are not typically required to undergo
certification against prescriptive standards such as those included under sub-
part 1309. The case study is illustrative only (but potentially applicable to
operations over persons unconnected to the operation, which is similar to many
commercial operations).
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representing the uncertainty in the APFH associated with each of the
nodes in the model. For further details, the reader is directed to Fenton
and Neil (2013).
5.4. Using the Outputs from the BBN within the Compliance Assessment
Process
The resulting five output distributions associated with the failure
condition severity nodes, describe the uncertainty associated with a
Propulsion failure resulting in a given failure condition severity (e.g., No
Safety Effect through to Catastrophic). The probability distributions them-
selves represent the uncertainty associated with the APFH for the
Propulsion system given a particular failure condition severity category.
The CA process (Step 3 in Fig. 9), involves the comparison of these output
distributions with the relevant FPO to determine the uncertainty in the
state of compliance. The FPOs defined in JARUS (EASA, 2015b) are used
for the purposes of this case study, with the resulting compliance sub-
propositions for each cm associated with F** given in Table 1.
As described in Section 4.3, the conditional probability describing the
uncertainty in the sub-proposition Hm can be determined by integrating
the posterior distributions for each of the failure condition severity cate-
gory nodes over the appropriate bounds (from zero to the relevant FPO),
as given in Eq. (25). The probability of compliance for each relevant sub-
proposition is the area under the curve to the left of the relevant FPO
(Washington et al., 2017a, 2017b). The resulting outputs representing the
certainty in each sub-proposition (i.e., compliance with each respective
FPO) are summarised in Table 1. The BBN, with associated probability
distributions and outputs is depicted graphically in Fig. 11.
Whilst the quantitative results are purely hypothetical, they illustrate
the nature of the outputs from the BBN model and their use within the CA
process. These values correspond to the degree of certainty (or uncertainty)
of the Propulsion system function satisfying the various FPOs, given all
available data and information. For example, the probability (representing
uncertainty) that the Propulsion function meets the minimum FPO for a
Major failure condition severity category is 0.893. This assessment
represents the state of knowledge from available data and information. An
advantage of the BBN SSA approach is that the analysis can be quickly
updated as new data or information become available.
At this point it is interesting to compare the outputs and results from
the Proposed model with those obtained through following the
Traditional SSA and CA processes. Under standard SSA guidelines, a
“worst case” credible consequential outcome must be assumed for all
failures. Thus, for this case study RPAS, only a single failure condition
severity category of Catastrophic would be assessed under the
Traditional approach. The resulting assessment of the APFH would be
1.4×10−2 (total number of failures divided by the total number of
flight hours). This point value assessment of the APFH does not meet
the corresponding FPO of 1× 10−6, and the system would conse-
quently be deemed non-compliant.
In contrast to this, the Proposed SSPR compliance framework described
in this paper would have determined that the probability of the system
meeting the FPO (for the Catastrophic failure condition severity category)
was 0.976. That is, there is an 97.6% certainty that the APFH, was in fact
less than the relevant FPO. Based on a CF process (refer to Washington
et al. (2017a)), this would have potentially resulted in a positive state of
compliance against the Catastrophic failure condition severity category. It
is important here to note that under the Proposed framework, the CA
process would need to be conducted for each failure condition severity
category before an overall state of compliance can be made.
5.5. Additional Analysis
An advantage of the BBN modelling approach is that it enables
further analysis as new data and information becomes available. For
example, an analyst can pose questions such as, given an incident of
specific consequential outcome, what is the most likely operational
failure mode and subsequently, system functional failure that results in
this consequence? This is an example of deductive reasoning.
To illustrate, consider the situation where new data, obtained
through an additional 100 hours of operational testing, becomes
Fig. 10. BBN for case study highlighting relevant nodes and relationships.
Table 1
Compliance probabilities for each failure condition severity categories.
Failure condition severity (cm) No Safety Effect Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic
Sub-Proposition (Hm) H1: N/A H2: λ2≤ 10−3 H3: λ3≤ 10−4 H4: λ4≤ 10−5 H5: λ5≤ 10−6
Compliance probability (P(H|D,I)m) N/A 0.963 0.893 0.856 0.976
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available. During this period, another four incidents classified as Major
are observed. Using the AgenaRisk™ software, these data can be added
to the top-level Major failure severity condition consequence node as
observations. The model can then be executed again, resulting in an
update to the probability distributions associated with each node. The
updated probability distributions compared to the original probability
distributions are shown in Fig. 12. The updated compliance prob-
abilities for each of the failure condition severity category nodes are
also presented in Table 2. Looking at the compliance probability for the
Major failure condition severity category for example, it can be seen
that the new data resulted in a reduced confidence in the state of
compliance. A similar behaviour can be seen for each of the remaining
failure condition severity categories as well.
From Fig. 13, the mean APFH of the Propulsion system can be seen to
increase from 1.500× 10−2 to 2.35×10−2 and the standard deviation
from 5.556× 10−3 to 7.5× 10−3. The added data relating to theMajor
failure condition severity category updated all the remaining nodes in
the BBN, highlighting its dynamic nature. This behaviour is particularly
useful to new systems, where data and expert knowledge is being
progressively accumulated. As can be seen in Fig. 12, the certainty in
the state of compliance for each failure condition severity is also up-
dated. This directly affects the overall CF process.
6. Discussion
The evolution in the outputs from the SSA process achieved by this
research is illustrated in Fig. 14. The Traditional SSA process, as de-
scribed in Section 2.1.1, does not account for uncertainty in the SSA, CA
and CF processes. The output of the SSA process is a point assessment of
the APFH resulting from a series of cascading conservative assumptions
as illustrated in Fig. 14(a). The work presented in Washington et al.
(2017a, 2017b), extended this approach to account for uncertainty in
the assessment of the APFH, as illustrated in Fig. 14(b). In so doing, the
Extended SSA approach enabled the basis for risk-based compliance
findings, thus evolving the CA and CF processes as well.
A more comprehensive treatment of uncertainty within the SSA process
has been proposed in this paper. Specifically, a BBN is used to take into
account the uncertainties in relation to the specification of the failure
scenario (i.e., the failure conditions and failure condition severities) and the
associated FPO against which compliance needs to be assessed. Uncertainty
in the assessment of the APFH is also still taken into consideration. The
output of the SSA process is now a family of distributions, each describing
the uncertainty in the assessed APFH associated with each possible failure
condition severity category, as shown in Fig. 14(c). This thus negates the
need for the conservative “worst case” consequential outcome assumption
and allows for the uncertainty in the failure condition severities to be
considered. The approach provides regulators with a more comprehensive
picture of the state of knowledge in relation to the APFH for input to CA
and CF processes. With reference to Paté-Cornell’s “six levels of treatment
of uncertainties” (Paté-Cornell, 1996); the Proposed framework provides for
the highest treatment of uncertainty associated with each of the four out-
puts from the SSA process. An updated CA process (still based on the
Bayesian hypothesis test) that is capable of taking this added data and
information into consideration is also proposed in this paper.
In addition to providing a more comprehensive means of treating
the uncertainty associated with each of the outputs of the SSA process,
the Proposed approach has a number of other advantages. It provides a
more mathematically robust means for combining objective data with
expert judgement and updating the state of knowledge as new data and
information is gained. By accounting for the uncertainty in the failure
condition severity categories, the Proposed approach negates the need
for making conservative “worst case” assumptions in relation to the
consequential outcomes. Finally, it also supports more justifiable and
systematic compliance findings, thus allowing for airworthiness
Fig. 11. BBN for case study showing probability distributions (failure rate-hr−1 vs. density/likelihood) and compliance probabilities.
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compliance decisions to be made based on compliance risk. In con-
junction with the Extended approach developed previously in
Washington et al. (2017), the research undertaken in this paper shows
how the concept of risk-based regulation can be extended to include a
risk-based approach to compliance assessment and compliance finding.
The Proposed BBN framework can be developed based on data and
information from a number of different sources. Simple FTA, FHA, FMEA
and FMECA can be used to help identify the set of system functions and
failure modes, while regulatory material can help specify the set of pos-
sible failure condition severity categories. In terms of substantiating the
Fig. 12. BBN for case study showing comparison of outputs (with and without additional failure condition severity data).
Table 2
Updated compliance probabilities for each failure condition severity category.
Failure condition severity (cm) No Safety Effect Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic
Sub-Proposition (Hm) H1: N/A H2: λ2≤ 10−3 H3: λ3≤ 10−4 H4: λ4≤ 10−5 H5: λ5≤ 10−6
Compliance probability (P(H|D,I)m) N/A 0.692 0.471 0.399 0.754
Fig. 13. Comparison of the output probability distributions for the Propulsion function.
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arcs similar tools such as FTA, FHA, FMEA and FMECA along with acci-
dent and incident data and expert judgement can all be used to help
substantiate the network. The weighting factors used in the proposed
model were based on the limited data available and expert judgement.
Future work will look at where additional data and information can be
obtained from and how to better specify these weighting factors taking the
additional data and information into consideration.
In accordance with the system safety assessment guidelines, and pre-
vious work undertaken by the authors, this paper makes use of a simple
Poisson model to represent the likelihood distribution while evaluating the
APFH of the system function. This inherently makes the assumption that
the failure rate associated with the system function is constant. As dis-
cussed in Washington et al. (2017), this can be extremely limiting as most
commercial UAS do not exhibit a constant failure rate. Consequently, a
Weibull model is recommended as a suitable alternative to characterise the
reliability of these systems. While this was an important extension to
make, the authors felt that this would add to the complexity of the BBN
model developed and as such would take away from the novelty of the
current research. Future work will look at incorporating this into the
Proposed approach, thus allowing for the variable failure rate associated
with these systems to be taken into consideration.
In addition to this, future work will look also to revise the CF pro-
cess to make best use of the additional data and information output
from the SSA and CA processes proposed in this paper. Additional work
is also needed to represent the uncertainty associated with the data
input to the SSA process (i.e., the data that are input into the BBN).
Chapter 10 of Kelly and Smith (2011) proposes a number of approaches
to account for data uncertainty, and future research will look to in-
corporate this into the proposed framework.
7. Conclusion
Regulatory bodies the world over are advocating for the need to move
towards a risk-based approach to the regulation of the rapidly emerging
RPAS sector. This requires a clear understanding of the risks and
uncertainty posed by these systems. The general lack of data and experi-
ence associated with the operation of civil RPAS gives rise to a considerable
uncertainty associated with all aspects of their operation. Traditional system
safety analysis approaches do not adequately address the high uncertainty
associated with novel or complex systems such as RPAS. Building on pre-
vious work (Washington et al., 2017a, 2017b), this paper has shown how
the uncertainty associated with each of the outputs of the SSA process can
be taken into consideration. Through the adoption of a BBN, the framework
presented in this paper provides an approach for capturing the uncertainty
in the potential consequential outcomes of an identified failure. This re-
moves the need for conservative “worst case” assumptions and allows for
compliance to be assessed for all possible failure condition severities. This
in turn allows for the relaxation of overly conservative safety objectives,
thereby reducing undue burden (in terms of costs in the design, production,
testing, and certification of the system) on manufactures and operators and
promoting a more risk-based approach to certification. The overall com-
pliance of the system (e.g. RPAS) as a whole, with its system-level safety
objectives is shown. The network can be updated as data from testing and
operational experience becomes available, facilitating updated compliance
reasoning on the output distributions. The novelty of the Proposed model
lies in the application of this framework to the airworthiness certification
and in particular to the Part 1309 regulations. The adoption of the Proposed
SSA approach would allow for the high uncertainty associated with the
safety assessment of new aviation systems, such as RPAS, to be taken into
consideration. Such an approach would enable the risk-based regulation of
the sector. This work is part of an ongoing program seeking to develop
tools that support risk-based regulation, and in so doing, assist regulators in
making more objective, transparent, systematic and consistent decisions
regarding regulation of new and emerging aviation systems.
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7. Managing Uncertainty in Unmanned Aircraft 
System Safety Performance Requirements 
Compliance Process 
 
Figure 13: Concept image of an unmanned aircraft operation over Amsterdam, Europe 
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“A ship in the harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for” 
Admiral Grace Hopper (1906-1992) 
This chapter entitled, “Managing Uncertainty in Unmanned Aircraft System Safety Performance 
Requirements Compliance Process” looks at the challenges and advantages of adopting the proposed 
risk-based framework for UAS and presents current and envisaged research aimed at addressing these 
challenges. It focuses on Research Question 2.3 and develops the overall concept for risk-based 
assessment and compliance regulatory processes which allows for a more comprehensive treatment of 
uncertainty. This in turn has the potential to result in more rational, transparent and systematic outcomes 
from the regulatory process, particularly for new or novel aviation systems. 
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Abstract—System Safety Regulations (SSR) are a central 
component to the airworthiness certification of Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UAS). There is significant debate on the setting of 
appropriate SSR for UAS. Putting this debate aside, the challenge lies 
in how to apply the system safety process to UAS, which lacks the 
data and operational heritage of conventionally piloted aircraft. The 
limited knowledge and lack of operational data result in uncertainty 
in the system safety assessment of UAS. This uncertainty can lead to 
incorrect compliance findings and the potential certification and 
operation of UAS that do not meet minimum safety performance 
requirements. The existing system safety assessment and compliance 
processes, as used for conventional piloted aviation, do not 
adequately account for the uncertainty, limiting the suitability of its 
application to UAS. This paper discusses the challenges of 
undertaking system safety assessments for UAS and presents current 
and envisaged research towards addressing these challenges. It aims 
to highlight the main advantages associated with adopting a risk 
based framework to the System Safety Performance Requirement 
(SSPR) compliance process that is capable of taking the uncertainty 
associated with each of the outputs of the system safety assessment 
process into consideration. Based on this study, it is made clear that 
developing a framework tailored to UAS, would allow for a more 
rational, transparent and systematic approach to decision making. 
This would reduce the need for conservative assumptions and take 
the risk posed by each UAS into consideration while determining its 
state of compliance to the SSR.  
 
Keywords—Part 1309 regulations, unmanned aircraft systems, 
system safety, uncertainty. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE UAS industry is the fastest growing sector of the 
commercial aviation industry. However, the integration of 
UAS into the ultra-safe aviation sector poses some challenges. 
All technologies have associated safety risks. Currently, the 
majority of UAS do not exhibit the same high reliability 
shown by conventionally piloted aircraft. A recent study 
conducted by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) 
showed that the number of reported Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
Systems (RPAS) occurrences between January 2012 and 
December 2016 was approximately 180. The models used to 
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forecast the number of reported occurrences also saw a 60% 
increase in this number in 2017 when compared with 2016 [1]. 
To date, the safety risks associated with civil/commercial UAS 
operations are largely managed through restrictions on their 
operation [2]. These restrictions include prohibiting their flight 
over populated regions or in close proximity to people. This 
can impede the utility of UAS in a wide range of civil and 
commercial applications.  
The risks presented to people and property overflown can 
be managed through the implementation of a range of 
technical and operational risk controls [3]. One such control is 
ensuring a higher degree of airworthiness, and in turn 
reliability, in the operated system. Airworthiness can be 
defined as, “the condition of an item (aircraft, aircraft system, 
or part) in which that item operates in a safe manner to 
accomplish its intended function” [4]. The item (aircraft, 
aircraft system, or part) is defined as airworthy if it is certified 
against the appropriate set of airworthiness regulations. For 
example, STANAG 4671 establishes the baseline set of 
airworthiness standards in relation to the design and 
construction of military UAS [5].  
It is now broadly recognised that airworthiness regulations 
should be tailored to the different UAS types and their 
Concepts of Operations (CONOPs), and that this tailoring 
should be governed by the level of risk posed. Further, not all 
UAS types may be required to meet prescriptive codes of 
airworthiness requirements in order to be safe for operation. 
EASA has proposed a risk-based airworthiness regulatory 
framework that divides airworthiness of UAS into the three 
categories of: 1) Open, 2) Specific, and 3) Certified [6]. UAS 
in the Specific and Certified categories are likely to require 
certification against prescriptive codes of airworthiness 
requirements (or parts of). These requirements are likely to 
include compliance to SSR, also referred to as “Part 1309 
regulations”.  
Compliance with the SSR is a central component to the 
airworthiness of any aviation system. SSR supplement 
prescriptive requirements on the design and testing of an 
aviation system and are, in part, put in place “to ensure that an 
aircraft is capable of continued safe flight and landing 
following a failure or multiple failures of systems” [7]. The 
regulations can be applied to installed sub-systems or an 
aircraft system as a whole. SSR are briefly discussed in 
Section II. 
There is ongoing debate on the setting of appropriate SSR 
for UAS [8]. Putting this debate aside, the next challenge lies 
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in how to apply the system safety assessment and compliance 
process to UAS. These challenges are discussed further in 
Section III. Addressing these challenges is critical to the 
eventual airworthiness certification of UAS, and subsequently, 
to enabling UAS operations in increasing populous areas. 
There is continuing research into addressing these 
challenges [9], [10]. This research has focused on how to 
better account for uncertainty in the System Safety 
Assessment (SSA) process (as currently used for conventional 
civil aviation systems) and how to improve compliance 
findings and decision making in the presence of uncertainty. 
The revised system safety process described in [9], [10], 
enables a fundamentally new approach to regulatory decision 
making, that of making compliance decisions on the basis of 
risk. The process is particularly suited to UAS and any other 
aviation system or sub-system where there is limited 
knowledge and data to base assessments of safety performance.  
Section III of this paper summarises the broader research 
endeavour of existing research [9], [10] and future research. 
The advantages of these modified frameworks, and application 
to the SSA of civil/commercial UAS are also described in 
Section IV.B. The limitations of current research and avenues 
for extension are presented in Section III.C, with concluding 
remarks outlined in Section IV. 
II. SYSTEM SAFETY REGULATIONS (SSR) 
SSR are contained in sub-part 1309 of conventionally 
piloted aircraft airworthiness certification regulations (e.g. 
CS/FAR 23.1309 [11] for aeroplanes in the normal, utility, 
acrobatic or commuter category and CS/FAR 25.1309 [12] for 
aeroplanes in the transport category). They supplement 
prescriptive standards on the design, manufacture, and 
installation of aircraft components, and at a high level, specify 
the requirements for [13]: 
 A documented analysis showing that equipment and 
systems perform as intended under foreseeable operating 
and environmental conditions; 
 The adoption of principles from fail-safe and fault-
tolerant design [12]; and 
 The demonstration (through a documented qualitative or 
quantitative analysis) that the expected frequency of 
failure of equipment and systems, when considered 
separately and in relation to other systems, is inversely-
related to the severity of its effect on the safe operation of 
the system.  
The latter requirement is commonly referred to as the SSPR 
and is the particular element of SSR that this research is 
focused on.  
The SSPR establishes a minimum acceptable level of 
reliability of aviation equipment and components. It comprises 
of three sub-processes, namely the SSA, Compliance 
Assessment (CA), and Compliance Finding (CF) sub-
processes [9]. The sub-processes and the interactions between 
them are illustrated in Fig. 1 and are discussed further in the 
following three sub-sections. The limitations of the overall 
SSPR compliance process are outlined in Subsection II.D. 
A. System Safety Assessment Process 
The purpose of the SSA process is to identify potential 
system failures and their safety effect, determine the 
likelihood of their occurrence, and assign a relevant safety 
objective. Inputs to the SSA process include component 
reliability data, expert knowledge, concept of operations, and 
system baseline description.  
The SSA process includes a number of sub-processes that 
can be applied at different stages of a product lifecycle. 
Detailed in the SAE ARP 4761 are a range of recommended 
supporting tools and techniques that can be used within the 
process, including Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Common Mode Analysis 
(CMA), etc. [4]. Further details on the SSA process and the 
tools used in a SSA can be found in [4], [9], [14]. 
Outputs from the SSA process include: 
 a description of identified failure conditions,  
 associated assessments of the failure severity category, 
 associated assessments of the average probability of 
failure per flight hour (APFH) of the failure conditions 
being realised, and  
 an assignment of applicable failure probability objective 
(FPO).  
These outputs can be represented by the four sets F, C, Λ 
and O, respectively (1)-(4).  
 
                           (1) 
 
                              (2) 
 
                              (3) 
 
                              (4) 
 
The integer set Q, given in (5), is used to index an 
assessment for a specific failure condition (fn), where N 
corresponds to the total number of unique failure conditions 
identified within the SSA process. The output assessment for a 
specific failure condition (fn) is described by the tuple given in 
(6). 
 
                       (5) 
 
               (6) 
 
System safety advisory materials (e.g., [11], [12]) define the 
qualitative and quantitative scales to be used for the 
assessment of the failure severity category and APFH. An 
example of these scales, based on those provided in 
airworthiness regulations for UAS [7] and manned systems 
[11], are provided in Tables I-III in the Appendix. The FPO is 
qualitatively described in the SSR and depends on the 
particular certification category of the aircraft or component. It 
is often represented graphically as shown in Fig. 8 of the 
Appendix. 
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B. Compliance Assessment Process 
CA can be thought of as a process of determining the degree 
to which a candidate system meets relevant requirements. 
Inputs to the CA process are the N tuples described in (6). For 
each assessment, a simple deterministic binary “pass or fail” 
process is applied, whereby, λn (the APFH assessed for a 
specific failure condition fn) is compared to its corresponding 
FPO (on) to determine the state of compliance. The state of 
compliance for the nth identified failure mode, hn, is true if λn is 
less than on, as given in (7): 
 
                       (7) 
 
The CA process is undertaken for all N assessed failure 
conditions, with the resulting compliance state assessments 
contained in the set H. 
 
                                (8) 
 
An overall compliance state of the system, HS, is 
determined as True if it can be shown that all the assessed 
APFH satisfy their FPOs (i.e., all hn are True), (9). 
 
                   (9) 
C. Compliance Finding Process 
The CF process is a simple deterministic decision-making 
process. The system is deemed compliant to the Part 1309 
SSPR if the following conditions hold: 
 Hs is True; and  
 All necessary documentation on the assessment outcomes, 
people, tools, and data used as part of the SSA and 
compliance processes is provided.  
If the system is determined to be non-compliant (i.e., Hs = 
False) then an iterative engineering process is usually 
undertaken to reduce the APFH and/or the failure condition 
severity, as shown by the dotted line in Fig. 1. It is possible for 
regulators to declare a system as non-compliant based on 
insufficient evidence of compliance. In such cases, further 
information or a reassessment is required (shown as a 
feedback path in Fig. 1). A system is then deemed as 
compliant (or not) with the SSPR, with the outcome forming 
part of its case for certification. 
D. Limitation of Current SSPR Compliance Process 
The SSA process can be conducted at the component, sub-
system, or system level. Each assessment results in a set of 
outputs described by the tuple defined in (6). These 
assessments are however conducted independently of each 
other. Therefore, the interactions and dependencies between 
these components or sub-systems are not taken into 
consideration. While the current approach is simple and easy 
to implement, such dependencies would need to be taken into 
consideration in order to address the complexity of the overall 
problem and move towards a risk based approach to 
regulations. 
Another major limiting assumption of the current SSA 
process is that it assumes a constant failure rate when 
providing an estimate of the APFH of the system. This 
essentially implies that the system is a mature system and as 
such is in the useful life phase of its operational life cycle, 
which is characterised by a constant failure rate. For new 
systems like UAS, owing to a number of factors described in 
the following section, the failure rate is not constant. The 
inability of the current SSA approach to take the reducing or 
increasing failure rate of the UAS into consideration is another 
limiting factor of the approach.   
While the current SSPR compliance process does recognise 
that multiple failure scenarios are possible, it takes the worst-
case scenario into account [14], thus failing to take the 
uncertainty associated with the other scenarios into 
consideration.  
Uncertainty is inherent in every stage of the SSPR 
compliance process illustrated in Fig. 1. However, the current 
process does not comprehensively capture this uncertainty. 
Uncertainty manifests as uncertainty in the SSA process 
outputs, specifically: 
1. F – Uncertainty in relation to whether all failure 
conditions have been identified (completeness), and 
whether each identified failure condition (fn), is correctly 
specified in terms of its modes of failure and potential 
effects; 
2. C – Uncertainty in relation to the estimate of the 
magnitude of consequential effects and in turn, the 
severity condition category (cn) assigned to each of the 
identified failure conditions in F; 
3. Λ – Uncertainty in relation to the estimate of the APFH 
(λn) for each failure condition; 
4. O – Whether the correct FPO (on) is assigned to each 
identified failure condition. 
The CA decision process described in (9) has no means for 
accounting for these uncertainties, with the CA output being a 
binary comparison with two possible outcomes: True or False. 
There is no objective means of expressing the resulting 
uncertainty in the output state of compliance. Consequently, 
decision makers are unable to objectively account for 
uncertainty when making compliance findings.  
The uncertainty in the SSA process and CA process carries 
forward to the CF process. Its inescapable existence gives rise 
to six possible outcomes from the compliance decision making 
process as described in [9]. These range from certifying a 
UAS as compliant when it is in fact compliant (desirable 
outcome) to requiring further data and analysis when the UAS 
is in fact non-compliant (less than desirable outcome). There 
is currently no objective and mathematical means for a 
decision maker to decide between these outcomes. Decision 
makers use a subjective and somewhat “black box” process to 
make compliance findings and as such the process lacks the 
transparency and objectivity required of regulatory decision 
making. 
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III. CHALLENGES IN THE APPLICATION OF THE SSPR         
PROCESS TO UAS 
There are numerous on-going efforts to define suitable SSR 
for UAS. These include those specified by NATO [5], [15], 
EASA [16] and EUROCONTROL [17]. There are various 
points of contention between specifications [8]. Whilst the 
focus of this debate has been on the specification of the SSR, 
there has been limited research to date exploring the 
challenges associated with the application of the traditional 
SSPR compliance process to UAS; specifically, how to show 
compliance with the SSR. 
UAS are fundamentally different from conventionally 
piloted aircraft (CPA), not only in the nature of their physical 
systems and how they are operated but also in the underlying 
philosophy and engineering processes used in their design and 
manufacture. These differences lead to unique challenges 
when it comes to their airworthiness certification. Some of the 
challenges described in [18], [19] include: 
 Challenge associated with the regulatory surveillance 
enforcement; 
 Accounting for the human system interaction in the 
assessment process; 
 Need to certify the UAS based on both the function of the 
system and properties of the intended operational 
environment as opposed to just certifying the CPA based 
on the intended function of the system.  
 Need to account for mitigation measures as part of the 
safety case when certifying the UAS as opposed to 
looking at the mitigation measures on a case by case basis 
when evaluating a CPA.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Overview of the SSPR Compliance Process [9] 
 
Further to the general challenges described in [18], [19], 
there are a number of important differences between UAS and 
CPA that can impact their certification:  
 Design philosophy – many UAS have a different design 
trade space than CPA. For many UAS, system reliability 
can be determined by a trade-off between capability, cost, 
and restrictions on their operation. For manned aircraft, 
there is always a hard limit to this trade, dictated by the 
minimum reliability and system performance required to 
ensure the safety of those on-board. Some of the main 
issues in adopting new technologies such as UAS that 
impact this trade space are described in [20]. 
 Engineering processes – currently, many 
civil/commercial UAS are designed and manufactured in 
non-traditional aviation engineering environments. Many 
small UAS are designed by hobbyist, modelling and 
remote control flying enthusiasts. As a consequence, 
many UAS lack the supporting documentation, and 
systems engineering rigour that would be expected in the 
engineering of a CPA. This body of evidence is a key 
input to the SSPR process.  
 Technology refresh rate – UAS types are rapidly 
evolving. A study conducted in [21] shows how 
technologies that are central to UAS have improved at a 
rapid pace over the years. This is driven by the need to 1) 
keep pace with new capability in component technologies 
(e.g., new battery, sensing, autopilot, and communications 
sub-systems), 2) meet new and emerging requirements of 
new customers, and 3) to ensure that their product-
offering is at the forefront of current capability. The high 
refresh rate coupled with the use of Commercial Off the 
Shelf (COTS) components makes it difficult to collect 
reliability data on systems and components.  
 Changing certification baseline – Many UAS lack a 
static design baseline against which a certification case 
can be established. This stems from the high technology 
refresh rate and the customer demand for flexible and 
reconfigurable systems capable of performing a variety of 
missions. As a consequence, it can be difficult to develop 
significant safety heritage in a particular system 
configuration. In contrast, CPA have a relatively static 
system baseline. This allows safety data to be gathered for 
a single aircraft type or across the entire fleet of a 
particular aircraft type. 
 Unassured components – UAS make extensive use of 
COTS components. COTS components are generally not 
designed, manufactured, or tested to an approved standard 
and therefore lack the necessary assurance of normal 
aviation components. These standards are an important 
input to the SSA process.  
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 Lack of knowledge – In general there is a lack of domain 
expertise in the design and operation of civil/commercial 
UAS when compared to CPA. This is owing to the 
relative infancy of the sector and restrictions on their 
operation. Expert judgment in relation to UAS design and 
operations is a key input to the SSA process. The lack of 
knowledge gives rise to uncertainty in the SSA process. 
This uncertainty can be in relation to known parameters or 
even unknown parameters (parameters that can impact the 
model but have not been taken into consideration owing 
to the lack of information available on them). Currently 
there is no means of representing this knowledge 
uncertainty in the SSA process.    
 Heterogeneity of fleet and operations – There is 
significant diversity in the types, configurations, 
performance, and operational profiles of civil/commercial 
UAS. A study conducted in [19] shows that the Maximum 
Take-Off Weight (MTOW) of the UAS fleet ranged from 
a few grams to hundreds of tonnes, whereas for the CPA 
fleet, the MTOW ranged from a few hundred kilograms 
through to thousands of tonnes. Similarly, as can be seen 
from Fig. 2, there is significant diversity in the type of 
operations of the UAS as well. The heterogeneity of the 
UAS fleet and their operations makes it difficult to base 
assessments and develop knowledge through comparison. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Diversity in types of UAS operations, based on [22] 
 
 
Fig. 3 Comparison of cumulative mishap rate based on [23] 
 
 Changing failure rate- The current SSPR compliance 
process assumes a constant failure rate as CPA are mature 
systems that are in the useful life phase of their life-cycle. 
This assumption cannot be made for UAS as these 
systems are still relatively new and are in the infant 
mortality phase of their life-cycle. Factors like the design 
philosophy, technology refresh rate, use of COTS all 
contribute to systems with a dynamic baseline. Thus, the 
failure rate of many systems might never reach a 
stable/constant value. An example of the mishap rate for 
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UAS compared to manned systems based on [23] is 
shown in Fig. 3. From this, it can be seen that the mishap 
rate of the UAS has still not reached a constant value, 
while that for manned aircraft has become relatively 
stable. The limited data available on UAS compared to 
manned aircraft can also be seen here.  
As a result of these differences, there is a general lack of 
knowledge and operational data, and a lack of trust in the data 
and knowledge that is available, to support airworthiness 
assessment and compliance finding processes for UAS. There 
can be considerable uncertainty associated with the 
certification of civil/commercial UAS, which in turn can lead 
to high certification risk (i.e., the risk associated with 
certifying a UAS as compliant, and therefore safe for 
operation, when indeed it is not). 
The SSPR compliance process as used for the certification 
of CPA does not adequately account for the high uncertainty 
inherent to the SSA of UAS. System safety guidance materials 
[4], [11], [12], [14], [24] make no explicit mention of 
uncertainty, its measurement or treatment as part of a SSA. 
Reference [14] acknowledges that a failure mode can 
potentially have a range of negative impacts on the safety of 
flight. In such cases, the recommended practice is to assign the 
highest potential severity category cn. In so doing, uncertainty 
in the set of potential consequential outcomes is discarded and 
can result in an overly conservative failure probability 
objective being assigned to the system. While this may not 
adversely impact the safety of the general public, it does result 
in the imposition of unnecessarily stringent restrictions on the 
design of UAS. This in turn comes at the cost of capability and 
system cost.  
The reliability of a UAS can be improved in a number of 
ways including, investing in more advanced and expensive 
components that have been designed to higher standards and 
installation of redundant systems to use in case of emergencies. 
While it is important to have a UAS with components that are 
designed to a certain level of reliability and with redundant 
systems put in place, this needs to be balanced with the cost 
(both in terms of monetary costs and costs in terms of added 
weight, volume and power consumption to the system) 
involved in installing these components and the risk posed by 
having systems with lower reliability. The added components 
would result in a reduced payload capacity, range and 
endurance, thus limiting the potential applications.  
Taking all of this into consideration, it is clear that research 
needs to be conducted into improving the current SSPR 
compliance process so that it is capable of taking the unique 
characteristics associated with UAS into consideration.  
IV. IMPROVING THE SSPR COMPLIANCE PROCESS 
A new approach to regulatory compliance is to consider it 
as a problem of decision making under uncertainty. Jaynes [25] 
describes the desiderata of rationality and consistency for 
plausible reasoning in the presence of uncertainty. Based on 
this, decision makers can only make inferences (or 
propositions) about the state of the world based on the 
uncertain knowledge and information at hand. Bayesian 
inference provides a means for measuring uncertainty in 
relation to these hypotheses by producing information based 
on models, data, and other information [26]. In addition to this, 
Bayesian inference also allows for the state of knowledge 
(degree of belief in the hypothesis) to be progressively 
updated as new data or experience in the operation of the 
system is gained. Decisions are made on the basis of objective 
measures of uncertainty (or by extension, measures of risk) as 
opposed to binary statements of compliance. This approach to 
safety compliance has been explored for autonomous ships [27] 
and for showing assurance in autonomous UAS performance 
[28]. Within a safety assessment context, Bayesian approaches 
have been extensively used in the probabilistic risk assessment 
of space launch activities [29], [30] and nuclear power 
generation [31]. Such assessments are characterised as 
complex and based on sparse data; characteristics common to 
the SSA of UAS.  
A. Extended SSPR Compliance Process 
References [9] and [10] have begun to apply this general 
approach to the SSPR compliance process for UAS. The 
research to date has focused on addressing only the 
uncertainty in relation to the assessment of the APFH for 
individual failure conditions. The modified approach is 
illustrated in Fig. 6 and briefly described in this section. For 
further details the reader is directed to [9].  
The principle modification lies in the SSA process, 
specifically, the quantification of the APFH. As described in 
Section II, the output set Λ contains point value assessments of 
λn of the APFH for each failure. This is depicted graphically in 
Fig. 4. Under the extended approach of [9], Bayesian methods 
are used to characterise the state of knowledge in each 
assessment of APFH as opposed to the value of λn. The 
modified output from the SSA process is the set Λ*, which 
comprises N conditional probability distributions describing 
the uncertainty (or degree of belief) in λn. The probability 
distributions obtained replace the point-value assessments of 
the APFH originally output from the SSA process, as 
illustrated in Fig. 5. Each probability distribution, denoted by 
p(λn|D,I) and given in (10) represents the state of knowledge 
in APFH for the given failure condition, where D represents 
data and I the knowledge and information available. 
 
                       (10) 
 
As shown in Fig. 6, these distributions are input to the CA 
process. Various inference approaches (hypothesis testing and 
Bayesian prediction) can be used to provide a measure of the 
uncertainty in the state of compliance with the FPO. The 
simple deterministic True or False output of the CA process is 
replaced by measures describing the degree of certainty in the 
state of compliance (i.e., system failure meets its assigned 
FPO, on). Referring to Fig. 5, this can be visualised as the area 
under the curve that resides in the “acceptable” region. 
As shown in Fig. 6, the CA uncertainty measures are then 
input to the CF process, which, in [9], has been structured as a 
simple normative decision-making problem. Whilst many 
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possible decision making formulations could be adopted, the 
normative approach ensures an objective, transparent, and 
systematic input to decision making. From [9], there are six 
possible outcomes from the CF process: 
 The UAS is deemed to be compliant when it is actually 
compliant; 
 The UAS is deemed to be compliant but it is actually non-
compliant; 
 The UAS is deemed to be non-compliant but it is actually 
compliant; 
 The UAS is deemed to be non-compliant when it is 
actually non-compliant; 
 There is insufficient information in the state of 
compliance when the UAS is actually compliant;  
 There is insufficient information in the state of 
compliance when the UAS is actually non-compliant. 
A loss/benefit function can be assigned to each possible 
outcome and combined with the uncertainty measures to 
provide measures of the compliance risk. A range of objective 
decision utility functions can then be applied to aid the 
regulator in making the best compliance decision (Reference 
[9] applied a simple minimum-risk decision selection 
function). 
 
 
Fig. 4 Output from traditional SSA approach 
 
 
Fig. 5 Output from extended SSA approach 
 
 
Fig. 6 Overview of the extended SSPR Compliance Process [9] 
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B. General Advantages 
The approach provides a more transparent, rational, and 
systematic compliance decision-making process. It proposes a 
significant change to how aviation safety practitioners 
currently undertake regulatory compliance activities. The 
application of such an approach provides a: 
 more comprehensive means for assessing and treating 
uncertainties inherent to the SSA of an aviation system;  
 mathematically robust means for combining data with 
expert judgement in safety assessments; 
 means to support inductive and deductive reasoning in 
relation to the system safety of UAS (e.g., predictive 
assessments or incident analysis); 
 framework that is compatible with existing system safety 
modelling and analysis tools (e.g., Functional Hazard 
Assessments (FHA), Failure Mode Effects and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), etc.); 
 mathematically robust means for updating the state of 
knowledge as new data or operational experience is 
gained (a useful feature for rapidly evolving systems such 
as UAS); 
 framework that supports more justifiable and systematic 
compliance findings; 
 method for making airworthiness compliance decisions 
based on compliance risk; 
 means for ensuring more transparent, objective, and 
consistent compliance findings in the presence of 
uncertainty; and 
 means to reduce the need for conservative assumptions 
and the subsequent impost of unnecessary costs on the 
UAS industry. 
C. Further Evolutions of the SSPR Compliance Process 
The revised SSPR compliance process represents a 
paradigm shift in regulatory compliance. However, there 
remain a number of opportunities to further enhance the 
process to take better account of the issues identified in 
Section III.  
The traditional SSA process assumes that failures occur at a 
constant rate. The same assumption was made in the approach 
developed in [9] through the use of a Poisson likelihood 
distribution. The assumption of a constant failure rate fails to 
account for the variable failure rate characteristic of most new 
systems like UAS (as described in Section III). The model 
presented in [10] addresses this shortcoming by adopting a 
Weibull distribution as the likelihood distribution.  
There is also a need to extend the SSPR process to account 
for the uncertainty in the remaining outputs of the SSA 
process. For example, a single failure can have more than one 
failure mode, and in turn, different consequential effects. The 
uncertainty in relation to these different scenarios can also 
differ. This in turn can lead to uncertainty in the assignment of 
the correct FPO. This uncertainty has traditionally been 
addressed through the assignment of the worst case 
consequential outcome, which, as described previously, can 
lead to overly conservative requirements on the reliability of 
the system. This is a consequence driven as opposed to a risk 
driven regulatory approach. A means for capturing and 
representing all potential consequential outcomes (and in turn 
risk) associated with potential failure conditions is needed. 
The output for a single failure condition would thus be a set of 
assessments, conceptually shown in Fig. 7. 
SSA processes make use of a wide range of data sources. 
From component reliability test data, incident, and accident 
reports, through to expert judgment based on operational 
experience or technical knowledge. Data uncertainty has yet to 
be fully accounted for in the current SSA approach. Current 
SSA guidelines recommend the use of sensitivity analysis, 
which does not account for biases, missing, or erroneous data. 
There are various techniques for accounting for input data 
uncertainty within a Bayesian context, which could be adopted 
and applied to the specific problem of UAS failure modelling. 
 
 
Fig. 7 Desired output from SSA approach 
 
The current SSPR framework assumes independence in 
failure conditions and their management. This is largely 
necessitated by the need to manage complexity. The FPOs are 
derived from an apportionment of a system-level acceptable 
failure rate to individual failure conditions. Implicit to this 
apportioning is the assumption of independence. Common 
mode failures are considered in current SSA processes, 
however, the combined assessment and management of all 
failure conditions accounting for the dependencies between 
them, is not undertaken at the system level. Consequently, 
there is no guarantee the overall system-level safety objective 
is met. 
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More advanced modelling approaches are required to 
address these challenges. One such approach is through the 
use of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN), which are 
particularly suited to higher level system modelling. Examples 
of the application of BBN to aviation operational risk 
modelling include [32]−[34]. These techniques have yet to be 
applied within the framework of a formal SSA within the 
SSPR compliance process. 
V. CONCLUSION 
System safety is a critical component of the airworthiness 
certification of UAS. Assurance in the airworthiness of UAS 
is needed to enable greater freedom of their operation in non-
segregated airspace and over increasingly populous areas. 
Whilst research to date has focused on the specification of the 
SSR for UAS, there has been little effort directed towards 
understanding the suitability of existing regulatory compliance 
processes. 
This paper has highlighted a number of challenges to the 
application of existing system safety compliance process to 
UAS. It is found that a more comprehensive treatment of the 
uncertainties inherent to the SSA of UAS is needed. Potential 
approaches for achieving this are presented. 
UAS are revolutionising all aspects of aviation – the 
introduction of new technology, autonomy, operations, and 
airspace design and manufacturing processes. This evolution 
extends to the fundamental philosophy and approach to the 
safety regulation of aviation. Through UAS, there is the 
opportunity to reassess and evolve longstanding regulatory 
practices; potentially bringing them in line with more 
contemporary principles for safety management and decision 
making. An example of this is the move towards risk-based 
regulation for the UAS sector, a regulatory development 
principle that has equal applicability to all aviation sectors. 
With this in mind, the fundamental theory, process, and 
techniques explored within this paper have broader 
applicability to the aviation sector. 
APPENDIX 
 
Fig. 8 Risk matrix showing FPO based on [7] 
 
 
 
 
TABLE I 
QUALITATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FAILURE SEVERITY CATEGORIES FOR UAS 
BASED ON [7] 
No Safety Effect 
Failure conditions that would have no effect on safety. 
For example, failure conditions that would not affect the operational 
capability of the RPAS or increase remote crew workload. 
Minor 
Failure conditions that would not significantly reduce RPAS safety and that 
involve remote crew actions that are within their capabilities. Minor failure 
conditions may include a slight reduction in safety margins or functional 
capabilities, a slight increase in remote crew workload, such as flight plan 
changes. 
Major 
Failure conditions that would reduce the capability of the RPAS or the ability 
of the remote crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent 
that there would be a significant reduction in safety margins, functional 
capabilities or separation assurance. In addition, the failure condition has a 
significant increase in remote crew workload or impairs remote crew 
efficiency. 
Hazardous 
Failure conditions that would reduce the capability of the RPAS or the ability 
of the remote crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent 
that there would be the following; 
 Loss of the RPA [Remotely Piloted Aircraft] where it can be reasonably 
expected that a fatality will not occur, or 
 A large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, or 
 High workload such that the remote crew cannot be relied upon to perform 
their tasks accurately or completely. 
Catastrophic 
Failure conditions that could result in one or more fatalities 
 
TABLE II 
QUALITATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FAILURE PROBABILITY OBJECTIVES FOR 
MANNED AIRCRAFT [11] 
Probable 
Those failure conditions anticipated to occur one or more times during the 
entire operational life of each airplane. These failure conditions may be 
determined on the basis of past service experience with similar components 
in comparable airplane applications. 
Remote 
Those failure conditions that are unlikely to occur to each airplane during its 
total life but that may occur several times when considering the total 
operational life of a number of airplanes of this type. 
Extremely Remote 
Those failure conditions not anticipated to occur to each airplane during its 
total life, but which may occur a few times when considering the total 
operational life of all airplanes of this type. 
Extremely Improbable 
For commuter category airplanes, those failure conditions so unlikely that 
they are not anticipated to occur during the entire operational life of all 
airplanes of one type. For other classes of airplanes, the likelihood of 
occurrence may be greater. 
 
TABLE III 
QUANTITATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FPO FOR UAS1 [7] 
FPO Quantitative value (APFH) 
Probable < 10-3 hr-1 
Remote < 10-4 hr-1 
Extremely Remote < 10-5 hr-1 
Extremely Improbable < 10-6 hr-1 
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8. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Figure 14: Boeing X-45 model in National Air and Space Museum, Washington, DC 
Image Copyright © Achim Washington 
This chapter aims to summarise the main findings made in relation to each of the publications contained 
in Chapter 3 to Chapter 7, and relate this to the overall aim, objectives and research questions outlined 
previously in this thesis. Section §8.1 provides an in-depth discussion highlighting the main 
contributions of the chapters, how they relate to each other and how they relate to the overall thesis. 
Section §8.2 then summarises the novel contributions of the overall thesis, with avenues of future 
research highlighted in Section §8.3. Closing remarks are then provided in Section §8.4 
8.1. Discussion 
Over the course of this thesis, the individual papers presented in Chapter 3 through to Chapter 7 address 
different elements of the overall research questions that were identified in Section §1.2. Each chapter 
on its own makes a number of novel contributions to theory and when viewed in conjunction with each 
other they help address the overall aim of the thesis, which is to “improve regulatory outcomes under 
the new paradigm of risk-based regulation, through providing a conceptual framework for the rational, 
transparent and systematic treatment of uncertainty in the risk assessment and regulatory decision-
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making process”. This section will provide a summary of the contributions of each chapter, highlighting 
the differences that exist between them and relating them to the overall research questions and 
objectives of the thesis. The novel contributions, while summarised in Section §8.2, have been outlined 
here on a chapter by chapter basis to provide a clear indication of how they were achieved.   
8.1.1. Chapter 3: A Review of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Ground Risk   
Models 
A risk-based approach to the regulation of the industry requires a risk-based approach to rule-making, 
compliance assessment and compliance finding. Focusing on the risk-based approach to rule-making, 
it was clear that a means of capturing the risks posed by UAS to people and property on the ground 
(primary hazard of interest) and a means of relating this risk to different components of the regulation 
was needed. Based on a review of the literature it was evident that GRM are commonly used in the 
industry to identify and characterise these risks. This chapter summarised the current state of the art 
with respect to GRM, identifying the various component models that go into defining these GRM. A 
review was undertaken for each of the component models, which provides: a detailed description of the 
component model; a review of the literature highlighting the current state of the art with respect to the 
component model; a summary of how the component model is substantiated in the literature; a detailed 
analysis of the sources of uncertainty and how they are taken into consideration (including the level of 
uncertainty) with respect to each component model; and finally a clear linkage between the component 
model and the component of the regulations that they impact, highlighting the implications of the level 
of treatment of uncertainty with respect to these component models. The conceptual framework 
developed in this chapter provides the theoretical basis which can be used to help support the 
development of GRM.  
In developing this conceptual framework and analysing the models identified in the literature, 
a number of high-level findings were made. Firstly, it was seen that there exists a significant amount of 
diversity in the GRM (and component sub-models). The diversity amongst these models can lead to a 
lack of consensus and variability in the risk assessment outputs that are input into the regulatory 
decision-making process and can thus impact the risk-based approach to compliance assessment and 
compliance finding as well. Secondly, it was observed that a majority of these GRM (and component 
sub-models) are based on a number of conservative assumptions, the cascading impact of which have 
not been evaluated in the context of these GRM. These assumptions are mostly implicit and 
undocumented, and where explicit, their impact on the resulting assessments of risk are not explored. 
A series of conservative assumptions can lead to overly conservative risk estimates, and in turn, impose 
unnecessary regulatory costs on the industry. Finally, it was evident that there exists a considerable 
amount of diversity in the level of uncertainty taken into consideration by each of the component sub-
models, with a majority of the models only taking lower levels of uncertainty into consideration. When 
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considered in the context of supporting the development of regulations for UAS, this diversity and 
limited treatment of uncertainty in each of the component sub-models of the GRM can hamper objective 
decision-making in relation to the regulations. This can thus prevent the adoption of a more transparent, 
systematic and consistent regulatory decision-making process, something necessary for the 
development of justifiable regulations that have a clear and traceable relationship to the safety risks 
they are intended to manage. In developing a GRM it is imperative to take these factors into 
consideration.  
The focus of this chapter was thus on Research Question 1. It clearly identifies the sources of 
uncertainty associated with the safety risk assessment process, detailing how they are being 
characterised and represented in existing models using Paté-Cornell’s [33] “six levels of treatment of 
uncertainties in risk analysis” framework (Research Question 1.1). By relating the uncertainty 
associated with each of these component models to the regulations and seeing how the different levels 
of uncertainty can impact these regulations, the research highlighted the need to apply a Level 5 
(displaying uncertainties about fundamental hypotheses by a family of risk curves) treatment of 
uncertainty to the existing aviation safety risk management and regulatory development processes 
(Research Question 1.2). The six levels of treatment of uncertainty identified by Paté-Cornell [33] 
clearly show how the risk and uncertainty measures obtained from the regulatory safety risk assessment 
processes can be represented to decision makers (Research Question 1.3). While it is evident that a 
Level 5 treatment of uncertainty is most beneficial, discussion relating to which of these levels best 
supports regulatory decision-making was provided in the later chapters.  
By answering these research questions, this chapter partially addresses the first research 
objective which was to “identify and characterise the various sources of uncertainty inherent in risk 
assessment and decision-making processes and determine how this is currently managed, with 
application to the aviation regulatory framework”. 
The paper presented in this chapter is one of the first of its kind, not only providing an in-depth 
review of the component sub-models but also showing how they take uncertainty into consideration and 
how this impacts the associated regulations. In addition, based on the extensive literature review 
undertaken, a set of generic component sub-models that need to be taken into consideration in 
developing a GRM were identified. Future research can look at how to relate each of these component 
sub-models to different risk metrics (e.g. Failure Metric, Hazard Metric, Economic Risk Metric, 
Individual Risk Metric, Collective Risk Metric and Societal Risk Metric) to see how they can impact 
the overall SRMP and consequently how they can be used to help the adoption of a risk-based approach 
to compliance assessment and compliance finding. By clearly outlining the component sub-models and 
describing how they relate to each other, this paper provides a conceptual framework for describing the 
component sub-models of GRM, and in turn, providing a general theoretical basis for the systematic 
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development and analysis of models proposed in the literature. Taking the overall objectives of the 
thesis into consideration, in undertaking the review, it was considered important to see how each of the 
component sub-models accounted for uncertainty. The paper thus identifies various sources of 
uncertainty with respect to each of the component sub-models and shows how failing to account for 
such uncertainties can impact different elements of the regulation. For example, looking at the failure 
model it was observed that there is significant uncertainty (epistemic and aleatory) in the identification 
and modelling of failures for UAS. This uncertainty arises due to several factors including a lack of 
reliability data, the changing system configurations, use of non-certified components, and limited 
operational experience. This often results in the imposition of conservative restrictions on these 
systems, more stringent failure probability objectives and conservative design performance criteria for 
components. This in turn can have implications on the design, production, testing, and certification of 
these systems. Similar findings were made in relation to each of the remaining component sub-models 
as well. This was an important component of the research as it directly feeds into the risk management 
process which in itself is the focus of the remaining chapters. 
8.1.2. Chapter 4: A Bayesian Approach to System Safety Assessment and 
Compliance Assessment for Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
While the previous chapter focused on the models used to help identify and characterise the risk, this 
chapter (as well as the following chapters) focused on how to make compliance findings based on 
compliance risk, taking uncertainty into consideration. Using the case study of the SSR, the paper aimed 
to identify the various sources of uncertainty associated with the Traditional SSPR compliance process 
and look at how some of these sources of uncertainty were taken into consideration to support more 
objective, transparent and rational compliance findings in those cases where there is uncertainty 
associated with the assessment of the system. The paper outlines the structure of the Traditional SSPR 
compliance process, identifies the sources of uncertainty associated with this process, shows how some 
of these sources of uncertainty can be taken into consideration (using Bayesian analysis, Bayesian 
hypothesis testing and normative Decision theory) and proposes an Extended SSPR compliance process 
that takes this uncertainty into consideration. Avenues for future research (some of which are 
undertaken in the proceeding chapters) were also identified in this chapter.  
The general lack of data and experience in the operation of civil UAS gives rise to uncertainty 
in relation to all aspects of their performance. The Traditional SSPR compliance process does not 
provide a means of taking this uncertainty into consideration in either the SSA or the CA and CF 
decision-making processes that follow. A comprehensive treatment of uncertainty is required for more 
rational, objective and consistent compliance decision-making. Focusing on the SSPR compliance 
process, this chapter provides a means of capturing the uncertainty in not only the SSA process (through 
the adoption of a Bayesian analysis approach) but also the CA process (through the adoption of a 
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Bayesian hypothesis test) and the CF process (through the adoption of normative decision theory) that 
follow. While this marks a significant step forward compared to traditional approaches, there were a 
number of assumptions made and a number of areas where future research effort could be directed. 
Firstly, the extended framework presented in this chapter does not provide a means of taking the 
uncertainty in the data input to the model into consideration. Secondly, looking at the SSA process, it 
is clear that the extended framework only allows for uncertainty in one of the outputs (i.e. APFH) to be 
taken into consideration. The uncertainty in the remaining outputs (i.e. failure condition descriptions, 
failure condition severities and failure probability objectives) have not been addressed. Finally, focusing 
on the SSA process, in accordance with the system safety guidelines, a common Poisson failure rate 
model (which assumes a constant failure rate) is adopted. While such an assumption might be suitable 
for well-established and mature aviation systems, it may not be suitable for small UAS owing to a 
number of factors such as the changing system-baseline. This brings into question the validity of the 
assumption of a constant failure rate model. Future research would need to look at how these additional 
sources of uncertainty can be considered and what alternate models are able to characterise the 
reliability of such systems. The same fundamental theory and approach developed in this chapter could 
readily be adopted to any other regulatory compliance process or aviation system. This marks another 
potential avenue for future research.   
The focus of this chapter was thus on answering Research Question 2, though elements of 
Research Question 1 are also addressed. In relation to the first research question, the chapter clearly 
shows how the identified sources of uncertainty can be incorporated into the SSPR compliance process 
(Research Question 1.2). It highlights the benefits of adopting a Level 5 treatment of uncertainty by 
providing a means of displaying multiple risk curves to the decision maker (though at this point they 
are all in relation to the failure rate associated with the worst-case consequential outcome) through the 
adoption of various Bayesian analysis techniques (Research Question 1.3). In relation to the second 
research question, the chapter clearly identifies the sources of uncertainty in not just the SSA process 
but also the CA and CF processes and shows how they are currently managed in each of these sub-
processes (Research Question 2.1). By developing the Extended SSPR compliance process, the research 
undertaken in this chapter directly shows how some of the identified sources of uncertainty in the 
Traditional SSPR compliance process can be represented and accounted for to support more objective 
and consistent regulatory outcomes, using Bayesian analysis, Bayesian hypothesis testing and 
normative decision theory (Research Question 2.2).    
By answering these research questions, this chapter clearly focuses on addressing the second 
and third research objectives, that is, “drawing on contemporary risk and uncertainty theory, to develop 
a new compliance assessment and compliance finding decision-making process that incorporates the 
varying sources of uncertainty inherent in them” and applying “the above to the regulation of UAS, in 
particular, the system safety “Part 1309” regulations”. Elements of the first research objective are 
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however also addressed. While this chapter in conjunction with the previous chapter essentially 
addresses each of the research objectives and answers most of the research questions, work still needs 
to be done to further improve the Extended SSPR compliance process and achieve the overall aim of 
the thesis. These improvements are made in the following two chapters, with the summary of findings 
and overall advantages outlined in Chapter 7. 
The Extended SSPR compliance process developed in this chapter clearly shows how 
uncertainties in the SSA, CA and CF processes can be taken into consideration. This allows the 
framework to be applied to new and novel technologies such as UAS. The research has thus helped 
show how the concept of risk-based regulation can be extended to include a risk-based approach to 
compliance assessment and compliance finding and how the uncertainty associated with these three 
processes can be taken into consideration. In addition to this, the research proposes a new risk-based 
approach to the regulatory compliance process, through reframing it as a problem of decision making 
under uncertainty. By adopting the Bayesian hypothesis test and normative decision theory in the 
Extended SSPR compliance process, the research developed and demonstrated a mathematically robust 
approach for accounting for uncertainty in performance/compliance assessments; and allowed for the 
systematic treatment of uncertainty in the aviation regulatory compliance assessment and compliance 
finding processes.  
8.1.3. Chapter 5: Managing Uncertainty in the System Safety Assessment of 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
One of the assumptions made in the Extended SSPR compliance process provided in the previous 
chapter was in relation to the APFH and the use of a constant failure rate model (in the form of a Poisson 
model) to account for the uncertainty in this parameter. While this assumption may be suitable for more 
established technologies such as CPA that are in the “useful life” phase of their lifecycle and was in 
keeping with the requirements outlined in the guidelines, it did not take the relative infancy of UAS 
into consideration. When dealing with new and evolving technologies such as UAS that make use of 
COTS components and have a continuously changing system baseline, it is evident that these systems 
will potentially never reach the “useful life” phase of their lifecycle. They are more likely to be in the 
“infant mortality” phase of their lifecycle. This chapter thus looks to refine the extended framework 
developed in the previous chapter by addressing this limitation and providing a model that is capable 
of taking the variable failure rates associated with UAS into consideration. The chosen model was a 
Weibull model. In addition to providing a means of taking the variable failure rate associated with these 
UAS into consideration the model also provided the decision maker with a number of different outputs 
which could be used to help support more risk-informed decisions. For example, the posterior 
distribution of the shape parameter (one of the input parameters for the Weibull model) can be used to 
provide insight into the particular phase of operation of the system (i.e. infant mortality phase, useful 
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life phase or wear-out phase). Forward inferences (predictions) on the future failure performance of the 
fleet can also be made using various Bayesian inference techniques. While this directly addresses some 
of the limitations of the extended framework by relaxing the modelling assumption that the UAS exhibit 
constant failure rates, there are still certain limitations with the extended framework that have yet to be 
addressed. The most significant of which being the inability of the extended framework to take the 
uncertainty in the remaining outputs of the SSA process into consideration. Uncertainty in the input 
mishap data is another area where future research efforts need to be directed. 
As this research is directly building off the research undertaken in the previous chapter, it is 
evident that the main focus of this chapter is on the second research question. By clearly describing the 
limitations associated with not taking the variable failure rate of the system into consideration and 
identifying the uncertainties introduced with this assumption, the research helps identify additional 
uncertainties and shows how they are currently managed in the aviation safety compliance assessment 
and compliance finding processes (Research Question 2.1). By advocating the need to evolve the 
framework and take this uncertainty into consideration through the adoption of a Weibull failure rate 
model and showing how this can further support more objective and consistent regulatory outcomes, 
the research further helps answer the second part of this research question (Research Question 2.2).   
  By helping answer these research questions and extending the framework further, the research 
again focuses on the second and third research objectives that is, “drawing on contemporary risk and 
uncertainty theory, to develop a new compliance assessment and compliance finding decision-making 
process that incorporates the varying sources of uncertainty inherent in them” and applying “the above 
to the regulation of UAS, in particular, the system safety “Part 1309” regulations”. 
As this research focuses on a particular limitation of the Extended SSPR compliance process 
(i.e. the limitation associated with the use of a constant failure rate model), its novel contributions are 
focused on addressing this limitation. In particular, it shows how types of model uncertainty can be 
accounted for in the assessment and compliance processes, something fundamental to the application 
of a risk-based approach to the regulation of the UAS industry. In doing so, it evolves the Extended 
SSPR compliance process further. 
8.1.4. Chapter 6: Adoption of a Bayesian Belief Network for the System 
Safety Assessment of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems 
Another limitation of the Extended SSPR compliance process presented in Chapter 4 is in relation to 
the inability of the framework to account for the uncertainty associated with the remaining outputs from 
the SSA process. In keeping with traditional frameworks, the extended framework assumed a worst-
case consequential outcome from the failure scenario. This has the potential to lead to overly 
conservative safety objectives as well as operational constraints. This, in turn, results in additional costs 
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in the design, production, testing, and certification of the system. Identified failure conditions are 
assessed and treated independently, with compliance only shown against the assigned worst-case safety 
objective. As a result, overall compliance of the RPAS (as a whole) with its system-level safety 
objective is never shown. This chapter aims to address this assumption and the associated limitations, 
thus evolving the Extended SSPR compliance process even further.  
The chapter starts by reintroducing the Traditional SSPR compliance process and outlining the 
sources of uncertainty associated with this process. The Extended SSPR compliance process is then 
presented to show how previous work looked to extend this framework by providing a rational, 
transparent and systematic means of accounting for uncertainty in this process, thus supporting a risk-
based approach to the regulation of the industry. The major limitation of this extended framework which 
would then be addressed is highlighted, with the research developing a Proposed SSPR compliance 
process. This framework outlines the general set notation that would be needed to take the additional 
sources of uncertainty into consideration. It then relates the framework to a generic RPAS to see how 
the sets could be substantiated, thus showing how the uncertainty in the remaining outputs could be 
accounted for from a theoretical perspective. A BBN is then introduced as a suitable tool to model the 
SSA process and relate its outputs to the CA process. Details regarding the substantiation of the arcs 
and quantification of the NPTs are then provided, with the revised outputs clearly identified. A case 
study example is used to exemplify the features of the developed model. 
As mentioned above, the chapter proposes the use of a BBN as a means for more 
comprehensively capturing the uncertainty in the SSA process. The proposed BBN SSA approach takes 
into consideration the uncertainty in the consequential outcomes assigned to a set of identified failure 
conditions, removing the need for worst-case assumptions. System safety compliance assessments can 
also be made at different levels of abstraction of the system (i.e., from an individual failure condition 
through to a set of all identified failure conditions, representative of the overall system), providing a 
means of assessing the compliance of the overall system with its top-level safety objectives. The output 
of the SSA process is now a family of distributions describing the uncertainty in the assessed APFH. 
This provides the regulator with a more comprehensive picture of the state of knowledge in relation to 
the APFH for input to the CA and CF processes. It is important here to note that, while the BBN has its 
advantages, there are still certain challenges that can impact the overall output from the SSA process. 
For example, each of the input parameters that are represented by probability distributions have 
uncertainty surrounding them. On using the BBN to combine these distributions, the uncertainty has 
the tendency to compound. The impact of this on the resulting distribution has not been explored. While 
this discussion is beyond the scope of this research it does highlight a potential avenue for research.  
The proposed framework still does not take uncertainty in the data input to the model into 
consideration. Future work needs to look at how this data uncertainty can be taken into consideration 
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in the proposed framework. In addition to this, while the adoption of a risk matrix is standard practice 
in industry, it is evident that there is potential uncertainty associated with the application of this risk 
matrix, which is being propagated throughout the SRMP. While addressing the limitations associated 
with this uncertainty is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to understand the uncertainty 
associated with these risk-matrices and how they can potentially impact the overall output from the 
SRMP. Future research can look to study the impact of this on the overall outputs from the framework. 
While the proposed SSA process allows for additional sources of uncertainty to be taken into 
consideration, the CA and CF processes have not been further updated from the extended framework, 
to account for these additional outputs. Future research needs to look at how these additional sources 
of data and information can be used within these decision-making processes, perhaps through the 
adoption of alternate decision theories within the CF process. Future research can also look at how this 
theory can be applied to represent the decision risk within a standard risk matrix and incorporate existing 
evaluation and treatment decision-making frameworks (e.g. ALARP and SFARP decision-making 
frameworks) commonly used in aviation risk management. 
As this research is again directly building off the research undertaken in Chapter 4, it is evident 
that the main focus of this chapter was on the second research question, though elements of the first 
research question are also addressed. The framework supports a Level 5 treatment of uncertainty, and 
clearly shows how these additional outputs in the form of multiple probability curves can be used to 
improve regulatory outcomes. The research highlights the advantages of the Level 5 treatment of 
uncertainty and shows how the risk and uncertainty measures obtained from the regulatory safety risk 
assessment processes can be represented to decision makers (Research Question 1.3). The paper clearly 
shows how the uncertainties associated with these remaining outputs are managed (Research Question 
2.1) and then shows how these uncertainties can be represented and accounted for to support more 
objective and consistent regulatory outcomes, through the adoption of a BBN (Research Question 2.2).  
By answering these research questions, it is evident that this research can directly be used in 
conjunction with the previous chapters to address the overall aim of the thesis, that is “to improve 
regulatory outcomes under the new paradigm of risk-based regulation, through providing a conceptual 
framework for the rational, transparent and systematic treatment of uncertainty in the risk assessment 
and regulatory decision-making process” by providing additional information which can be used to 
further strengthen the Extended SSPR compliance process, thus addressing the second and third 
research objectives. 
While the Extended SSPR compliance process marked a significant step change over the 
Traditional SSPR compliance process, further work needed to be undertaken to incorporate the 
uncertainties associated with the remaining outputs of the SSA process. The chapter develops the 
Proposed SSPR compliance process, which provides a means of taking these additional sources of 
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uncertainty into consideration. In addition to being one of the first research endeavours to apply a BBN 
within an aviation SSR “Part 1309” system safety context, the research makes a number of additional 
novel contributions to theory. By relating the outputs of the SSA process to a generic RPAS, it develops 
a general template for high level classification of functions and failures which can be applied to any 
aircraft system. This can be used in the context of other regulatory processes as well. The research 
advocates the adoption of a BBN as a valid approach for capturing uncertainty in the assessed 
compliance scenario. This removes the requirement for assessing single credible (often worst-case) 
scenarios, thus extending compliance scenarios to multiple assessments and addressing one of the major 
limitations associated with current approaches.  
8.1.5. Chapter 7: Managing Uncertainty in Unmanned Aircraft System 
Safety Performance Requirements Compliance Process 
The research presented in Chapter 4 to Chapter 6 looked to evolve the Traditional SSPR compliance 
process so that it could be applied to new and evolving systems such as UAS, that are characterised by 
limited data and high uncertainty. Focusing on the SSA process, this chapter looks to highlight some of 
the main challenges associated with the application of the traditional framework to new and evolving 
systems such as UAS and see how this impacts the CA and CF decision-making processes that follow. 
A summary of current and envisaged research towards addressing these challenges is also presented. 
Based on the research undertaken, it was seen that the main challenges include: the challenge associated 
with the regulatory surveillance enforcement; accounting for the human system interaction in the 
assessment process; the need to certify the UAS based on both the function of the system and properties 
of the intended operational environment as opposed to just certifying the CPA based on the intended 
function of the system; and the need to account for mitigation measures as part of the safety case when 
certifying the UAS as opposed to looking at the mitigation measures on a case by case basis when 
evaluating a CPA. In addition to these challenges, it was also seen that there are a number of differences 
between UAS and CPA that can impact their certification. These differences are in relation to the: design 
philosophy; engineering processes; technology refresh rate; changing certification baseline; unassured 
components; lack of knowledge; heterogeneity of fleet and operations; and changing failure rate.  
Taking these challenges and inherent differences into consideration it is evident that there is a 
general lack of knowledge and operational data, and a lack of trust in the data and knowledge that is 
available to support airworthiness assessment and compliance finding processes for UAS. There can be 
considerable uncertainty associated with the certification of civil/commercial UAS, which in turn can 
lead to high certification risk (i.e., the risk associated with certifying a UAS as compliant, and therefore 
safe for operation, when indeed it is not). The Traditional SSPR compliance process as used for the 
certification of CPA does not adequately account for this high uncertainty inherent to the SSA, CA and 
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CF process of UAS. Developing a framework tailored to UAS, would allow for a more rational, 
transparent and systematic approach to decision-making. This would reduce the need for conservative 
assumptions and take the risk posed by each UAS into consideration while determining its state of 
compliance to the SSR.  
This chapter links all of the work undertaken in Chapter 4 to Chapter 6 and highlights the 
challenges associated with applying the Traditional SSPR compliance process to UAS. The advantages 
of the Extended and Proposed SSPR compliance processes are also discussed. The difference between 
UAS and CPA were highlighted, further supporting the need for a more rational, transparent and 
systematic treatment of uncertainty in the adoption of a risk-based approach to the regulation of the 
industry.  
While elements of Research Question 2.1 and Research Question 2.2 were discussed at a high-
level, the main focus of the work was in linking the previous research and highlighting the limitations 
and advantages of the identified approaches. In doing so it directly answers Research Question 2.3 by 
highlighting some of the potential benefits of the risk-based philosophy in the aviation sector.  
By answering the above research questions, it is evident that the research was focused on the 
second and third research objectives. The high-level discussion provided clearly shows how the 
extensive research undertaken in each of the chapters relates to each other and how this directly helps 
achieve the overall aim of the thesis. By clearly identifying the advantages of the Extended and 
Proposed SSPR compliance process, the research supports the adoption of such frameworks for new 
and evolving technologies such as UAS. 
8.1.6. Summary 
The aim of this thesis is to improve regulatory outcomes under the paradigm of risk-based regulation, 
through providing a conceptual framework for the rational, transparent and systematic treatment of 
uncertainty in the risk assessment and regulatory decision-making processes. The review of literature 
identified that the definition of risk is moving towards one that considers uncertainty. Thus, in moving 
towards a risk-based approach to regulation, it is imperative to take the uncertainty associated with the 
process into consideration. To achieve the overall aim of this thesis, the research objectives outlined in 
Section §1.3 were identified.  
Under a risk-based approach to regulation, the SRMP drives not only the rule-making process 
but also the regulatory processes of compliance assessment and compliance finding. Uncertainty is 
inherent to all the elements of the SRMP. However, a review of aviation safety guidance and safety 
management practices found that aviation safety literature does not adequately address the uncertainty 
associated with the SRMP. For example, when measuring risk, only the likelihood and severity are 
taken into consideration, with uncertainty generally not mentioned. Where uncertainty is mentioned, it 
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is addressed through the use of conservative worst-case assumptions. This has the potential to result in 
the imposition of overly stringent restrictions on the operation of the systems where there is uncertainty 
in the safety risk, such as UAS. Subsequently, providing a more comprehensive treatment of uncertainty 
in the aviation SRMP is essential to the uptake of a risk-based approach to rule-making. Further, it 
follows that if assessments of performance are uncertain, then these uncertainties are also inherent in 
the assessments required to show compliance to regulations. It was found that the current aviation 
compliance process does not provide an objective means for accounting for uncertainty. As a 
consequence, compliance assessments can be subjective and inconsistent, with regulators lacking the 
tools and processes to be able to make objective compliance findings on the basis of compliance risk. 
A means to enable NAA to account for uncertainty in regulatory compliance processes is needed. 
Taking this into consideration, this thesis aimed at answering two main research questions: 
1. What are the uncertainties associated with the safety risk assessment process and how are 
they addressed within the current aviation safety risk management and regulatory 
development processes? 
2. How can uncertainty associated with the SRMP be accounted for in existing aviation rule-
making and compliance processes? 
The papers presented in Chapter 3 through to Chapter 7 addressed each of these research 
questions. Taking the case study example of UAS into consideration, Chapter 3 provided an in-depth 
review of the state of the art in UAS GRM used to evaluate the risks posed by the operation of UAS to 
people and property on the ground. Based on the review, the various sources of uncertainty inherent in 
the safety risk assessment process were identified (Research Question 1.1). The GRM and component 
sub-models were then related to the regulations to show how the uncertainty in these sub-models and 
the conservative assumptions used to manage them, impact different components of the regulations 
(Research Question 1.2).  The six level of treatment of uncertainty identified clearly show the risk and 
uncertainty measures obtained from the regulatory safety risk assessment processes can be represented 
to decision makers (Research Question 1.3). Chapter 0 explored how this uncertainty can be taken into 
consideration in the SRMP, highlighting the benefits of adopting a Level 5 treatment of uncertainty 
(Research Question 1.2, Research Question 1.3 and Research Question 2.1). Looking at the case study 
of the SSR, the paper presented in Chapter 4 extended the concept of risk-based regulation to include a 
risk-based approach to the processes of compliance assessment and compliance finding (Research 
Question 2.2). This allows for compliance decisions to be made based on compliance risk. The papers 
presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 further extends this framework to show how additional 
uncertainties in the system safety process can be taken into consideration (Research Question 2.1 and 
Research Question 2.2). Chapter 6 also further helps highlight the advantages of adopting a Level 5 
treatment of uncertainty (Research Question 1.3). Finally, Chapter 7 looked at the challenges and 
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advantages associated with adopting such a risk-based framework for UAS and presented current and 
envisaged research towards addressing these challenges (Research Question 2.3).  
The focus of this thesis has been on providing a conceptual framework for the rational, 
transparent and systematic treatment of uncertainty in the risk assessment and regulatory decision-
making process. The overall research and developed framework have been presented to military 
airworthiness authorities and received positive feedback (refer to [139]). In developing this framework 
every effort was taken to validate its structure through referencing the use of accepted tools, practices 
and definitions; as is evidenced by the discussion provided in the individual chapters. This is however 
only a partial validation, and it is recognised that this effort does not validate the outcomes or claimed 
benefits of use of the model. According to Dalamagkidis et al. [140], “a thorough model validation 
would require a wealth of experimental results, some of which are difficult if not impossible to obtain”. 
In the absence of such data, as is the case with UAS, one approach of validating the outcomes or claimed 
benefits of use of the model is through the use of data from alternate sources, such as General Aviation 
data, as inputs to the model. This approach was adopted by Melnyk et al. [141], Waggoner [142] and 
Lum and Waggoner [143] to name a few, to validate their risk models. This marks an avenue for 
potential future research for this thesis. A limitation associated with the use of such an approach is the 
inherent differences that exist between UAS and General Aviation systems. This is potential source of 
uncertainty that would need to be taken into consideration. Another approach to the validation of the 
posited benefits of the proposed framework can be through its application to a real-world certification 
case. Such a validation exercise would require the collaboration of both an industry applicant and NAA. 
The analysis would however be system or product specific and consequently the outputs and posited 
benefits would not be able to be disclosed due to commercial sensitivities (especially when dealing with 
military systems). While such a validation exercise has yet to be undertaken, follow on research projects 
have been planned with military airworthiness authorities to further help validate parts of the proposed 
framework. As described by Clothier et al. [144], “Decision makers must have a high degree of 
confidence in the modelling approach employed before the results are of any use in the decision-making 
process. Model verification and validation becomes an essential component of the risk analysis 
process”. These future research endeavours thus mark an important step in the adoption of the 
frameworks proposed in this thesis.  
8.2. Summary of Novel Contributions 
This thesis has made a number of novel contributions to theory. The specific case study of UAS and 
SSPR has been used to illustrate the more general novel theoretical contributions made in this thesis. 
The majority of these contributions are applicable to any aviation sector, rule or regulation. The novel 
contributions include: 
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• Development of a conceptual framework for describing the component-models of GRM, and in 
turn, providing a general theoretical basis for the systematic development and analysis of models 
proposed in the literature; 
• Identification of the various sources of uncertainty with respect to each of the component-models 
and showing how failing to account for such uncertainties can impact various elements of the 
regulation; 
• Development of an overall concept for risk-based assessment and compliance processes, showing 
how the theoretical concepts described evolve towards a more comprehensive treatment of 
uncertainty. The potential benefits and challenges associated with this process are also highlighted; 
• Proposing a new risk-based approach to regulatory compliance process, through reframing it as a 
problem of decision making under uncertainty. This approach: 
• Developed and demonstrated a mathematically robust approach for accounting for uncertainty 
in performance/compliance assessments; 
• Allowed for the systematic treatment of uncertainty in the aviation regulatory compliance 
assessment and compliance finding processes by the application of a normative decision 
theory, combined with assessments of the consequence of the different compliance finding 
outcomes, to provide NAA with a systematic basis for making compliance decisions (findings) 
on the basis of compliance risk; 
• Demonstrating how types of model uncertainty can be accounted for in the assessment and 
compliance processes; 
• Development of a general template for high level classification of functions and failures which can 
be applied to any aircraft system; 
• Application of a BBN as a valid approach for capturing uncertainty in the assessed compliance 
scenario. This removes the requirement for assessing single credible (often worst-case) scenarios, 
thus extending compliance scenarios to multiple assessments; 
• Being the first to apply a BBN within an aviation SSR “Part 1309” system safety context.  
8.3. Future Research 
There are numerous opportunities to extend the initial theoretical contributions provided in this thesis. 
These include:  
• Further developing sub-models of the GRM to address identified deficiencies and enhance 
treatment of uncertainties where a knowledge gap is present (e.g. recovery model, stress model). 
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These sub-models are identified as important areas for advancement and will directly influence the 
overall GRM and the regulations they impact; 
• Providing a theoretical approach for accounting for data uncertainty (e.g., inaccurate, censored or 
missing, etc.) input to assessment processes (e.g., failure rate data); 
• Identify and characterise the uncertainties within the ALARP and SFARP decision-making 
frameworks; 
• Determine how a normative decision-making approach can be adapted to account for ALARP and 
SFARP decision making principles, and the uncertainties inherent to them; 
• Exploring how to represent decision risk within a standard risk matrix taking the uncertainty 
associated with the likelihood and severity into consideration 
• Application of the general approach to other aviation sectors (e.g., space launch, UAM, etc.), and 
regulations; 
• Working in partnership with an industry applicant and NAA, validate posited benefits of the 
approach through its use as an alternate means of compliance. 
8.4. Closing Remarks  
The proposed conceptual framework has the potential to significantly change how NAA approach rule-
making and compliance activities for new or novel aviation systems such as UAM concepts, personal 
air mobility vehicles, reusable space launch vehicles, and UAS. The implementation of the proposed 
framework enables NAA to account for uncertainty implicit to regulatory compliance assessment and 
compliance finding processes. This enables NAA with a systematic and objective means of making 
compliance findings on the basis of “compliance risk”. In the context of risk-based rule-making, the 
more comprehensive treatment of uncertainty means regulations need not be based on conservative or 
worst-case assumptions; ensuring regulations are more proportionate to the operational safety risks they 
are intended to manage. 
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9. Appendices  
9.1. Appendix A: Supporting Publications 
A complete list of published papers, conference papers and presentations completed during this 
candidature are presented in Table 12 and Table 13.  
Table 12: Supporting journal and conference publications 
Title of Paper A Review of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Ground Risk Models 
Authors Achim Washington, Reece Clothier, Jose Silva 
Journal Progress in Aerospace Sciences 
Status Published 
Impact Factor 6.814 
Link https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0376042117301392  
Title of Paper 
A Bayesian Approach to System Safety Assessment and Compliance Assessment 
for Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Authors Achim Washington, Reece Clothier, Brendan Williams 
Journal Journal of Air Transport Management 
Status Published 
Impact Factor 2.412 
Link https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0969699716304768  
Title of Paper 
Managing Uncertainty in the System Safety Assessment of Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems 
Authors Achim Washington, Reece Clothier, Brendan Williams, Jose Silva 
Conference  
17th Australian International Aerospace Congress (AIAC 17), Melbourne, 
Australia, 27th and 28th February, 2017 
Status Published in proceedings (full paper peer reviewed) 
Link 
https://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;res=IELENG;dn=739801934
595508  
Title of Paper 
Adoption of a Bayesian Belief Network for the System Safety Assessment of 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems 
Authors 
Achim Washington, Reece Clothier, Natasha Neogi, Jose Silva, Kelly Hayhurst, 
Brendan Williams 
Journal Safety Science 
Status Published  
Impact Factor 3.619 
Link https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925753518312670 
Title of Paper 
Managing Uncertainty in Unmanned Aircraft System Safety Performance 
Requirements Compliance Process 
Authors Achim Washington, Reece Clothier, Jose Silva 
Conference 
International Conference on Unmanned Aircraft Systems (ICUAS 2018, 
Amsterdam), 10th and 11th May, 2018 
Status Published in proceedings (full paper peer reviewed) 
Link 
https://waset.org/publications/10008962/managing-uncertainty-in-unmanned-
aircraft-system-safety-performance-requirements-compliance-process  
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Title of Paper Challenges to the Risk-based Regulation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Authors Achim Washington, Reece Clothier, Jose Silva 
Conference  
18th Australian International Aerospace Congress (AIAC 18), Melbourne, 
Australia, 24th to 26th February, 2019 
Status Published in proceedings (full paper peer reviewed) 
Link 
https://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=319803390521073;res=I
ELENG;type=pdf 
Title of Paper 
Development of a Template Safety Case for Unmanned Aircraft Operations Over 
Populous Areas 
Authors Reece Clothier, Brendan Williams, Achim Washington 
Conference 
SAE International AeroTech Congress & Exhibition (SAE 2015, Seattle, USA), 
22-24 September 2015  
Status Published in proceedings (full paper peer reviewed) 
Link http://papers.sae.org/2015-01-2469/  
Title of Paper 
Challenges to the development of an airworthiness regulatory framework for 
unmanned aircraft systems 
Authors 
Reece Clothier, Brendan Williams, James Coyne, Mark Wade, Achim 
Washington 
Conference 
16th Australian International Aerospace Congress (AIAC16), Barton, ACT, 
Australia, 24-26 February 2015 
Status Published in proceedings (full paper peer reviewed) 
Link https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/212667555?q&versionId=233541550  
Title of Paper 
Practical Considerations in the Design of an Obstacle Detection, Mapping and 
Path Planning System for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Authors Achim Washington, Willem van Deventer, Reece Clothier  
Journal International Journal of Unmanned Systems Engineering (IJUSEng) 
Status Published  
Link 
https://search.proquest.com/openview/102213a14896b7e1e89358043ddcc4de/1
?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=2032535  
Table 13: Supporting industry presentations 
Title of 
Presentation  
Accounting for Uncertainty in System Safety Assessments 
Authors Dr Reece Clothier, Mr Achim Washington, Mr Brendan Williams, Ms Kelly Cox 
Conference 
DGTA System Safety and Software Conference, Sept, RAAF Laverton, 
Melbourne, Australia. 
Status Presented on 11th September 2016 
Title of 
Presentation 
Higher Level Treatment of Uncertainty in Aviation Risk Management with 
Applications to the Regulation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Authors Mr Achim Washington, Dr Reece Clothier 
Conference NASA Langley Research Centre, Virginia 
Status Presented on 2nd November 2016 
Title of 
Presentation 
Risk-based Regulation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Authors Mr Achim Washington, Dr Reece Clothier, Dr Jose Silva 
Conference Australian System Safety Conference 2019 (ASSC 2019) 
Status Presented on 24th May 2019 
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9.2. Appendix B: Definition of Authorship 
In accordance with the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research, authorship is 
defined as being based on substantial contributions in a combination of:  
i. Conception and design of the project; 
ii. Analysis and interpretation of research data; 
iii. Drafting significant parts of a work, or 
iv. Critically revising it so as to contribute to the interpretation. 
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9.3. Appendix C: Reference Tables for Literature Review 
Table 14: Definitions of risk 
S. No. Definition Source 
 Probability Based Risk Definitions  
1 Risk is defined as the possibility that human actions or events lead to consequences that harm aspects of things that human beings value. [107] 
2 Possibility of loss, injury, disadvantage or destruction; to expose to hazard or danger; to incur risk of danger. [82] 
3 Probability of an adverse event amplified or attenuated by degrees of trust, acceptance of liability and/or share of benefit. [82] 
4 Risk is the combination of the probability of an event and its consequences. [145] 
5 Risk is a measure of the probability and severity of adverse effects. [51] 
6 
Risk “is” the set of triplets. R= {<𝑠𝑖 , 𝑝𝑖 . 𝑐𝑖>}, where si is a scenario identification or description; pi is the probability of that scenario; and xi is the consequence or 
evaluation measure of that scenario, i.e., the measure of damage.  
[38] 
7 Combination of the likelihood of harm and the severity of that harm. [42] 
8 A combination of the severity of the mishap and the probability that the mishap will occur [47] 
9 More common today is the definition of risk as the probability of occurrence for an undesirable outcome.  [52] 
10 
The defining of risk as the product of probability and consequence magnitude is slightly more common than the defining of risk as probability or as magnitude of 
consequence. 
[52] 
11 
A combination of the likelihood of a hazard occurring and the severity of the accident that could result; e.g. the higher the risk, the more likely the accident will occur 
and/or the more severe will be the consequence. 
[31] 
12 
Safety risk is defined as the assessment, expressed in terms of predicted probability and severity, of the consequences of a hazard, taking as reference the worst 
foreseeable situation. 
[25] 
13 The composite of predicted severity and likelihood of the potential effect of a hazard. [26] 
14 
The chance of something happening that will have an impact on objectives. A risk is often specified in terms of an event or circumstance and any consequence that 
might flow from it. Risk is measured in terms of a combination of the consequences of an event, and its likelihood. Risk can have a positive or negative impact.  
[27], [28] 
15 The combination of the likelihood and severity that is associated with a non-compliance as part of the certification basis. [32] 
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S. No. Definition Source 
Uncertainty Based Risk Definitions 
1 The notion of risk involves some kind of loss or damage that might be received by a target and the uncertainty of its transformation in an actual loss or damage. [49], [83] 
2 
Risk should be associated with a system and commonly defined as the potential loss resulting from an uncertain exposure to a hazard or resulting from an uncertain 
event that exploits the system’s vulnerability 
[34] 
3 Effect of uncertainty on objectives [146] 
4 A measure of uncertainty of an event happening times the severity of the outcome. [77] 
5 The notion of risk involves both uncertainty and some kind of loss or damage that might be received. Risk = uncertainty + damage [38] 
6 
Risk is defined as, uncertainty of outcome, whether positive opportunity or negative threat, of actions and events. It is the combination of likelihood and impact, 
including perceived importance. 
[147] 
7 An uncertain consequence of an event or an activity with respect to something that humans value [148] 
8 Risk is equal to the two-dimensional combination of events/ consequences and associated uncertainties. [149] 
9 Risk is uncertainty about and severity of the consequences (or outcomes) of an activity with respect to something that humans value. [150] 
10 
Risk is, at minimum, a two-dimensional concept involving (1) the possibility of an adverse outcome, and (2) uncertainty over the occurrence, timing, or magnitude 
of that adverse outcome. If either attribute is absent, then there is no risk. 
[52] 
11 
A characteristic of a situation or action wherein two or more outcomes are possible, the particular outcome that will occur is unknown, and at least one of the 
possibilities is undesired 
[52] 
12 Risk is the future impact of a hazard that is not controlled or eliminated. It can be viewed as future uncertainty created by the hazard [40] 
13 Effect of uncertainty on objectives  [121] 
S. No. Definition Source 
Other Risk Definitions 
1 Risks are the occurrence likelihood and occurrence consequences of an event. [34] 
2 Risk is a threat (or opportunity) that could affect adversely (or favourably) achievement of the objectives of a project and its outcomes.  [34] 
3 Risk can be defined as the expected value of harm.  [62] 
4 Risk refers to situations with objective probabilities for the randomness the decision-maker is faced with. [151] 
5 Risk has been defined as, the chance that someone or something that is valued will be adversely affected in a stipulated way by the hazard.  [65] 
7 Risk is a combination of the consequences of an event, including changes in circumstances, and the associated likelihood of occurrence. [34] 
8 Risk is “the combination of the likelihood of harm and the severity of that harm.  [42] 
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Table 15: Measuring risk 
S. No. Equation Description Ref. 
1 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = (𝐶1,𝑃1), (𝐶2, 𝑃2), … , (𝐶𝑛, 𝑃𝑛) 
C 
P 
: 
: 
Consequence 
Probability 
[86] 
2 𝑅 = 𝑆 × 𝑃 
R 
S 
P 
: 
: 
: 
Risk 
Severity of harm 
Likelihood of occurrence of that harm 
[53] 
3 𝑅 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝐶𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
R 
P 
C 
n 
: 
: 
: 
: 
Risk 
Probability the event will occur 
Potential consequence 
Number of events 
[109] 
4 R = {< 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑝𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖 >},  where i = 1, 2, 3… N 
R 
{} 
si 
pi 
 
xi 
 
: 
: 
: 
: 
 
: 
 
Risk 
Set 
Scenario identification 
Probability of the scenario measuring the likelihood 
of it happening 
Consequence or evaluation measure of that scenario 
[38] 
5 R = {< 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑝𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖 >}, where i = 1, 2, 3… N+1 
R 
{} 
si 
pi 
 
xi 
 
: 
: 
: 
: 
 
: 
 
Risk 
Set 
Scenario identification 
Probability of the scenario measuring the likelihood 
of it happening 
Consequence of evaluation measure of that scenario 
[38] 
6 𝑅 = {< 𝑠𝑖  , 𝑝𝑖(∅𝑖  , 𝑥𝑖) >}, where i = 1, 2, 3… N+! 
si 
Øi 
 
xi 
 
pi (Øi, xi) 
: 
: 
 
: 
 
: 
Scenario identification 
Measure of frequency with which the proposed 
scenario occurs 
Consequence of evaluation measure of that scenario 
Probability curve which takes the uncertainty about 
the actual value of Øi and the damage xi into 
account  
[38] 
  
 
© Copyright Achim Washington 2019  96 
 
7 Risk ≡ {(l1, o1, u1, cs1, po1), (l2, o2, u2, cs2, po2), … , (ln, on, un, csn, pon)}   
l 
o 
u 
cs 
po 
n 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
Likelihood 
Outcome 
Utility (or significance) 
Causal scenario 
Population affected by the outcome 
Number of outcomes 
[34] 
8 Risk = (A, C, Pf) 
A 
C 
Pf 
 
: 
: 
: 
 
Activity  
Consequence 
Frequency interpreted probability of the event (A) 
occurring per unit of time 
[110] 
9 Risk = (A, C, Pf
∗, U (Pf
∗), K) 
A 
C 
Pf* 
U(Pf*) 
K 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
Activity 
Consequence 
Estimate of Pf 
Uncertainty description of Pf* relative to Pf 
Background knowledge 
[110] 
10 Risk = (A, C, Pf
∗, P (Pf), K) 
A 
C 
Pf* 
P(Pf) 
K 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
Activity 
Consequence 
Estimate of Pf 
subjective probabilities4 P used to express 
uncertainties about Pf Background knowledge 
[110] 
11 Risk = (A, C, Pf
∗, C (Pf), K) 
A 
C 
Pf* 
C(Pf) 
K 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
Activity 
Consequence 
Estimate of Pf 
Traditional confidence interval for Pf 
Background knowledge 
[110] 
12 Risk = (A, C, U) 
A 
C 
U 
: 
: 
: 
Event 
Consequence  
Uncertainty 
 
13 Risk = (A, C, U, P, K) 
A 
C 
U 
P 
K 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
Event 
Consequence  
Uncertainty in the risk description 
Subjective probability expressing U based on K  
Background knowledge 
[110] 
                                                     
4 a subjective probability is a measure of uncertainty seen through the eyes of the assessor 
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Table 16: Common definitions of the safety risk management process 
S. No. Definition Ref. 
1 A decision-making process designed to systematically identify hazards, assess the degree of risk, and 
determine the best course of action. 
[40] 
2 A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures, 
accountabilities, policies and procedures. 
[13] 
3 Safety risk management encompasses the assessment and mitigation of safety risks. The objective of 
safety risk management is to assess the risks associated with identified hazards and develop and 
implement effective and appropriate mitigations. Safety risk management is therefore a key component 
of the safety management process at both the State and product/service provider level. 
[122] 
4 Safety risk management is a careful examination of what, in your work, could cause harm, so that you 
can weigh up whether you have taken enough precautions, or should do more to prevent harm. 
[66] 
5 The process of ensuring that hazards and potential accidents are identified and managed. [42] 
6 The process of reducing the risks to a level deemed acceptable by society. [107] 
7 The systematic application of management and engineering principles. [48] 
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9.4. Appendix D: Bayesian Analysis – Concepts and Tools 
This section looks to describe some of the concepts and tools that will be used in the individual chapters 
to take the identified sources of uncertainty into consideration. This review is only meant as a high-
level description of these concepts and tools. For further details on these concepts and tools and how 
they have been applied in the context of this thesis, the reader is directed to the individual references 
and chapters.  
9.4.1. Bayes Theorem 
In probability theory and statistics, it is often required to calculate the probability of an event given that 
another event has occurred at some prior point in time [71]. Bayes’ Theorem describes the probability 
of this event arising, given some prior data and information in relation to the event. It is based on 
conditional probabilities and along with the concept of subjective probabilities, forms the basis of 
Bayesian inference [71], [85], [152]. Bayesian inference itself is commonly used in PRA, which is 
fundamental to the research undertaken as part of this thesis. 
According to Bayes’ Theorem, for a sequence of disjoint events (e.g. A1, A2, …, An) and any 
other given event (e.g. B) where the probability of that event is greater than zero (i.e. Pr(B) > 0), the 
posterior probability is equal to the likelihood probability of the observation times the prior probability 
divided by the normalisation constant [71]. This is described mathematically in Equation (1) below 
(based on [71], [85]): 
𝑃(𝐴𝑖|𝐵) =
𝑃(𝐵 | 𝐴𝑖) × 𝑃(𝐴𝑖)
𝑃(𝐵)
 (1) 
Here P(Ai|B) is the posterior (or posteriori) probability for the event Ai; P(Ai) is the prior (or a 
priori) probability of the event Ai before experimentation or observation; P(B|Ai) is the probability of 
the observation given Ai is true; and P(B) is the normalisation constant, which for disjoint events and 
discrete probability distributions can be calculated using Equation (2): 
𝑃(𝐵) =  ∑ 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴𝑗) × 𝑃(𝐴𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=1
 (2) 
While Equation (1) pertains to disjoint discrete events and discrete probability distributions, it 
cannot be directly applied to continuous probability distribution functions that are often used in many 
real-world applications. An analogous form of this equation is used for this application as outlined in 
Equation (3), based on [71].     
𝑝(𝜆𝑛|𝐷, 𝐼) =
𝑝(𝐷 | 𝜆𝑛, 𝐼) × 𝑝(𝜆𝑛|𝐼)
𝑃(𝐷|𝐼)
 (3) 
 Here p(λn|D,I) corresponds to the posterior distribution and it describes the uncertainty in the 
parameter of interest (λn) based on the prior state of knowledge and new evidence provided by D. 
p(D|λn,I) corresponds to the likelihood distribution and represents the aleatory uncertainty in the model. 
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p(λn|I) corresponds to the prior distribution and describes the uncertainty in our current state of 
knowledge; the model parameter (epistemic uncertainty), based on previous information, I. Finally, 
P(D|I) corresponds to the normalisation factor and is the marginal or unconditional probability of 
observing the data, D. It is important here to note that, with the exception of the normalisation factor, 
all the other components are probability distributions as is evident from the nomenclature adopted.  
 Different probability distribution functions can be used for both the prior and likelihood 
distributions. In terms of the likelihood distribution, a range of distributions including the Poisson 
distribution, Exponential distribution, Gamma distribution and Weibull distribution can be used [52]. 
For a complete list of distributions and corresponding details the reader is directed to [52]. The choice 
of likelihood distribution is dependent on the data and the fundamental physical phenomenon being 
observed, hence it is conditioned on the implicit information, I. The choice of prior distribution can 
again vary significantly, with the distributions generally divided into two broad categories, informative 
and non-informative [71]. The prior distribution can be any distribution that best represents the state of 
knowledge and is dependent on the assessor. Conjugate priors can also often be used to represent the 
prior distributions. This negates the need for complex numerical integrations [71], [85]. Conjugate 
priors only exist when the observation distribution comes from the exponential family and they take the 
same functional form as the likelihood of the observation distribution [85]. There are a number of 
limitations associated with the use of conjugate priors, for details the reader is directed to [85]. It is 
important to note that a number of different software packages and tools were used throughout this 
thesis to conduct the Bayesian analysis, including: MATLAB, AgenaRisk and OpenBUGS. Hence, the 
choice of prior distribution did not need to be limited to a conjugate prior. Chapter 4 provides an 
example case study where a conjugate prior is used as part of the Bayesian analysis undertaken. The 
mathematics in relation to this are also explored in this chapter. For further details on the choice of 
conjugate priors and the challenges associated with them, the reader is directed to [71], [85], [153]–
[156]. While additional information on the choice of distributions is provided in the individual chapters 
of this thesis, this has not been explored in detail as it is beyond the scope of the thesis.  
9.4.2.  Bayesian Credible Intervals and Bayesian Hypothesis Testing 
From the preceding discussion, it is evident that the output from the Bayesian analysis process is a 
probability distribution representing the uncertainty about the parameter of interest (posterior 
distribution). Given this output, a number of additional tools and techniques can be used to infer further 
information from the outputs. Two types of inferences that are of interest are interval estimation and 
hypothesis testing. These inferences will be briefly outlined below, describing both the Frequentist and 
Bayesian approaches associated with them.   
In terms of interval estimation, the interval that has a predetermined probability of containing 
the parameter needs to be determined [85]. Under the Frequentist interpretation, a traditional confidence 
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interval is used. This is based on the sampling distributions of the statistic, i.e. how it varies over all 
possible samples [85]. These probabilities are not conditional on the actual sample that did occur [85]. 
The limitations of this approach are discussed in Ref. [85]. Under the Bayesian interpretation, Bayesian 
Credible Intervals are used. This makes use of the posterior distribution output from the Bayesian 
analysis process and has a direct (degree of belief) probability interpretation conditional on the observed 
sample data [85]. This provides more valuable information to the assessor, based upon which decisions 
can be made. This approach is used throughout the thesis, particularly in Chapter 4 where the Bayesian 
Credible Intervals are used to provide additional outputs from the SSA process to support a Level 5 
treatment of uncertainty.      
In terms of hypothesis testing (one-sided hypothesis test), we wish to provide a means of 
making claims that are justified by data. Two alternate hypotheses (null hypothesis and the alternative 
hypothesis) are described, that try to explain the discrepancy between the observed data and what would 
be expected under the null hypothesis [85]. Under the Frequentist approach the probability of the data 
given the null hypothesis is true is calculated. This is then compared to the threshold level (level of 
significance) and if it is below this level, the null hypothesis is rejected at that level of significance, and 
if it is more than the threshold level (level of significance) then it is accepted at that level of significance. 
Under the Bayesian approach the additional data and information that is provided as part of the posterior 
distribution is used to provide more informed decisions. The posterior probability of the null hypothesis 
being true is calculated by integrating over the correct regions (i.e. from zero to the threshold level). 
The null hypothesis is rejected if the posterior probability is less than the level of significance. This 
Bayesian approach is used throughout the thesis, particularly in Chapter 4 to Chapter 6, to support the 
risk-based approach to CA. This in turn allows for compliance findings to be made based on compliance 
risk, thus helping support the overall aims and objectives of this thesis. For further details the reader is 
directed to Ref. [85] and the individual chapters of this thesis. 
9.4.3. Bayesian Belief Networks 
BBN are graphical structures that make use of probabilistic reasoning to ascertain information about 
the unknown [157] and are beneficial when expert opinion is ambiguous, incomplete or uncertain [158]. 
There are two elements characteristic of any BBN, namely, the directed graphs and the node probability 
tables (NPT). The directed graphs comprise of two sub elements, the nodes (circles in Figure 15) which 
describe the variables of interest and the arcs (arrows in Figure 15) which represent the direct 
dependencies between the nodes. The nodes correspond to the variables and the arcs link directly 
dependent variables [152]. Looking at Figure 15 (a), an arc between any two nodes (e.g. node X to node 
Y) encodes an assumption that there is a direct causal or influential dependence of node X on node Y. 
Based on this, node X is then said to be a parent of node Y. It is important to note here that there are no 
cycles in the graph (so, for example, if we have an arc from X to Y and from Y to Z, then we cannot 
have an arc from Z to X). This avoids circular reasoning [152] and is important to take into consideration 
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while developing a BBN. Each node of the BBN has an associated probability table, called the NPT. 
This is the probability distribution of the node (e.g. node Y in Figure 15 (a)) given the set of parents of 
the node (e.g. node X in  Figure 15 (a)). For a node without parents (e.g. node X in Figure 15 (a)) also 
called a root node, the NPT of the node is simply the probability distribution of that node. It is important 
here to note that, when dealing with real-world risk applications, the nodes are numeric (discrete or 
continuous) and hence a range of pre-defined mathematical and statistical functions can be used instead 
of having to manually define the NPT [152].  
From the preceding discussion, it was made evident that the arcs represent the causal or influential 
dependencies between the nodes. As such, the direction of the arrows/edges is of utmost importance. 
The arc directions should always be in the direction of cause to effect rather than in the direction implied 
by the deductions one might wish to make [152]. However, it is important to note that taking the latter 
approach does not necessarily lead to an invalid BBN. The process of determining what evidence will 
update which node is determined by the conditional dependency structure [152], examples for which 
are outlined in Figure 15 (a), (b) and (c). For more details on this, the reader is directed to Ref. [152]. 
 
Figure 15: Structural properties of BBNs showing different conditional dependencies 
For a BBN consisting of n variables A1, A2, …, An, the full joint probability distribution can be 
represented using the chain rule as described in  [152] and represented in Equation (4). 
 (4) 
                                           
This may however prove to be overly complex, especially for larger networks and can thus be 
simplified using the knowledge of the parents for each node. Representing the parents for the node Ai 
as Parents(Ai) the full joint probability distribution of the BBN can be simplified as described in Ref. 
[152] and shown in Equation (5) below. 
 
(5) 
In the context of this thesis, BBNs have been used in Chapter 6 to allow for additional sources 
of uncertainty associated with the remaining outputs of the SSA process to be taken into consideration. 
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For further details, the reader is directed to the individual chapter. It is important to note that while the 
BBN provide a means of capturing both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties associated with the system, 
there is still the concern of the uncertainties associated with the limited data available on the system. 
The less the data, the more the uncertainty that the sample mean and variance is actually representative 
of the population. This has the tendency to propagate, especially when multiplying distributions (as is 
done in the developed BBN) and this introduces further uncertainty in the output. The BBN allows this 
output to be updated as new data and information is gathered and this consequently addresses some of 
this uncertainty. Future research efforts will look to provide a means of capturing this data uncertainty 
in the model, thus allowing for more statistically significant results. At this point it is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, however it marks another potential area for future research. For further information on 
propagation of uncertainty, the reader is directed to [159]–[161]. 
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